Exordia

I think that you would rightly pay attention, men of Athens, if any man should promise to demonstrate that in the matters you are considering justice and expediency coincide. Now I believe that I shall do this without difficulty if you on your part will comply with a very slight request of mine. Let none of you, according as one or another has an opinion about the present situation, be positive that he is right in all his conclusions; but, if it turns out that something be said against these, let him consider it, listening to all the points patiently, and then, if some suggestion seems to have been rightly made, adopt it. For the measure that succeeds will belong no less to you who adopted it than to him who proposed it to you. Surely the first step toward sound deliberation is not to have reached a decision before you have heard the discussions upon which you should base your decision. For the occasion and the method of ratifying your resolutions and of deciding in the first instance what seems expedient are not the same.[*](A measure was often debated several times before being ratified. Debate should be leisurely, ratification prompt and decisive: Dem. Ex. 21. 3.)

I have come forward, men of Athens, to consult with you whether I should speak or not, and I shall explain to you for what reason I am at a loss how to decide this by myself. It is obligatory, in my opinion, that one who seeks to gratify neither himself nor certain people, but wishes to say on your behalf what he is convinced is most expedient, should both support good measures proposed by either side, and, conversely, oppose all unfair proposals which either side thinks fit to urge. Accordingly, if you should submit to hear both these lines of argument briefly, you would deliberate much better on the remaining questions; but, if you should desert me before learning my views, it would be my lot to be put in the wrong with both sides without being guilty of injustice to either. Now, I do not deserve to be in this plight. Therefore, if you bid me, I am prepared to speak; otherwise it is well for me to keep silence.

I consider it both just and profitable, men of Athens, for you to lay aside charges and accusations when we are to deliberate, and for each one to say what he thinks is best concerning the matters before you. For while we all understand that through the fault of certain men our affairs are in a bad way, it is the task of your counsellor to suggest by what means they may be improved.