Against Dionysodorus
Demosthenes
Demosthenes. Vol. VI. Private Orations, L-LVIII, In Neaeram, LIX. Murray, A. T., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939 (printing).
But hear what he says in reply to this. He alleges that the ship was disabled on the voyage from Egypt, and that for this reason he was obliged to touch at Rhodes and unlade the grain there. And as a proof of this he states that he chartered ships from Rhodes and shipped some of his goods to Athens. This is one part of his defence, and here is another.
He claims that some other creditors of his have agreed to accept from him interest as far as Rhodes, and that it would be hard indeed if we should not make the same concession that they have made. And thirdly, besides all this, he declares that the agreement requires him to pay the money if the ship arrives safely, but that the ship has not arrived safely in the Peiraeus. To each of these arguments, men of the jury, hear the just answer that we make.
In the first place, when he says that the ship was disabled, I think it is plain to you all that he is lying. For if his ship had met with this mishap, she would neither have got safely to Rhodes nor have been fit for sailing afterwards. But in fact it is plain that she did get safe to Rhodes and was sent back from thence to Egypt, and that at the present time she is still sailing everywhere except to Athens. And yet is it not outrageous that, when he has to bring his ship back to the port of Athens, he says she was disabled, but when he wants to unlade his grain at Rhodes, then that same ship is seen to be seaworthy?
Why, then, he says, did I charter other ships and tranship my cargo and despatch it here to Athens? Because, men of Athens, neither the defendant nor his partner was owner of the entire cargo, but, I fancy, the supercargoes who were on board despatched their own goods hither, in other bottoms necessarily, seeing that these men had cut short the voyage before the ship reached her destination. As for the goods, however, which were their own, they did not ship these in their entirety to Athens, but sought out what ones had advanced in price.
For why, pray, was it that, when you had hired other bottoms, as you say, you did not tranship the entire cargo of your vessel, but left the grain there in Rhodes? Because, men of the jury, it was to their interest to sell the grain in Rhodes; for they heard that the price had fallen here in Athens, but they shipped to you the other goods, from which they hoped to make a profit. When, then, Dionysodorus, you talk about the chartering of the vessels, you give proof, not that your ship was disabled, but that it was to your advantage to do so.
Concerning these matters, then, what I have said is sufficient, but in regard to the creditors, who, they say, consented to accept from them the interest as far as Rhodes, this has nothing to do with us. If any man has remitted to you any part of what was due him, no wrong is suffered by either party to the arrangement. But we have not remitted anything to you, nor have we consented to your voyage to Rhodes, nor in our judgement is anything more binding than the agreement.
Now what does the agreement say, and to what port does it require you to sail? From Athens to Egypt and from Egypt to Athens; and in default of your so doing, it requires you to pay double the amount. If you have done this, you have committed no wrong; but if you have not done it, and have not brought your ship back to Athens, it is proper that you should suffer the penalty provided by the agreement; for this requirement was imposed upon you, not by some other person, but by yourself. Show, then, to the jury one or the other of two things—that our agreement is not valid, or that you are not required to do everything in accordance with it.
If certain people have remitted anything in your favor, and have been induced on one ground or another to accept interest only as far as Rhodes, does it follow that you are doing no wrong to us, your agreement with whom you have broken in having your ship put into Rhodes? I do not think so. For this jury is not now deciding upon concessions made to you by others, but upon an agreement entered into by you yourself with us. For that the remission of the interest, supposing that it actually took place, as these men allege, was to the advantage of the creditors, is plain to every one of you.
For those who lent their money to these men for the outward voyage from Egypt to Athens, when they reached Rhodes and this man put into that port, suffered no loss, I take it, by remitting the interest and receiving the amount of their loan at Rhodes, and then putting the money to work again for a voyage to Egypt. No; this was more to their advantage than to continue the voyage to this port.
For voyaging from Rhodes to Egypt is uninterrupted, and they could put the same money to work two or three times, whereas here they would have had to pass the winter and to await the season for sailing. These creditors therefore have reaped an additional profit, and have not remitted anything to these men. With us, however, it is not a question of the interest merely, but we are unable to recover even our principal.