Hellenica

After him Autocles, who had the reputation of being a very incisive orator, spoke as follows: Men of Lacedaemon, that what I am about to say will not be said to your pleasure, I am not unaware; but it seems to me that men who desire the friendship which they may establish to endure for the longest possible time, ought to point out to one another the causes of their wars. Now you always say, The cities must be independent, but you are yourselves the greatest obstacle in the way of their independence. For the first stipulation you make with your allied cities is this, that they follow wherever you may lead. And yet how is this consistent with independence?

And you make for yourselves enemies without taking counsel with your allies, and against those enemies you lead them; so that frequently they who are said to be independent are compelled to take the field against men most friendly to themselves. Furthermore — and there can be nothing in the world more opposed to independence — you establish governments of ten here and governments of thirty there; and in the case of these rulers your care is, not that they shall rule according to law, but that they shall be able to hold possession of their cities by force. So that you manifestly take pleasure in despotisms rather[*](371 B.C.) than in free governments.

Again, when the King directed that the cities be independent, you showed yourselves strongly of the opinion that if the Thebans did not allow each one of their cities, not only to rule itself, but also to live under whatever laws it chose, they would not be acting in accordance with the King’s writing; but when you had seized the Cadmea, you did not permit even the Thebans themselves to be independent. The right thing, however, is that those who are going to be friends should not insist upon obtaining their full rights from others, and then show themselves disposed to grasp the most they can.

By these words he caused silence on the part of all, while at the same time he gave pleasure to those who were angry with the Lacedaemonians. After him Callistratus said: Men of Lacedaemon, that mistakes have not been made, both on our side and on yours, I for one do not think I could assert; but I do not hold to the opinion that one ought never again to have any dealings with people who make mistakes. For I see that no one in the world remains always free from error. And it seems to me that through making mistakes men sometimes become even easier to deal with, especially if they have incurred punishment in consequence of their mistakes, as we have.

In your own case, also, I see that sometimes many reverses result from the things you have done with too little judgment, among which was, in fact, the seizure of the Cadmea in Thebes; now, at any rate, the cities which you were eager to make independent have all, in consequence of the wrong done to the Thebans, fallen again under their power. Hence I hope that now, when we have been[*](371 B.C.) taught that to seek selfish advantage is unprofitable, we shall again be reasonable in our friendship with each other.

Now touching the slanderous allegations of certain people who wish to defeat the peace, to the effect that we have come here, not because we desire friendship, but rather because we fear that Antalcidas may arrive with money from the King, consider how foolishly they are talking. For the King directed, as you know, that all the cities in Greece were to be independent; why then should we, who agree with the King in both word and deed, be afraid of him? Or does anyone imagine that the King prefers to spend money and make others great, rather than, without expense, to have those things accomplished for him which he judged to be best?

So much for that. Why, then, have we come? That it surely is not because we are in straits, you could discover, if you please, by looking at the situation by sea or, if you please, at the situation by land at the present time. What, then, is the reason? Manifestly that some of our allies are doing what is not pleasing to us. And perhaps we also should like to show you the gratitude we rightly conceived toward you because you preserved us.[*]( At the close of the Peloponnesian war the Lacedaemonians rejected the proposal urged by many of their allies, that Athens should be destroyed.cp. II. ii. 19, 20.)

Furthermore, to mention also the matter of expediency, there are, of course, among all the cities of Greece, some that take your side and others that take ours, and in each single city some people favour the Lacedaemonians and others the Athenians. If, therefore, we should become friends, from what quarter could[*](371 B.C.) we with reason expect any trouble? For who could prove strong enough to vex us by land if you were our friends? And who could do you any harm by sea if we were favourably inclined toward you?

Moreover, we all know that wars are forever breaking out and being concluded, and that we — if not now, still at some future time — shall desire peace again. Why, then, should we wait for the time when we shall have become exhausted by a multitude of ills, and not rather conclude peace as quickly as possible before anything irremediable happens?

Again, I for my part do not commend those men who, when they have become competitors in the games and have already been victorious many times and enjoy fame, are so fond of contest that they do not stop until they are defeated and so end their athletic training; nor on the other hand do I commend those dicers who, if they win one success, throw for double stakes, for I see that the majority of such people become utterly impoverished.

We, then, seeing these things, ought never to engage in a contest of such a sort that we shall either win all or lose all, but ought rather to become friends of one another while we are still strong and successful. For thus we through you, and you through us, could play even a greater part in Greece than in times gone by.

Since these men were adjudged to have spoken rightly, the Lacedaemonians voted to accept the peace, with the provision that all should withdraw their governors from the cities, disband their armaments both on sea and on land, and leave the cities independent. And if any state should act in violation of this agreement, it was provided that any which so desired might aid the injured cities, but that any[*](371 B.C.) which did not so desire was not under oath to be the ally of those who were injured.

On these terms the Lacedaemonians took the oath for themselves and their allies, while the Athenians and their allies took the oath severally, city by city. The Thebans also signed their names among the cities which had sworn, but on the following day their ambassadors came in again and demanded that the writing be changed to read that the Boeotians instead of the Thebans had sworn.[*]( i.e., insisting upon their claim to headship in Boeotia.) Agesilaus, however, replied that he would change no part of what they had sworn to and signed in the first place; but if they did not wish to be included in the treaty, he said that he would strike out their names if they so directed.

When, accordingly, under these circumstances the others had concluded peace, while the only controversy was with the Thebans, the Athenians were of the opinion that now there was hope that the Thebans would be decimated, as the common saying puts it, and as for the Thebans themselves, they went home utterly despondent.

After this the Athenians, on their side, proceeded to withdraw their garrisons from the cities and to send after Iphicrates and his ships, and they compelled him to give back everything which he had captured after the time when the oaths were taken at Lacedaemon.

But the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, while they withdrew both their governors and their garrisons from all the other cities, did not follow this course in the case of Cleombrotus, who was at the head of the army in Phocis and now asked the authorities at home what he should do. Prothous did indeed say that it seemed to him they[*](371 B.C.) ought first to disband the army in accordance with their oaths and send round word to the various cities to make contributions, as large as each city chose to make, to the temple of Apollo,[*]( i.e., for a war fund.) and afterwards, in case anyone tried to prevent the cities from being independent, to call together again at that time all who wished to support the cause of independence and lead them against those who opposed it; for he thought, he continued, that in this way the gods would be most favourably inclined toward them and the cities would be least annoyed.

The Lacedaemonian assembly, however, upon hearing these words, came to the conclusion that he was talking nonsense; for at this moment, as it seems, Fate was leading them on; and they sent orders to Cleombrotus not to disband his army, but to lead it at once against the Thebans if they did not leave the cities independent. When, therefore, he learned that, so far from leaving the cities independent, the Thebans were not even disbanding their army, in order that they might marshal themselves against him, under these circumstances he undertook to lead his troops into Boeotia.Now Cleombrotus did not enter Boeotia from Phocis at the point where the Thebans expected him to enter and where they were keeping guard at a narrow pass; but proceeding by way of Thisbae along a mountainous and unexpected route, he arrived at Creusis, captured its wall, and took twelve triremes belonging to the Thebans.