De Agricultura

and he who shows himself superior to all the rest of these is most admirable, and we must not envy him, when he gets the first prize of all the wrestlers. And those who are thought worthy of the second or of the third place, must not be cast down; for these prizes are proposed for the acquisition of virtue. But to those who are

Therefore it is said in a way to convey much instruction, "The horseman will fall," that if any one falls from vice, he may be raised up by leaning on good things, and so may stand upright again. And in a still more instructive manner is that other expression used, which bids one not leap off in front, but "fall backwards," since it is always advantageous to be behind-hand in vice and passion;

for it is always good to be beforehand in doing what is good, but to be slack in doing what is disgraceful: and, on the other hand, it is good to come close to the one, but to stand aloof from and to be as far as possible removed from the other. And that man is free from all disorder, to whom it happens to be removed at a distance from the errors of passion. Accordingly, Moses says that he is "awaiting the salvation which comes from God," [*](Genesis xlix. 18. ) in order that, as far as he is removed from committing iniquity, so far he may also advance in well-doing.

Everything, then, that is requisite has now been said on the subject of a horseman and a rider, and a keeper of sheep and a shepherd, and a tiller of the ground and a husbandman; and all the difference existing between each of these pairs has been very accurately defined, as far as it was in our power. It is time now to turn to what follows.

Moses, then, introduces the man who is desirous of virtue as not possessing a complete knowledge of the whole business of a husbandman, but only as labouring with diligence at its principles and rudiments; for he says, "Noah began to be a husbandman." [*](Genesis ix, 20. ) And the beginning, as the proverb of the old writers has it, is half of the whole; as yet, therefore, he is half of the distance removed from the end, and where the end is not attained, it has been often injurious to many persons, to have begun great enterprises.

At all events, before now, some persons whose minds were not right, through their thoughts revolving in continued changes, have conceived a notion of some good things, but have derived no advantage from it; for it has happened that, as they did not attain the end which they desired, they have been overwhelmed by the impetuosity of a [*](Genesis xlix. 18. ) [*](Genesis ix, 20. )

Was it not on this account that when Cain fancied that he had offered up a blameless sacrifice, an oracle came to him bidding him not to feel confidence as a man who had presented a well approved offering? for that he had not sacrificed with holy and perfect victims. And the oracle is as follows: "If thou dost not bring thy offering properly, and if thou dost not distribute it rightly." [*](Genesis iv. 7. )

What is right, then, here is the honour of God, and that which is not properly distributed is not right. But let us now examine what meaning is contained under this expression. There are some persons who look upon piety as consisting in the affirmation that all things have been made by God, both what is good and the contrary;

to whom we would say that one portion of your opinion is praiseworthy, but the other portion blameable. One portion is praiseworthy, because it properly honours that which alone is worthy to receive honour; but that portion is blameable, which does so without any discrimination or division. For it was not proper to confuse and mingle everything together, nor to declare God the cause of everything without distinction, but to make a difference, and to pronounce him the cause only of those things which are good;

for it is an absurdity to be anxious about priests, taking care that they shall be perfect in their bodies and free from all defect and mutilation, and to be very particular about the animals which are offered in sacrifice, to be sure that they have no defect of any kind whatever, not even the most insignificant possible; and to appoint men, and to say whom and how many ought to be appointed for this business, whom some call inspectors of blemishes, to take care that the victims may be brought to the altar without any blemish or imperfection, and yet to allow the opinions which are held concerning God to be in confusion in the soul of each individual, and not to take care that they are discriminated by the rule of right reason.

Do you not see that the law pronounces the camel to be an unclean beast, because it chews the cud and does not part the hoof. [*](Leviticus xi. 4. ) And yet, if we considered this sentence [*](Genesis iv. 7. ) [*](Leviticus xi. 4. )

For as the animal which chews the cud, again masticates the food which is put before it and devoured by it, when it again rises up to its teeth, so also the soul of the man who is fond of learning, when it has received any speculative opinions by hearing them, does not abandon them to forgetfulness, but quietly by itself revolves over every one of them again in its mind in all tranquillity, and so comes to the recollection of them all.

But it is not every memory which is good, but only that which is exerted on good subjects, since it is a most pernicious thing that what is bad should not be forgotten; on which account, with a view to perfection, it is necessary that the hoofs should be parted, in order that so the faculty of memory, being divided into two sections, the word which flows through the mouth may divide the lips, as being things which nature has made of a two-fold character, and may also separate the advantageous species of memory from that which is mischievous.

Again, the dividing the hoof without chewing the cud does not by itself appear to bring any advantage with it. For what advantage is there in distinguishing the natures of things beginning at the top, and going down to the most unimportant points, and yet not to be able to do so in one’s self, not to have one’s own divisions clearly distinguished, which by some persons are with great felicity named atoms and indivisible portions?

for all these things are manifest displays of intelligence and excessive accuracy, sharpened to a degree of the most acute comprehension. But they have no influence in causing virtue, or in making men live a life free from reproach.

Accordingly, in their daily discussions, the company of sophists all over the world annoys the ears of those whom they meet, by discussing with minute accuracy, and expounding precisely, all expressions of a double and ambiguous character, and distinguishing everything which appears to occur to the recollection (and a great many things are fixed deeply in it). Do not these men divide the elements of grammatical speech into consonants and vowels? And do not some men divide speech into their first principles,

Do not musicians again divide their own science into rhythm, and part, and melody? and subdivide melody into the chromatic, the enharmonic, and the diatonic species, into the divisions of fourths, and fifths, and the diapason, and into combined and distinct melodies?

Do not geometricians divide their science into two generic lines, the straight line, and the circumference? And do not other professors of other arts draw careful distinctions between the species which exist in each of their arts, going accurately through them all from beginning to end?

And the whole company of students of philosophy may argue with them on their line of conduct, each going through the studies to which he is accustomed; because, of all existing things some are corporeal, and some incorporeal; some again are inanimate, and some have vitality; some are endowed with, others destitute of reason; some are mortal, others divine; and of mortals some are male, and some female, these being the two divisions of the human race.

Again, of incorporeal things, some are perfect and others imperfect; and of perfect things, some are questions and interrogations, others are imprecatory or adjurative; and there are other kinds which have special differences in the elementary principles of such things. Again, there are some things which the dialecticians are accustomed to call actions;