Memorabilia

Xenophon

Xenophon in Seven Volumes Vol 4; Marchant, E. C. (Edgar Cardew), 1864-1960, translator; Marchant, E. C. (Edgar Cardew), 1864-1960, editor

And is it not likely that self-control causes actions the opposite of those that are due to incontinence?Certainly.Then is not the cause of the opposite actions presumably a very great blessing?Yes, presumably.Consequently we may presume, Euthydemus, that self-control is a very great blessing to a man?We may presume so, Socrates.

Has it ever occurred to you, Euthydemus — ?What?That though pleasure is the one and only goal to which incontinence is thought to lead men, she herself cannot bring them to it, whereas nothing produces pleasure so surely as self-control?How so?Incontinence will not let them endure hunger or thirst or desire or lack of sleep, which are the sole causes of pleasure in eating and drinking and sexual indulgence, and in resting and sleeping, after a time of waiting and resistance until the moment comes when these will give the greatest possible satisfaction; and thus she prevents them from experiencing any pleasure worthy to be mentioned in the most elementary and recurrent forms of enjoyment. But self-control alone causes them to endure the sufferings I have named, and therefore she alone causes them to experience any pleasure worth mentioning in such enjoyments.What you say is entirely true.

Moreover, the delights of learning something good and excellent, and of studying some of the means whereby a man knows how to regulate his body well and manage his household successfully, to be useful to his friends and city and to defeat his enemies — knowledge that yields not only very great benefits but very great pleasures — these are the delights of the self-controlled; but the incontinent have no part in them. For who, should we say, has less concern with these than he who has no power of cultivating them because all his serious purposes are centred in the pleasures that lie nearest?

Socrates, said Euthydemus, I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form.Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil.

And thus, he said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in discussion. The very word discussion, according to him, owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation,[*](The etymological point, διαλέγω, classify, implying διαλέγομαι, discuss, is lost in the English.) sorting, discussing things after their kind: and therefore one should be ready and prepared for this and be zealous for it; for it makes for excellence, leadership and skill in discussion.

I will try also to show how he encouraged his companions to become skilled in discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also expound it to others; on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. For this reason he never gave up considering with his companions what any given thing is.To go through all his definitions would be an arduous task. I will say only enough to indicate his method of analysis.

His analysis of Piety — to take that first — was more or less as follows:Tell me, Euthydemus, what sort of thing is Piety, in your opinion?A very excellent thing, to be sure, he replied.Can you say what sort of man is pious?He who worships the gods, I think.May a man worship the gods according to his own will and pleasure?No, there are laws to be observed in worshipping the gods!

Then will not he who knows these laws know how he must worship the gods?I think so.Then does he who knows how he must worship the gods think that he must do so according to his knowledge, and not otherwise?He does indeed.And does everyone worship the gods as he thinks he ought, and not otherwise?I think so.

Then will he who knows what is lawful about the gods worship the gods lawfully?Certainly.Then does not he who worships lawfully worship as he ought?Of course.Yes, but he who worships as he ought is pious?Certainly.Shall we therefore rightly define the pious man as one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods?I at any rate think so.

In dealing with men, again, may one do as one chooses?No, in the case of men too there are laws of conduct.Then do not those who observe them in their dealings with one another behave as they ought?Of course.And do not they who behave as they ought behave well?Certainly.And do not they who behave well towards men act well in human affairs?Presumably.And do not those who obey the laws do what is just?Certainly.