Memorabilia

Tell me, Pericles, he said, can you teach me what a law is? Certainly, he replied.Then pray teach me. For whenever I hear men praised for keeping the laws, it occurs to me that no one can really deserve that praise who does not know what a law is.

Well, Alcibiades, there is no great difficulty about what you desire. You wish to know what a law is. Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done.Do they suppose it is right to do good or evil?Good, of course, young man, — not evil.

But if, as happens under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet and enact rules of conduct, what are these?Whatsoever the sovereign power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and directs to be done is known as a law.If, then, a despot, being the sovereign power, enacts what the citizens are to do, are his orders also a law?Yes, whatever a despot as ruler enacts is also known as a law.

But force, the negation of law, what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not by persuasion, but by force?That is my opinion.Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without persuasion, is the negation of law?I think so: and I withdraw my answer that whatever a despot enacts without persuasion is a law.

And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, but through using its power, are we to call that force or not?Everything, I think, that men constrain others to do without persuasion, whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force.It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, but force?

Alcibiades, said Pericles, at your age, I may tell you, we, too, were very clever at this sort of thing. For the puzzles we thought about and exercised our wits on were just such as you seem to think about now.Ah, Pericles, cried Alcibiades, if only I had known you intimately when you were at your cleverest in these things!

So soon, then, as they presumed themselves to be the superiors of the politicians, they no longer came near Socrates. For apart from their general want of sympathy with him, they resented being cross-examined about their errors when they came. Politics had brought them to Socrates, and for politics they left him.

But Criton was a true associate of Socrates, as were Chaerophon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others who consorted with him not that they might shine in the courts or the assembly, but that they might become gentlemen, and be able to do their duty by house and household, and relatives and friends, and city and citizens. Of these not one, in his youth or old age, did evil or incurred censure.

But, said his accuser, Socrates taught sons to treat their fathers with contempt: he persuaded them that he made his companions wiser than their fathers: he said that the law allowed a son to put his father in prison if he convinced a jury that he was insane; and this was a proof that it was lawful for the wiser to keep the more ignorant in gaol.

In reality Socrates held that, if you clap fetters on a man for his ignorance, you deserve to be kept in gaol yourself by those whose knowledge is greater than your own: and such reasoning led him frequently to consider the difference between Madness and Ignorance. That madmen should be kept in prison was expedient, he thought, both for themselves and for their friends: but those who are ignorant of what they ought to know deserve to learn from those who know it.

But, said his accuser, Socrates caused his companions to dishonour not only their fathers, but their other relations as well, by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relations, but from their doctor or their counsel.

Of friends too he said that their goodwill was worthless, unless they could combine with it some power to help one: only those deserved honour who knew what was the right thing to do, and could explain it. Thus by leading the young to think that he excelled in wisdom and in ability to make others wise, he had such an effect on his companions that no one counted for anything in their estimation in comparison with him.

Now I know that he did use this language about fathers, relations and friends. And, what is more, he would say that so soon as the soul, the only seat of intelligence, is gone out of a man, even though he be our nearest and dearest, we carry out his body and hide it in the tomb.

Moreover, a man’s dearest friend is himself: yet, even in his lifetime he removes or lets another remove from his body whatever is useless and unprofitable. He removes his own nails, hair, corns: he lets the surgeon cut and cauterize him, and, aches and pains notwithstanding, feels bound to thank and fee him for it. He spits out the saliva from his mouth as far away as he can, because to retain it doesn’t help him, but harms him rather.

Now in saying all this, he was not giving a lesson on the duty of burying one’s father alive, or making mincemeat of one’s body: he meant to show that unreason is unworth, and was urging the necessity of cultivating sound sense and usefulness, in order that he who would fain be valued by father or by brother or by anyone else may not rely on the bond of familiarity and neglect him, but may try to be useful to all those by whom he would be valued.

Again, his accuser alleged that he selected from the most famous poets the most immoral passages, and used them as evidence in teaching his companions to be tyrants and malefactors: for example, Hesiod’s line:

1. No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace.
[*](Hes. WD 309)

Now, though Socrates would fully agree that it is a benefit and a blessing to a man to be a worker, and a disadvantage and an evil to be an idler — that work, in fact, is a blessing, idleness an evil — working, being a worker, meant to him doing good work; but gambling and any occupation that is immoral and leads to loss he called idling. When thus interpreted there is nothing amiss with the line:

1. No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace.

Again, his accuser said that he often quoted the passage from Homer, showing how Odysseus:

1. Whenever he found one that was a captain and a man of mark, stood by his side, and restrained him with gentle words: Good sir, it is not seemly to affright thee like a coward, but do thou sit thyself and make all thy folk sit down... But whatever man of the people he saw and found him shouting, him he drove with his sceptre and chid him with loud words: Good sir, sit still and hearken to the words of others that are thy betters: but thou art no warrior and a weakling, never reckoned whether in battle or in council.[*](Hom. Il. 2.188; Leaf’s translation.)

But Socrates never said that: indeed, on that view he would have thought himself worthy of chastisement. But what he did say was that those who render no service either by word or deed, who cannot help army or city or the people itself in time of need, ought to be stopped, even if they have riches in abundance, above all if they are insolent as well as inefficient.

But Socrates, at least, was just the opposite of all that: he showed himself to be one of the people and a friend of mankind. For although he had many eager disciples among citizens and strangers, yet he never exacted a fee for his society from one of them, but of his abundance he gave without stint to all. Some indeed, after getting from him a few trifles for nothing, became vendors of them at a great price to others, and showed none of his sympathy with the people, refusing to talk with those who had no money to give them.[*](Aristippus especially is meant.)