Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit

And every one may learn to appreciate the true freedom of which the virtuous man is in the enjoyment from other circumstances.

Besides all this, would not any one affirm that the friends of God are free? unless indeed one can think it consistent to [*]( Some editions print this as a quotation, but Mangey does not. It is not known where it comes from if it is one.) [*]( There is a considerable hiatus in the text here.)

But the lawgiver of the Jews ventures upon a more bold assertion even than this, inasmuch as he was, as it is reported, a student and practiser of plain philosophy; and so he teaches that the man who is wholly possessed with the love of God and who serves the living God alone, is no longer man, but actually God, being indeed the God of men, but not of the parts of nature, in order to leave to the Father of the universe the attributes of being both and God.

Is it right, then, to think a man who is invested with such privileges as these a slave, or rather as the only one who is free? Who, even though he may not be thought worthy by himself of being classed as God, one nevertheless ought by all means to pronounce happy, by reason of his having God for his friend; for God is not a weak _ champion, nor regardless of the rights and claims of friendship, inasmuch as he is the God of companionship, and as he presides over everything that belongs to companions.

Moreover, as among cities, some being governed by an oligarchy or by tyrants, endure slavery, having those who have subdued them and made themselves masters of them for severe and cruel tyrants; while others, existing under the superintending care of the laws and under those good protectors, are free and happy. So also in the case of men; those who are under the dominion of anger, or appetite, or any other passion, or of treacherous wickedness, are in every respect slaves; and those who live in accordance with law are free.

But the unerring law is right reason; not an ordinance made by this or that mortal, a corruptible and perishable law, a lifeless law written on lifeless parchment or engraved on lifeless columns; but one imperishable, and stamped by immortal nature on the immortal mind.

On which account any one may reasonably marvel at the dim-sightedness of those

Moreover, in addition to what has been already said, there is one most undeniable proof of freedom, equality of speech, which all virtuous men use to one another; on which account they say that the following iambics are inspired with the true spirit of genuine philosophy:— = "For slaves no freedom have, not e’en in speech." And again:— "You’re but a slave, and may not dare to speak."

As, therefore, musical science gives to all those who have studied music an equal right to speak on matters connected with their art; and as a man who is learned in grammar or in geometry has a right to speak among grammarians and mathematicians, so also the law in life allows the same privilege to those who are learned in the way in which men ought to live.

But all virtuous men are skilful in all the affairs which belong to life, inasmuch as they also are so with respect to the things which belong to universal nature; and some of them are free; and so therefore are they who have the freedom of speaking to them on equal terms; therefore no virtuous man is a slave, but all are free.

And from the same principle as a starting-point it will also be clearly shown that the foolish man is a slave; for as the laws which prevail with respect to music do not give those who are ignorant of it a right of speaking about it in terms of equality with those who are well versed in it; nor do the laws respecting grammar give those ignorant of that knowledge a right of speaking about it on terms of equality with those who are well skilled in it; nor, in short, does the law with respect to any art confer such a right on those who are ignorant of it towards those who are learned in it; so also

But to all free men, perfect equality of speech on all subjects is given by the law; and some virtuous men are free; and of the proper principles of life, the foolish are utterly ignorant, but the wise are most profoundly versed in them: therefore it is not the case that ever any foolish or wicked men are free, but they are all slaves.

And Zeno, as much as any one else, being under the influence of virtue, ventures boldly to assert that the wicked have not a right to any equality of speech towards the virtuous; for he says, "Shall not the wicked man suffer if he contradicts the virtuous man?" Therefore the wicked man has not a right to freedom of speech as respects the virtuous man.

I know that many persons will rail at this assertion as one which is dictated rather by self-conceit than by real wisdom. But if, after they have desisted from mocking and ridiculing it, they will condescend to investigate the matter and to examine clearly into what is really said, then, recognising and admiring its perfect truth, they will become aware that there is nothing for which a man will suffer more than for disregarding the words of a wise man.

For loss of money, and the brand of dishonour, and banishment, and insults by means of beating, and all other things of that sort, injure a man but little, or rather not at all, when compared with acts of wickedness and the things which are the results of acts of wickedness. But it happens that the generality of men, not being able to perceive the injuries of the soul by reason of the mutilated state of their reason, are grieved only at external calamities, being wholly deprived of the faculty of judging correctly, which is the only one by which they can comprehend the injury received by the intellect.

But if they were able to look up and see clearly, then, beholding the deceits which arise out of folly, and the perplexities which proceed from covetousness, and all the intoxicated folly to which intemperance gives rise, and all the transgressions of the law in which injustice indulges, they would be filled with interminable grief at the injuries sustained by the best portion of themselves, and would be incapable of receiving comfort by reason of the excessive greatness of the evil.

But Zeno appears to have drawn this maxim of his as it

What has now then been said with the view of establishing the truth in the matter inquired into is, in my opinion, sufficient. But since physicians are accustomed to cure various diseases with still more various remedies, it is necessary that we should bring a series of proofs, keeping close to the subject, in order to establish those propositions which appear paradoxical by reason of their unusual character. For some people, even if they are convicted by ever so close a series of proofs, can hardly be brought to see their error.

Therefore, it is not an incorrect assertion that the man who does everything wisely does everything well; and he who does everything well does everything correctly; and he who does everything correctly does everything also in an unerring, and blameless, and irreproachable, and faultless, and beneficial manner: so that he will have free permission to do everything, and to live as he pleases. And he who has this liberty must be free. But the virtuous man does do everything wisely; therefore he alone is free.

And indeed the man whom it is not possible either to compel to do anything, or to prevent from doing anything, cannot possibly be a slave; and one cannot compel or prevent the virtuous man. Therefore the virtuous man cannot be a slave; and that he is never under compulsion or under any restraint is quite plain; for that man is under restraint who does not obtain what he desires. But the wise man only desires such things as proceed from virtue, in which it is impossible for him to be disappointed. And again, if he is under compulsion, then it is plain that he does something against his will; but in all cases where there are actions, they are either good ones proceeding from virtue, or evil ones [*]( Genesis xxviii. 1. )