On The Estate of Ciron
Isaeus
Isaeus. Forster, Edward Seymour, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (1962 printing).
Yet do not for a moment suppose, that, if our mother had been such as our opponents allege, our father would have either given a wedding-feast or provided a marriage-banquet and not rather hushed up the whole matter; or that the wives of the other demesmen would have chosen her to celebrate the festival with the wife of Diocles and given the sacred objects into her hands and not rather entrusted this office to some other woman; or that the wardsmen would have admitted us and not rather objected and justified their objection, if it had not been universally admitted that our mother was a legitimate daughter of Ciron. As it was, owing to the notoriety of the fact and its recognition by so many persons, no such question was raised from any quarter. Now call the witnesses to prove the truth of these statements.
Witnesses
Furthermore, gentlemen, the conduct of Diocles on the occasion of our grandfather's death clearly shows that we were acknowledged as the grandchildren of Ciron. I presented myself, accompanied by one of my relatives, a cousin of my father, to convey away the body with the intention of conducting the funeral from my own house. I did not find Diocles in the house, and I entered and was prepared to remove the body, having bearers with me for this purpose.
When, however, my grandfather's widow requested that the funeral should take place from that house, and declared that she would like herself to help us to lay out and deck the corpse, and entreated me and wept, I acceded to her request and went to my opponent and told him in the presence of witnesses that I would conduct the funeral from the house of the deceased, since Diocles' sister had begged me to do so.
Diocles, on hearing this, made no objection, but asserting that he had actually bought some of the requisites for the funeral and had himself paid a deposit for the rest, demanded that I should pay him for these, and arranged to recover from me the cost of the objects which he had purchased and to produce those who had received the deposit for the objects for which he alleged that he had paid a deposit. Immediately afterwards he casually remarked that Ciron had left nothing at all, although I had not said a single word about his money.
Yet had I not been Ciron's grandson, he would never have made these arrangements with me, but would rather have said, “Who are you? What right have you to carry out the burial? I do not know you: you shall not set foot in the house.” This is what he ought to have said, and what he has now instigated others to say. As it was, he said nothing of the kind, but only told me to bring the money next morning. And to prove the truth of these statements, please summon the witnesses.
Witnesses
Diocles was not the only person who made no such objections at the time; the present claimant to the estate was also silent and is now making his claim because he has been suborned by Diocles. Though Diocles refused to accept the money which I brought and alleged next day that he had received payment from my opponent, yet I was not prevented from attending the burial but joined in all the ceremonies, the expenses of the funeral, so far from being paid by my opponent or Diocles, being defrayed from the property left by the deceased.
Yet if Ciron had not really been my grandfather, it was the duty of my opponent to repulse me and reject me and prevent me from taking part in the burial. My position with regard to him was quite a different one: for I allowed him, as my grandfather's nephew, to share in all the rites, but he ought never to have allowed me to do so, if what they now have the audacity to say were true.
But he was so overawed by his knowledge of the true facts, that at the tomb, when I spoke and accused Diocles of detaining the property and of having suborned him to dispute the inheritance, he did not venture to utter a sound or say a word of what he now has the impudence to assert. And to prove that I am telling the truth, please call the witnesses to these events.
Witnesses
What ought to induce you to believe the statements which you have heard? Ought not the evidence of witnesses to induce you to do so? I certainly think so. But what entitles you to believe the witnesses? Is it not the confirmation of their evidence under torture? It seems only reasonable. But what entitles you to disbelieve the statements of my opponents? Is it not their refusal to put the matter to the test? This is an absolutely necessary conclusion. How then could anyone prove that my mother is a legitimate daughter of Ciron more clearly than by the method which I am adopting?
For events in the distant past I furnished hearsay evidence vouched for by witnesses; where living witnesses are available, I produced those who are familiar with the facts, who knew perfectly well that my mother was brought up in Ciron's house, that she was regarded as his daughter, and that she was twice betrothed and twice married; I further showed that on all these points my opponents have refused to allow the evidence of slaves under torture, who knew all the facts. By the gods of Olympus, I could not possibly give stronger proofs than these, and I think that those which I have produced are sufficient.
But to continue; let me next prove to you that I have a better right than my opponent to Ciron's fortune. I suppose that you admit in principle as a self-evident fact that those who are descended from the same stock as Ciron are not nearer in right of succession than those who are descended from him. (How, indeed, could they be, since the former are called collateral kinsmen, the latter lineal descendants of the deceased?) Since, however, even though this is so, they have the impudence to dispute my right, we will explain the point in greater detail from the actual laws.
