Anabasis

On the fourth day they proceeded to descend into the plain. But when Tissaphernes and his command overtook them, necessity taught them to encamp in the first village they caught sight of, and not to continue the plan of marching and fighting at the same time; for a large number of the Greeks were hors de combat, not only the wounded, but also those who were carrying them and the men who took in charge the arms of these carriers.

When they had encamped, and the barbarians, approaching toward the village, essayed to attack them at long range, the Greeks had much the better of it; for to occupy a position and therefrom ward off an attack was a very different thing from being on the march and fighting with the enemy as they followed after.

As soon as it came to be late in the afternoon, it was time for the enemy to withdraw. For in no instance did the barbarians encamp at a distance of less than sixty stadia from the Greek camp, out of fear that the Greeks might attack them during the night.

For a Persian army at night is a sorry thing. Their horses are tethered, and usually hobbled also to prevent their running away if they get loose from the tether, and hence in case of any alarm a Persian has to put saddle-cloth and bridle on his horse, and then has also to put on his own breastplate and mount his horse—and all these things are difficult at night and in the midst of confusion. It was for this reason that the Persians encamped at a considerable distance from the Greeks.

When the Greeks became aware that they were desirous of withdrawing and were passing the word along, the order to pack up luggage was proclaimed to the Greek troops within hearing of the enemy. For a time the barbarians delayed their setting out, but when it began to grow late, they went off; for they thought it did not pay to be on the march and arriving at their camp in the night.

When the Greeks saw at length that they were manifestly departing, they broke camp and took the road themselves, and accomplished a march of no less than sixty stadia. Thus the two armies got so far apart that on the next day the enemy did not appear, nor yet on the third; on the fourth day, however, after pushing forward by night the barbarians occupied a high position on the right of the road by which the Greeks were to pass, a spur of the mountain, namely, along the base of which ran the route leading down into the plain.

As soon as Cheirisophus observed that the spur was already occupied, he summoned Xenophon from the rear, directing him to come to the front and bring the peltasts with him.

Xenophon, however, would not bring the peltasts, for he could see Tissaphernes and his whole army coming into view;[*](i.e. from the rear.) but he rode forward himself and asked, Why are you summoning me? Cheirisophus replied, It is perfectly evident; the hill overhanging our downward road has been occupied, and there is no getting by unless we dislodge these people.

Why did you not bring the peltasts? Xenophon answered that he had not thought it best to leave the rear unprotected when hostile troops were coming into sight. Well, at any rate, said Cheirisophus, it is high time to be thinking how we are to drive these fellows from the height.

Then Xenophon observed that the summit of the mountain was close above their own army and that from this summit there was a way of approach to the hill where the enemy were; and he said, Our best plan, Cheirisophus, is to drive with all speed for the mountain top; for if we once get possession of that, those men above our road will not be able to hold their position. If you choose, then, stay in command of the army, and I will go; or, if you prefer, you make for the mountain top, and I will stay here.

Well, said Cheirisophus, I leave it to you to choose whichever part you wish. Then Xenophon, with the remark that he was the younger, elected to go, but he urged Cheirisophus to send with him some troops from the front; for it would have been too long a journey to bring up men from the rear.

Cheirisophus accordingly sent with him the peltasts at the front, replacing them with those that were inside the square; he also ordered the three hundred picked men[*](See Xen. Anab. 3.4.21 above and note 2 thereon.) under his own command at the front of the square to join Xenophon’s force.

Then they set out with all possible speed. But no sooner had the enemy upon the hill observed their dash for the summit of the mountain than they also set off, to race with the Greeks for this summit.

Then there was a deal of shouting from the Greek army as they urged on their friends, and just as much shouting from Tissaphernes’ troops to urge on their men.

And Xenophon, riding along the lines upon his horse, cheered his troops forward: My good men, he said, believe that now you are racing for Greece, racing this very hour back to your wives and children, a little toil for this one moment and no more fighting for the rest of our journey.

But Soteridas the Sicyonian said: We are not on an equality, Xenophon; you are riding on horseback, while I am desperately tired with carrying my shield.

When Xenophon heard that, he leaped down from his horse and pushed Soteridas out of his place in the line, then took his shield away from him and marched on with it as fast as he could; he had on also, as it happened, his cavalry breastplate, and the result was that he was heavily burdened. And he urged the men in front of him to keep going, while he told those who were behind to pass along by him, for he found it hard to keep up.

The rest of the soldiers, however, struck and pelted and abused Soteridas until they forced him to take back his shield and march on. Then Xenophon remounted, and as long as riding was possible, led the way on horseback, but when the ground became too difficult, he left his horse behind and hurried forward on foot. And they reached the summit before the enemy.