On The Estate Of Pyrrhus
Isaeus
Isaeus. Forster, Edward Seymour, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (1962 printing).
Our opponents, then, have pushed their effrontery so far that, while they denied that the adopted son need obtain the adjudication of an estate which has been bequeathed to him, they thought fit to claim the adjudication of her father's estate to Phile, whom they allege to have been a legitimate daughter left by Pyrrhus. Yet, as I have already said, when testators leave legitimate issue, their children need not demand the adjudication of their patrimony; but, on the contrary, when testators adopt children by will, such children must obtain an adjudication of what is bequeathed to them.
Since the former are the issue of the deceased, no one, I suppose, could dispute their possession of their patrimony; but all blood-relations think they have the right to dispute a bequest to an adopted son. In order, therefore, that suits for such estates may not be brought by any chance claimant and that persons may not dare to demand the adjudication of them as vacant inheritances, adopted sons apply to the court for an adjudication.
Let none of you, therefore, imagine that, if Xenocles had believed his wife to be a legitimate child, he would have brought a suit claiming her patrimony; no, the legitimate daughter would have entered into possession of her father's estate, and, if anyone had tried to seize it or deprive her of it by violence, he would have been ousting her from her patrimony and would have been liable not only to a civil prosecution but also to a public denunciation to the archon and would have risked his person and all his possessions.
Even before any action on the part of Xenocles, Pyrrhus's uncles, if they had known that their nephew had left a legitimate daughter and that none of us was willing to take her in marriage, would never have allowed Xenocles, who was an entire stranger in blood to Pyrrhus, to take and marry one who belonged to them by right of kinship.
Such a proceeding would have been extraordinary. The law ordains that daughters who have been given in marriage by their father and are living with their husbands—and who can judge better than a father what is to his daughter's interest?—in spite of the fact that they are thus married, shall, if their father dies without leaving them legitimate brothers, pass into the legal power of their next-of-kin; and indeed it has frequently happened that husbands have been thus deprived of their own wives.[*](Though the legal principle here stated is correct, it does not apply to all cases indiscriminately. For example, if a daughter, who was an heiress, married and had children, her rights accrued to the children when thy came of age; no doubt also, if she had no children, she could renounce her rights and remain with her husband.)
While, then, the necessary consequence of this law is that women who have been given in marriage by their fathers are thus liable to be legally claimed, would any one of Pyrrhus's uncles, if Phile were a legitimate daughter left by him, have allowed Xenocles to take and marry a woman who belonged to them by right of kinship and thus make him heir[*](As a matter of fact the husband of an heiress enjoyed the use of her fortune only during the minority of their son or sons.) to so large a fortune instead of themselves? Do not believe it, gentlemen;
no man so hates his own advantage and prefers the interest of strangers to his own. If, therefore, they pretend that the adoption of Endius annulled their rights over this woman and allege that it is for this reason that they laid no claim to her, the following questions must be put to them: First, why have they attacked those who have borne witness to the adoption of Endius by Pyrrhus if they admit that it took place?
And, secondly, why did they think fit to claim the succession to Pyrrhus's estate illegally, ignoring him who was its last tenant? Furthermore, you should ask them whether any legitimate child ever thinks of requesting the court to adjudicate to him what is his own. These are the questions with which you should oppose their impudence. That the woman could be legally claimed by her next-of-kin, if she was really a legitimate daughter of the deceased, appears most evidently from the laws.
The law states explicitly that, in the absence of legitimate male issue, a man can dispose of his property as he pleases, but that, if he has daughters, the legatees must take them as well. Thus a man may bequeath and dispose of his property with his daughters, but he may not either adopt a son or leave any of his possessions to anyone without also disposing of his legitimate daughters.
If, therefore, Pyrrhus adopted Endius as his son without also disposing of his legitimate daughter, the adoption would have been void in the eyes of the law; if, on the other hand, he intended to give him his daughter and after adopting him on these terms left her to him, how could you, the uncles of Pyrrhus, have allowed Endius to have the estate of Pyrrhus adjudicated to him without his taking also his legitimate daughter, if he had one, especially as you testified that your nephew solemnly charged you to look after this girl?
