Letters

If I were present in person I should be trying to explain these matters to you by word of mouth, but since I am in such a plight as I pray may be the lot of anyone who has uttered falsehoods against me to my ruin, I have sent my message in the form of a letter, in the first place, having supreme regard for your honor and your advantage and, in the second, because the same goodwill that I felt toward Lycurgus during his lifetime I believe it right to show that I feel also toward his sons.

If it has occurred to anyone that I have a great abundance[*](In this passage there is a running play of words based upon the common expression ἐκ τῆς περιουσίας, out of one’s abundance. Note περίεστι . . . ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος . . . περίεστι . . . περιγένοιτο) of troubles of my own, I should not hesitate to say to him that I am as much concerned to defend your interests and to forsake none of my friends as I am about my own deliverance. Therefore, it is not out of the abundance of my troubles that I do this, but, actuated by one and the same earnestness and conviction, I devote my efforts to furthering both these interests of mine and those of yours with a single purpose, and the abundance I possess is of such a kind as I pray may abound for those who plot any evil against you. And on these topics I have said enough.

This complaint, inspired by goodwill and affection, though now in outline only, I would gladly enlarge upon a little later in a long letter, which, if only I am alive, you may expect, unless justice shall be done me by you before that time, you who, O—what shall I say so as to seem neither to offend nor to fall short of the truth ?—you all too unfeeling men, who neither before the rest of the world nor before yourselves feel shame, who upon the same charges upon which you acquitted Aristogeiton have banished Demosthenes,

and the privileges which those who dare to set your authority at naught are permitted to have without your leave you do not grant to me, to enable me, if I can, by calling in the sums owing me and levying contributions[*](Harpocration cites this passage under the verb ἐρανίζω. Photius and the Etymologicum Magnum cite the verb only.) upon my friends, to adjust my obligations to you and not, with old age and exile as the guerdon of my past toils in your behalf, be seen wandering from place to place on alien soil, a common reproach to all who have wronged me.

Although it was my wish that my return home might come about by way of an ordinance[*](Cf. Dem. 18.13 ἐν ἐπηρείας τάξει καὶ φθόνου, by way of spite and jealousy. For the meaning cf. sect. 41 of this letter.) of gratitude and magnanimity on your part and that for myself I might secure a dismissal of the false charges unjustly lodged against me, asking only for immunity from imprisonment for such time as you have granted for the payment of the fine, yet these requests you do not grant and you demand, as it is reported to me, Well, who is preventing him from being here and transacting this business?

It is knowing how to feel shame, men of Athens, it is faring in a way unworthy of my public services in your behalf, and it is the loss of my property through those men on whose account I was persuaded in the first place to become surety for their payments in order that they might not have to pay double the sum of which they were unable to pay the original amount.[*](It was the law at Athens that the amount of a debt owed to the State should be doubled if not paid when due. Demosthenes had made a bad loan, which rendered it impossible to pay his fine of fifty talents.) From these men, could I but return with your goodwill, I might possibly recover part, even if not all, so as not to live sordidly the rest of my life, but if I come on such terms as those who talk in this way demand of me, I shall be the victim at one and the same time of ignominy, destitution and fear.

None of these considerations do you take into account but, grudging me the paltry words of a decree and an act of kindness,[*](See Dem. L. 3.39 by way of an ordinance of gratitude and magnanimity on your part.) you will allow me to perish, if it so happen, through your inaction, for I could appeal to no others but you. In that day you will say that I have been shamefully mistreated, I know for a certainty, when it will do neither you nor myself any good, for assuredly you do not expect that I have funds apart from my real and personal property, from which I am separated; the rest of my assets I wish to assemble if in a spirit of humanity instead of spitefulness you will but give me leave to attend to this business unmolested.[*](Demosthenes was condemned to be held in prison until his fine should be paid; he insists that he must enjoy liberty if he is to collect the funds necessary for payment.)

Neither will you ever show that I received money from Harpalus, for neither was I tried and proved guilty nor did I take money, and if you are looking for excuse to the notorious decision of the Council or to the Areopagus,[*](According to Plut. Dem. 26, the orator himself moved that the charges should be referred to the Areopagus, which promptly condemned him.) recall to mind the trial of Aristogeiton[*](Aristogeiton was acquitted, according to Demosthenes, upon the same evidence. See Dem. L. 3.37.) and hide your heads in shame[*](Eight references to this passage may be found in Walz’s Rhetores Graeci, which has an index.); because I have no milder injunction for those who have committed this offence against me.

For surely you will not claim it was just, after information was laid in the very same words by the same Council, for that man to be exonerated and me to be ruined; you are not so void of reason. For I do not deserve it; I am not that kind of a person nor worse than he, though I am unfortunate, thanks to you, I admit, for why not unfortunate when on top of my other calamities I must compare myself with Aristogeiton, and to make matters worse, a ruined man with one who has secured acquittal?

