Hellenica

So to you[*](370 B.C.) has now been offered by some god an opportunity, in case you aid the Lacedaemonians in their need, of acquiring them for all time as friends who will plead no excuses. For it is not in the presence of only a few witnesses, as it seems to me, that they would now receive benefit at your hands, but the gods will know of this, who see all things both now and for ever, and both your allies and your enemies know also what is taking place, and the whole world of Greeks and barbarians besides. For to none of them all is it a matter of indifference.

Therefore, if the Lacedaemonians should show themselves base in their dealings with you, who would ever again become devoted to them? But it is fair to expect that they will prove good rather than base men, for if any people in the world seem consistently to have striven for commendation and to have abstained from deeds of shame, it is truly they. Besides all this, take thought of the following considerations likewise.

If ever again danger should come to Greece from barbarians, whom would you trust more than the Lacedaemonians? Whom would you more gladly make your comrades in the ranks than these, whose countrymen, posted at Thermopylae, chose every man to die fighting rather than to live and admit the barbarian to Greece? Therefore, both because they proved themselves brave men along with you, and because there is hope that they will so prove themselves again, is it not surely right that you and we alike should show all good-will toward them?

It is also worth while to show the Lacedaemonians good-will for the sake of the allies who are present with them. For be well assured that those who remain faithful to them in their misfortunes are[*](370 B.C.) the very men who would be ashamed if they did not make due requital to you. And if we who are willing to share the peril with them seem to be small states, reflect that if your state is added to our number, we who aid them shall no longer be small states.

In former days, men of Athens, I used from hearsay to admire this state of yours, for I heard that all who were wronged and all who were fearful fled hither for refuge, and here found assistance; now I no longer hear, but with my own eyes at this moment see the Lacedaemonians, those most famous men, and their most loyal friends appearing in your state and in their turn requesting you to assist them.

I see also the Thebans, who then[*]( See 35 above, and cp. note on iii. 13.) did not succeed in persuading the Lacedaemonians to enslave you, now requesting you to allow those who saved you to perish.It is truly a noble deed that is told of your ancestors, when they did not suffer those Argives who died at the Cadmea to go unburied;[*]( After the defeat of the legendary expedition of the Seven against Thebes it was only the intervention of the Athenians which compelled the Thebans to permit the burial of the enemy’s dead.) but you would achieve a far nobler deed if you did not suffer those Lacedaemonians who still live either to incur insult or to perish.

And while that other deed was also noble, when you checked the insolence of Eurystheus and preserved the sons of Heracles,[*]( The sons of Heracles, driven from Peloponnesus by Eurystheus, found protection and aid at Athens.) would it not surely be an even nobler one if you saved from perishing, not merely the founders, but the whole state as well? And noblest of all deeds if, after the Lacedaemonians saved you then by a[*](370 B.C.) vote, void of danger, you shall aid them now with arms and at the risk of your lives.

Again, when even we, who by word urge you to aid brave men, are proud of doing so, it would manifestly be generous of you, who are able to aid by act, if, after being many times both friends and enemies of the Lacedaemonians, you should recall, not the harm you have suffered at their hands, but rather the favours which you have, received, and should render them requital, not in behalf of yourselves alone, but also in behalf of all Greece, because in her behalf they proved themselves brave men.

After this the Athenians deliberated, and they would not endure to listen to those who spoke on the other side, but voted to go to the aid of the Lacedaemonians in full force, and chose Iphicrates as general. And when his sacrifices had proved favourable and he had issued orders to his men to dine in the Academy,[*](cp. II. ii. 8.) many, it is said, went thither ahead of Iphicrates himself. After this Iphicrates led the way and they followed, believing that he would lead them to some noble achievement. And when, after arriving in Corinth, he delayed there for some days, they at once began to censure him, for the first time, for this delay; then when he at length marched them forth, they eagerly followed wherever he led the way, and eagerly attacked any stronghold against which he brought them.

As for the enemy in Lacedaemon, many Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans had already departed, inasmuch as they lived just across the border, some of them leading and others carrying what they had taken as plunder. On the[*](370 B.C.) other hand, the Thebans and the rest were desirous of departing from the country, partly for the very reason that they saw their army growing daily smaller, and partly because provisions were scantier, the supply having been in part used up or stolen away, in part wasted or burned up; besides, it was winter, so that by this time all alike wanted to withdraw.