Can you say, my good friends, that this point escaped your notice? Yet when Endius betrothed the woman and gave her in marriage, did you, his uncles, allow your own nephew's daughter to be betrothed as his daughter by a mistress, though you declare that you were present when your nephew took her mother to be his wife in due legal form, and further, that you took part by invitation in the celebrations on the tenth day after her child's birth?
Furthermore—and this is the worst part of your conduct—though you declare that your nephew solemnly charged you to look after this girl, your mode of looking after her was to allow her to be married as the daughter of a mistress, although, as you testified, she bore the name of your own sister.
From all this, gentlemen, and from what actually happened, it is easy to see that these men attain the limit of human impudence. For why did our uncle, if he had a legitimate daughter who survived him, adopt and leave behind my brother as his son? Had he nearer relatives than us whom he wished, by adopting my brother, to exclude from the right of claiming his daughter? In the absence of legitimate sons of his own, he neither has nor ever had a single relative nearer than us; for he had no brother or brother's sons, and we were the children of his sister.
But, it may be urged, he might have adopted some other kinsman and given him the possession of his estate and his daughter. Yet what need had he openly to incur the enmity of any one of his relatives, when it was in his power, if he had really married the sister of Nicodemus, to introduce the child, who has been declared to be her offspring, to the members of his ward as his own legitimate child, and leave her sole heiress to all his estate and direct that one of her sons should be introduced as his adopted son?
For it is clear that, if he left her sole heiress, he would have been fully aware that one of two things was likely to happen to her: either one of us, the nearest relatives, would obtain an adjudication and take her as wife; or, if none of us wished to take her, one of these uncles who just now gave evidence, or, failing them, one of the other relatives, would, on the same principle, obtain an adjudication of her together with the whole estate and take her as his wife.
By presenting, then, his daughter to the members of his ward without adopting my brother as his son, he might have obtained this result; whereas, by adopting my brother without introducing his daughter to the members of his ward, he made her illegitimate, as it was right that he should, and therefore incapable of succession, and left my brother heir to his estate.
Further, to prove to you that our uncle never gave a marriage-feast and never thought fit to introduce his daughter, whom our opponents declare to be his legitimate child, to the members of his ward, though their statutes demand that this should be done, the clerk shall read you the deposition of the members of Pyrrhus's ward. Read this; and you, stop the water-clock.
Deposition
Now take the deposition which shows that Pyrrhus adopted my brother.
Deposition
After this will you regard the testimony of Nicodemus as more worthy of credence than the evidence provided by our uncle's own acts?[*](ἐκμαρτυρία, which is strictly a technical term meaning a deposition taken in writing outside the court, is here rhetorically used for the evidence of a person's acts.) And will anyone attempt to persuade you that our uncle made a legal marriage with this woman who was a common courtezan? No, you will never, I am sure, believe it unless Nicodemus can explain the following points, which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech;
First, with what dowry does he say that he married his sister to Pyrrhus? Secondly, before what archon did this married woman give notice of having quitted her husband or his domicile? Next, from whom did Nicodemus recover her dowry, when the man had died to whom he says that he gave her in marriage? Or if, though he demanded it back, he was unable to recover in the course of twenty years, what action did he bring for alimony or for her dowry on behalf of this married woman against the tenant of Pyrrhus's estate?
Furthermore, in addition to all this, let him explain to whom he married his sister at an earlier or later date and whether she had children by another man. These, then, are the questions which you must make him answer, and do not forget to interrogate him also about the marriage-feast to the members of his ward. This is among the proofs which are most damaging to his evidence; for it is obvious that if Pyrrhus was induced to marry this woman, he would also have been induced to give a marriage-feast for her to the members of his ward and to introduce to them the child, who has been declared to be this woman's daughter, as his legitimate offspring.