De Virtutibus

Having previously said all that appeared to be necessary about justice, and those precepts which are closely connected with it, I now proceed in regular order to speak of courage, not meaning by courage that warlike and frantic delirium, under the influence of passion as its counsellor, which the generality of men take for it, but knowledge; [*](This seems to be an imitation of what Plato says in the Protagoras. "We must not look upon all bold (θαρραλέους) men as courageous (ἀνδρείους), for boldness is derived from human skill, or from anger, or from madness; but courage arises only from nature, and from a good disposition of the soul."—P. 350. )

for some persons, being elated by boldness when they have bodily strength to assist them, array themselves in the ranks of war, in complete armour, and slay innumerable hosts of the enemy to a man, gaining by their exploits the unseemly but fine sounding name of preeminent valour, being accounted by the multitude which judges of such matters exceedingly glorious in their victory, though in fact they have been savage and brutal both in nature and practise, having thirsted for human blood.

But then as some men who, always remaining in their own houses, while their bodies have been worn away either by long sickness or by painful old age, still being healthy and vigorous [*]( This seems to be an imitation of what Plato says in the Protagoras. "We must not look upon all bold (θαρραλέους) men as courageous (ἀνδρείους), for boldness is derived from human skill, or from anger, or from madness; but courage arises only from nature, and from a good disposition of the soul."—P. 350. )