Memorabilia

When chairman in the Assemblies he would not permit the people to record an illegal vote, but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself.

And when the Thirty laid a command on him that was illegal, he refused to obey. Thus he disregarded their repeated injunction not to talk with young men; and when they commanded him and certain other citizens to arrest a man on a capital charge, he alone refused, because the command laid on him was illegal.[*](Alluding to the famous case of Leon.)

Again, when he was tried on the charge brought by Meletus, whereas it is the custom of defendants to curry favour with the jury and to indulge in flattery and illegal appeals, and many by such means have been known to gain a verdict of acquittal, he rejected utterly the familiar chicanery of the courts; and though he might easily have gained a favourable verdict by even a moderate indulgence in such stratagems, he chose to die through his loyalty to the laws rather than to live through violating them.

Such views frequently found expression in his conversations with different persons; I recollect the substance of one that he had with Hippias of Elis concerning Justice. Hippias, who had not been in Athens for a considerable time, found Socrates talking: he was saying that if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn the craft: some indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he should go, teachers abound. And yet, strangely enough, if you want to learn Justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where to go for a teacher.

When Hippias heard this, How now? he cried in a tone of raillery, still the same old sentiments, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?Yes, Hippias, he replied, always the same, and — what is more astonishing — on the same topics too! You are so learned that I daresay you never say the same thing on the same subjects.I certainly try to say something fresh every time.Do you mean, about what you know?

For example, in answer to the question, How many letters are there in Socrates and how do you spell it? do you try to say something different now from what you said before? Or take figures: suppose you are asked if twice five are ten, don’t you give the same answer now as you gave before?About letters and figures, Socrates, I always say the same thing, just like you. As for Justice, I feel confident that I can now say that which neither you nor anyone else can contradict.

Upon my word, you mean to say that you have made a great discovery, if jurymen are to cease from voting different ways, citizens from disputing and litigation, and wrangling about the justice of their claims, cities from quarrelling about their rights and making war; and for my part, I don’t see how to tear myself away from you till I have heard about your great discovery.

But I vow you shall not hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of Justice; for it’s enough that you mock at others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything.Indeed, Hippias!

Haven’t you noticed that I never cease to declare my notions of what is just?And how can you call that an account?I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don’t you think that deeds are better evidence than words?Yes, much better, of course; for many say what is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does what is just can be unjust.

Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury or calumny, or stirring up strife between friends or fellow-citizens, or doing any other unjust act?I have not.To abstain from what is unjust is just, don’t you think?Even now, Socrates, you are clearly endeavouring to avoid stating what you think Justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they don’t do.

Well, I thought that unwillingness to do injustice was sufficient proof of Justice. But, if you don’t think so, see whether you like this better: I say that what is lawful is just.[*](Cyropaedia I. iii. 17.)Do you mean, Socrates, that lawful and just are the same thing?I do.

Because I don’t see what you mean by lawful or what you mean by just.Does the expression laws of a state convey a meaning to you?It does.And what do you think they are?Covenants made by the citizens whereby they have enacted what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided.Then would not that citizen who acts in accordance with these act lawfully, and he who transgresses them act unlawfully?Yes, certainly.And would not he who obeys them do what is just, and he who disobeys them do what is unjust?Certainly.Then would not he who does what is just be just, and he who does what is unjust be unjust?Of course.Consequently he who acts lawfully is just, and he who acts unlawfully is unjust.