Memorabilia

Surely, Euthydemus, you don’t covet the kind of excellence that makes good statesmen and managers, competent rulers and benefactors of themselves and mankind in general?Yes, I do, Socrates, answered Euthydemus, that kind of excellence I greatly desire.Why, cried Socrates, it is the noblest kind of excellence, the greatest of arts that you covet, for it belongs to kings and is dubbed kingly. However, he added, have you reflected whether it be possible to excel in these matters without being a just man?Yes, certainly; and it is, in fact, impossible to be a good citizen without justice.

Then tell me, have you got that?Yes, Socrates, I think I can show myself to be as just as any man.And have just men, like carpenters, their works?Yes, they have.And as carpenters can point out their works, should just men be able to rehearse theirs?Do you suppose, retorted Euthydemus, that I am unable to rehearse the works of justice? Of course I can, — and the works of injustice too, since there are many opportunities of seeing and hearing of them every day.

I propose, then, that we write J in this column and I in that, and then proceed to place under these letters, J and I, what we take to be the works of justice and injustice respectively.Do so, if you think it helps at all.Having written down the letters as he proposed, Socrates went on:

Lying occurs among men, does it not?Yes, it does.Under which heading, then, are we to put that?Under the heading of injustice, clearly.Deceit, too, is found, is it not?Certainly.Under which heading will that go?Under injustice again, of course.What about doing mischief?That too.Selling into slavery?That too.Then we shall assign none of these things to justice, Euthydemus?No, it would be monstrous to do so.

Now suppose a man who has been elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile city, shall we say that he acts unjustly?Oh no!We shall say that his actions are just, shall we not?Certainly.And what if he deceives the enemy when at war?[*](Cyropaedia I, vi. 31, VI. i. 55.)That too is just.And if he steals and plunders their goods, will not his actions be just?Certainly; but at first I assumed that your questions had reference only to friends.Then everything that we assigned to injustice should be assigned to justice also?Apparently.

Then I propose to revise our classification, and to say: It is just to do such things to enemies, but it is unjust to do them to friends, towards whom one’s conduct should be scrupulously honest.By all means.

Now suppose that a general, seeing that his army is downhearted, tells a lie and says that reinforcements are approaching, and by means of this lie checks discouragement among the men, under which heading shall we put this deception?Under justice, I think.Suppose, again, that a man’s son refuses to take a dose of medicine when he needs it, and the father induces him to take it by pretending that it is food, and cures him by means of this lie, where shall we put this deception?That too goes on the same side, I think.And again, suppose one has a friend suffering from depression, and, for fear that he may make away with himself, one takes away his sword or something of the sort, under which heading shall we put that now?That too goes under justice, of course.

You mean, do you, that even with friends straightforward dealing is not invariably right?It isn’t, indeed! I retract what I said before, if you will let me.Why, I’m bound to let you; it’s far better than getting our lists wrong.

But now, consider deception practised on friends to their detriment: we mustn’t overlook that either. Which is the more unjust deception in that case, the intentional or unintentional?Nay, Socrates, I have lost all confidence in my answers; for all the opinions that I expressed before seem now to have taken an entirely different form. Still I venture to say that the intentional deception is more unjust than the unintentional.

Do you think there is a doctrine and science of the just, as there is of letters?Yes.Which, in your judgment, is the more literate, the man who intentionally blunders in writing and reading, or the man who blunders unintentionally?The one who blunders intentionally, I presume; for he can always be accurate when he chooses.May we not say, then, that the intentional blunderer is literate and the unintentional is illiterate?Indeed we must.And which knows what is just, the intentional liar and deceiver, or the unintentional?The intentional, clearly.You say, then, as I understand, that he who knows letters is more literate than he who is ignorant of them?YesAnd he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know?Apparently; but here again I don’t feel sure of my own meaning.

Now come, what do you think of the man who wants to tell the truth, but never sticks to what he says; when he shows you the way, tells you first that the road runs east, then that it runs west; and when he casts up figures, makes the total now larger, now smaller?Why, I think he shows that he doesn’t know what he thought he knew.

Are you aware that some people are called slavish?Yes.To what do they owe the name, to knowledge or to ignorance?To ignorance, obviously.To ignorance of the smiths’ trade, shall we say?Certainly not.Ignorance of carpentry perhaps?No, not to that either.Of cobbling?No, to none of these: on the contrary, those who are skilled in such trades are for the most part slavish.Then is this name given to those who are ignorant of the beautiful and good and just?That is my opinion.

Then we must strain every nerve to escape being slaves.Upon my word, Socrates, I did feel confident that I was a student of a philosophy that would provide me with the best education in all things needful to one who would be a gentleman. But you can imagine my dismay when I realise that in spite of all my pains I am even incapable of answering a question about things that one is bound to know, and yet find no other way that will lead to my improvement.Hereupon Socrates exclaimed:

Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?Yes, certainly; twice.Then did you notice somewhere on the temple the inscription Know thyself?I did.And did you pay no heed to the inscription, or did you attend to it and try to consider who you were?Indeed I did not; because I felt sure that I knew that already; for I could hardly know anything else if I did not even know myself.

And what do you suppose a man must know to know himself, his own name merely? Or must he consider what sort of a creature he is for human use and get to know his own powers; just as those who buy horses don’t think that they know the beast they want to know until they have considered whether he is docile or stubborn, strong or weak, fast or slow, and generally how he stands in all that makes a useful or a useless horse?That leads me to think that he who does not know his own powers is ignorant of himself.

Is it not clear too that through self-knowledge men come to much good, and through self-deception to much harm? For those who know themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand, they get what they want and prosper: by refraining from attempting what they do not understand, they make no mistakes and avoid failure. And consequently through their power of testing other men too, and through their intercourse with others, they get what is good and shun what is bad.

Those who do not know and are deceived in their estimate of their own powers, are in the like condition with regard to other men and other human affairs. They know neither what they want, nor what they do, nor those with whom they have intercourse; but mistaken in all these respects, they miss the good and stumble into the bad.

Furthermore, those who know what they do win fame and honour by attaining their ends. Their equals are glad to have dealings with them; and those who miss their objects look to them for counsel, look to them for protection, rest on them their hopes of better things, and for all these reasons love them above all other men.