When, accordingly, they proceeded to retire from Lacedaemon, then, of course, Iphicrates likewise proceeded to lead back the Athenians from Arcadia to Corinth. Now I have no fault to find with any good generalship he may have shown on any other occasion; but as regards all his actions at that time, I find them to have been either futile or inexpedient. For while he undertook to keep guard at Oneum so that the Thebans should not be able to get back home, he left unguarded the best pass, which led past Cenchreae.

And when he wanted to find out whether the Thebans had passed Oneum, he sent as scouts all the horsemen both of the Athenians and of the Corinthians. And yet a few men would have been quite as efficient for seeing as the many; while if it were necessary to retire, it would be much easier for the few than for the many both to find an easy route and to retire at their leisure. But to employ a force that was numerous and still inferior to the enemy — was this not surely the height of folly? For inasmuch as the horsemen extended their line over a large space because they were a large force, when it was necessary to retire they encountered a large number of difficult places, so that no fewer than twenty horsemen lost their lives. At that time, then, the Thebans returned home as they pleased.

In the following year ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians[*](369 B.C.) and their allies, with full powers, came to Athens to take counsel as to what should be the terms of the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. And while many foreigners and many Athenians said that the alliance ought to be on terms of full equality, Procles the Phliasian made the following speech:

Men of Athens, since you have decided that it is a good thing to make the Lacedaemonians your friends, it seems to me that you ought to consider this point, how the friendship is to endure for the longest possible time. Now it is only by making the compact on such terms as will be most advantageous to each party that we can expect it to be, in all probability, most enduring. The other points, then, have been pretty well agreed upon, but the question of the leadership is at present under discussion. Now it has been proposed by your Senate that the leadership by sea shall belong to you, and the leadership by land to the Lacedaemonians. And I, too, think that this distinction is based, not so much upon human judgment as upon divine arrangement and ordering.

In the first place, you have a position most excellently adapted by nature for supremacy by sea. For most of the states which are dependent upon the sea are situated round about your state, and they are all weaker than[*](369 B.C.) yours. In addition to this, you have harbours, without which it is not possible to enjoy naval power. Furthermore, you already possess many triremes, and it is a traditional policy of yours to keep adding ships.

You likewise possess as peculiarly your own all the arts and crafts which have to do with ships. Again, you are far superior to other men in experience of nautical affairs, for most of you get your livelihood from the sea; hence, while attending to your private concerns, you are also at the same time gaining experience for encounters by sea. Here is another point also: there is no port from which more triremes can sail forth at one time than from your city. And this is a matter of no slight importance with reference to leadership, for all men love best to join forces with the power which is first to show itself strong.

Furthermore, it has also been granted you by the gods to be successful in this pursuit. For while you have engaged in very many and very great combats by sea, you have met with an exceedingly small number of misfortunes and have achieved an exceedingly large number of successes. Therefore it is likely that the allies would like best to share in such perils if they were under your leadership.

And that this devotion to the sea is indeed both necessary and proper for you, you must conclude from the following fact: the Lacedaemonians once made war upon you for many years,[*]( The reference is to the Peloponnesian War, which was terminated by the capture of the Athenian fleet by the Lacedaemonians at Aegospotami (Hell. II. i. 20-32).) and though masters of your land could make no progress toward destroying you. But when at length the deity granted them to win the mastery by sea, straightway you fell completely under their power.[*](369 B.C.) In these circumstances, therefore, it is plain to be seen that all your safety depends upon the sea.

Such, then, being the situation ordained by nature, how could you be content to allow the Lacedaemonians to be leaders by sea, when, in the first place, they themselves admit that they are less experienced than you are in this work, and when, in the second place, they do not risk as much as you do in contests by sea, but merely the people on board the triremes, whereas you risk wives and children and the entire state.

This is the situation on your side; consider now that of the Lacedaemonians. Firstly, they dwell in the interior; hence, so long as they are masters of the land, they can lead a comfortable existence even if they are shut off from the sea. Therefore, realizing this fact themselves, they carry on their training from their very boyhood with a view to war by land. Furthermore, in that which is of the greatest importance, obedience to their commanders, they are best by land, as you are by sea.