On The Estate of Ciron

Yet if Ciron had not really been my grandfather, it was the duty of my opponent to repulse me and reject me and prevent me from taking part in the burial. My position with regard to him was quite a different one: for I allowed him, as my grandfather's nephew, to share in all the rites, but he ought never to have allowed me to do so, if what they now have the audacity to say were true.

But he was so overawed by his knowledge of the true facts, that at the tomb, when I spoke and accused Diocles of detaining the property and of having suborned him to dispute the inheritance, he did not venture to utter a sound or say a word of what he now has the impudence to assert. And to prove that I am telling the truth, please call the witnesses to these events.

Witnesses

What ought to induce you to believe the statements which you have heard? Ought not the evidence of witnesses to induce you to do so? I certainly think so. But what entitles you to believe the witnesses? Is it not the confirmation of their evidence under torture? It seems only reasonable. But what entitles you to disbelieve the statements of my opponents? Is it not their refusal to put the matter to the test? This is an absolutely necessary conclusion. How then could anyone prove that my mother is a legitimate daughter of Ciron more clearly than by the method which I am adopting?

For events in the distant past I furnished hearsay evidence vouched for by witnesses; where living witnesses are available, I produced those who are familiar with the facts, who knew perfectly well that my mother was brought up in Ciron's house, that she was regarded as his daughter, and that she was twice betrothed and twice married; I further showed that on all these points my opponents have refused to allow the evidence of slaves under torture, who knew all the facts. By the gods of Olympus, I could not possibly give stronger proofs than these, and I think that those which I have produced are sufficient.

But to continue; let me next prove to you that I have a better right than my opponent to Ciron's fortune. I suppose that you admit in principle as a self-evident fact that those who are descended from the same stock as Ciron are not nearer in right of succession than those who are descended from him. (How, indeed, could they be, since the former are called collateral kinsmen, the latter lineal descendants of the deceased?) Since, however, even though this is so, they have the impudence to dispute my right, we will explain the point in greater detail from the actual laws.

Supposing that my mother, Ciron's daughter, were still alive and that her father had died intestate and that my opponent were his brother and not his nephew, he would have the right to claim the daughter in marriage, but he could not claim the estate, which would go to the children born of their marriage when they had completed two years after puberty; for this is what the laws ordain. Since, then, the children, and not my opponent himself, would have become masters of her property if she were alive, it is obvious, since she is dead and has left children, namely, my brother and myself, that we, and not our opponents, have the right to succeed to the estate.

This is the clear intention not only of this law but also of that dealing with the neglect of parents. For if my grandfather were alive and in want of the necessities of life, we, and not our opponent, would be liable to prosecution for neglect. For the law enjoins us to support our parents, meaning by “parents” father, mother, grandfather, and grandmother, and their father and mother, if they are still alive; for they are the source of the family, and their property is transmitted to their descendants, and so the latter are bound to support them even if they have nothing to bequeath to them. How then can it be right that, if they have nothing to leave, we should be liable to prosecution for neglecting them, yet that, if they have something to leave, our opponent should be the heir and not we? Surely it cannot be right.