Supposing that my mother, Ciron's daughter, were still alive and that her father had died intestate and that my opponent were his brother and not his nephew, he would have the right to claim the daughter in marriage, but he could not claim the estate, which would go to the children born of their marriage when they had completed two years after puberty; for this is what the laws ordain. Since, then, the children, and not my opponent himself, would have become masters of her property if she were alive, it is obvious, since she is dead and has left children, namely, my brother and myself, that we, and not our opponents, have the right to succeed to the estate.
This is the clear intention not only of this law but also of that dealing with the neglect of parents. For if my grandfather were alive and in want of the necessities of life, we, and not our opponent, would be liable to prosecution for neglect. For the law enjoins us to support our parents, meaning by “parents” father, mother, grandfather, and grandmother, and their father and mother, if they are still alive; for they are the source of the family, and their property is transmitted to their descendants, and so the latter are bound to support them even if they have nothing to bequeath to them. How then can it be right that, if they have nothing to leave, we should be liable to prosecution for neglecting them, yet that, if they have something to leave, our opponent should be the heir and not we? Surely it cannot be right.
I will now institute a comparison with the nearest collateral relative and question you on the various degrees of relationship;[*](The text is doubtful here, but the general sense is clear.) for this is the easier way of making the matter clear to you. Is Ciron's daughter or his brother the nearer of kin to him? Clearly his daughter; for she is his issue, while the brother is only born of the same stock. Next, is the brother nearer of kin or the daughter's children? Certainly the daughter's children; for they are lineal descendants and not mere collaterals. If then our rights are so far superior to those of a brother, a fortiori we are still more to be preferred to our opponent, who is only a nephew.
But I am afraid of seeming tiresome in repeating truths so universally recognized; for you all inherit the property of your fathers, grandfathers, and remoter ancestors by the incontrovertible title of lineal descent, and I do not know that such a case as the present has ever been brought against anyone before. I shall therefore read the law about the neglect of parents and then try and show you the motives which led to the whole affair.
Law
The property of Ciron, gentlemen, consisted of an estate at Phlya, easily worth a talent, two houses in the city, one near the sanctuary of Dionysus in the Marshes,[*](On the probable position of this shrine S. of the Areopagus see Jane Harrison, Primitive Athens, pp. 83 ff.) let to a tenant and worth 2000 drachmae, the other, in which he himself used to live, worth thirteen minae; he also had[*](A number has probably fallen out here.) slaves earning wages, two female slaves and a young girl, and the fittings of his private residence, worth, including the slaves, about thirteen minae. The total value of his real property was thus more than ninety minae; but besides this he had considerable sums lent out, of which he received the interest.
It was to obtain this property that Diocles, together with his sister, carried on his plots for a long time, ever since the death of Ciron's sons. For he did not try to find another husband for her, although she was still capable of bearing children to another man; for he feared that, if she were separated from Ciron, the latter would resolve to dispose of his estate in the proper manner;[*](i.e., by leaving it to the speaker and his brother.) but he kept on urging her to remain with him, and to allege that she thought she was with child by him and then pretend that she had an accidental miscarriage, in order that he might be always hoping that a child would be born to him, and might not, therefore, adopt myself or my brother. Diocles also continually calumniated my father, alleging that he was intriguing against Ciron's property.
So he gradually persuaded Ciron to let him handle all the sums owing to him, and the interest upon them, and to manage his real property, cajoling the old man by his attentions and flattery until he had all his estate in his grasp. But, although he knew that in accordance with my rights I should seek to be master of this property when my grandfather was dead, yet he did not try to prevent me from visiting him and paying him attentions and conversing with him (for he was afraid that Ciron might become exasperated and be angry with him); but he was all the time preparing a claimant to dispute my right to the property, promising him a small share, if he were successful, and securing the whole estate for himself, and not admitting even to his accomplice that my grandfather had any money to leave, but pretending that there was nothing.
Immediately after Ciron's death he lost no time in making preparations for the funeral, the expenses of which he required me to pay, as you have heard the witnesses testifying; but he afterwards pretended that he had received the money from my opponent and refused any longer to accept payment from me, stealthily thrusting me aside, in order that it might appear that my opponent, and not I, was burying my grandfather. And when my opponent claimed this house and everything else that Ciron left behind him, although he said that he had left nothing, I did not think (and my friends agreed with me) that in these painful circumstances I ought to use violence and carry off my grandfather's body, but I took part in the rites and was present at the burial, the expenses of which were defrayed out of my grandfather's estate.
Thus I acted in this manner under compulsion; but in order that they might gain no advantage over me by alleging to you that I bore no part of the funeral expenses, I consulted the interpreter of the sacred law and by his advice I paid for at my own expense and offered the ninth-day offerings in the most sumptuous manner possible, in order that I might confound their sacrilegious tricks, and that it might not seem that they had paid for everything and I for nothing, but that I might be thought to have done my share.