And do not assume from these words that it is anger that moves me, because I could not feel that way toward you. To those who are wronged, however, it brings a certain relief to tell their sorrows, just as it relieves those in pain to moan, because toward you I feel as much goodwill as I would pray you might have toward me. I have made this plain in everything and shall continue to do so,

for I have been resolved from the beginning that it is the duty of every man in public life, if only he be a fair-minded citizen, so to feel toward all his fellow-citizens as children ought to feel toward their parents, and, while praying that he may find them perfectly reasonable, yet to bear with them in a spirit of kindliness as they are[*](This advice for children was possibly a commonplace. It is voiced by Epicurus, Vatican Collection 62.); because defeat under such circumstances is judged among right-minded men to be an honorable and befitting victory. Farewell.

[*](This letter is not cited in ancient authorities and there is less likelihood of its being genuine) Demosthenes to the Council and the Assembly sends greeting.

I hear that Theramenes[*](There is no known connection between this obscure man and the Theramenes who played a conspicuous role during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War.) has uttered various slanderous statements concerning me and in particular that he taunts me with being ill-fated.[*](The implication is that Demosthenes was an unlucky person who brought bad luck to the State. Deinarchus in his speech Against Demosthenes 31-33 (Din. 1.31-33) asserts that he also involved his collaborators in his own ill luck. It may he noted that Cicero, For the Manilian Law 10. 28, places felicitas on a par with scientia rei militaris, virtus, and auctoritas.) Now I am not astonished that this man should be ignorant that abusive language, which demonstrates no vice on the part of the one against whom it is spoken, carries no weight with fair-minded people. For if one who in his way of life is insolent, by birth is not a citizen, and was reared from childhood in a brothel, had even a faint perception in such matters, it would be more unintelligible than complete ignorance.

As for this man, If some day I return and am restored to my rights, I shall plan to have a talk with him about the drunken abuse he directs at me and at you, and I believe that, even if he is devoid of shame, I shall render him more self-restrained. To you, however, in the interest of the common good, I wish to make known by letter what statements I have to make about these matters. Listen to my words with all attention, for I think they are not only worth hearing but also worth remembering.

As for me, I assume that your city is the most fortunate in the world and the dearest to the gods, and I know that Zeus of Dodona and Dione[*](At the shrine of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus it was Dione, and not Hera, who was considered his consort. Elsewhere Dione was identified with Aphrodite or Venus.) and the Pythian Apollo are always saying this in their oracles and confirming with the seal of their approval the opinion that good fortune has her abode in the city among you. Moreover, all that the gods reveal about coming events it is obvious that they prophesy; but the epithets based upon past events they apply to experiences of the past.

Now, what I have done as a public man among you belongs in the class of events already past, on the ground of which the gods have bestowed upon you the epithet fortunate. How, then, is it fair for those who followed advice to be denominated fortunate but the adviser to receive the opposite epithet? Unless someone should give this explanation, that for the common good fortune, of which I was the counsellor, it is the gods who vouch, and to think they lie would be sacrilege, but that the personal slander, which Theramenes has directed against me, it is an insolent, shameless and not even intelligent person who has uttered.

Now, it is not only by the words of the oracles coming from the gods that you will find the fortune you have enjoyed to be good but also by viewing it in the light of the facts themselves, if you will scan them rightly. For if as human beings you are willing to regard our affairs, you will find that our city, as a result of the policy I advised, has been very fortunate, but if you shall demand to receive those blessings which are reserved for the gods alone, you aim at the impossible.

What, then, is reserved for gods but for men is impossible? To be in absolute control of all the blessings there are, both to possess them themselves and to bestow them upon others, and never in all eternity either to suffer anything bad or to look forward to suffering it. Next, these propositions having been laid down, as is proper, scan your blessings in comparison with those of the rest of mankind.

No one, for instance, is so foolish as to assert that what has befallen either the Spartans, whom I never advised, or the Persians, whom I never even visited, is preferable to your present lot. I pass over the Cappadocians, the Syrians, and the beings who inhabit the land of India toward the ends of the earth, all of whom have had the misfortune to suffer many terrible and grievous afflictions.

O yes, by Zeus, all will agree that you are faring better than these, but worse, they declare, than the Thessalians, Argives and Arcadians, or certain others, who had the luck to be in alliance with Philip. But you have come off far better than these, not only because you have not been reduced to slavery—and yet what blessing equals that?—but also because, while all those are thought to be responsible for the evils that have befallen the Greeks through Philip and their enslavement, in consequence of which they are hated with good reason,

you are seen to have struggled in defence of the Greeks at the expense of your lives, your property, your city, your territory and all you possess, in return for which you are entitled to glory and undying gratitude from all lovers of justice. Therefore, as a result of the counsels I gave, it has been the city’s good fortune to fare best of all the states that resisted Philip and there is the added gain of standing in higher repute than those who co-operated with him.