Exordia

I have taken the floor, men of Athens, because I do not hold the same views as some of those who have spoken. Still I shall not allege that these men out of villainy have expressed sentiments opposed to your best interests, but I say that many, while neglecting to judge events critically, make a practice of considering the words they will use, and if they chance to find an ample supply of these, of haranguing the people without more ado. In this they are wrong nor do they reflect in their own minds that, since it is the experience of all that over a long period many plans have worked out happily and some of them, because of the times, quite contrary to their promise, if some speaker cites the one kind and passes over the other, he will unconsciously be doing the easiest thing in the world, deceiving himself.

Now those who thus use the privilege of advising you seem to me to look upon the reputation for eloquence accruing to them from their speeches as an adequate ambition, but it is my opinion that the man who proposes to advise the State on matters of policy should rather consider how the measures adopted shall prove of benefit, and not how his remarks of the moment may find favour. For those who win esteem by their words ought to add to it the accomplishment of some useful work in order that not only now, but for all time, their utterances may have merit.

If you have decided, men of Athens, what it is best to do in the circumstances, it is a mistake to propose debate; for why should you be needlessly bored by listening to what you have yourselves judged to be expedient before hearing it discussed? But if, assuming that you must reach a judgement on the basis of what shall be said, you are exploring and deliberating, it is wrong to stop those who wish to speak, since by so doing you are deprived entirely of whatever practical proposal some speakers have thought up, and you cause other speakers to abandon their own conclusions in favour of what they think you desire to hear.