Against Stephanus I
Demosthenes
Demosthenes. Vol. V. Private Orations, XLI-XLIX. Murray, A. T., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939 (printing).
You have heard the deposition, men of the jury, and I think that even if you have noticed nothing else, this at least must have seemed strange to you, that it begins with a challenge and ends with a will. However, I on my part, count it right, when I shall have shown what may be called the main substance of the testimony to be false, then, and not till then, to say something also about matters of that sort.
Well, then, it is deposed by them that Phormio challenged me to open the will which Amphias, brother—in—law of Cephisophon, submitted to the arbitrator Teisias; and that I refused to open it; and that the will to which they themselves deposed was a copy of that original; and then follows a copy of the will.
Now as to whether Phormio tendered me this challenge or not, and whether the will is genuine or spurious I say nothing as yet; I will discuss these matters before you presently; but I will take up the testimony they have given, that I refused to open the document. I would have you look at the matter in this way—what reason would anyone have had for refusing to open it? In order, one may say, that the will might not be shown to the jury.
Well and good. If they had not deposed to the will as well as to the challenge, there would have been some reason in my refusing to open the document; but since they deposed to both, and the jurymen were going to hear the will in any case, what advantage was there for me in refusing? None, assuredly. Quite the contrary, men of Athens; even if these men had tendered no challenge, but had merely talked of the matter, and someone had delivered a document to them as a will,
it would have been my business to tender the challenge and to order them to open it, in order that, if the contents differed from the statements which these men had made in their deposition, I might have called a number of the bystanders as witnesses, and have used this fact as a proof that the rest of their story too was a fabrication; but, if the contents were the same, I might have required the one presenting it to give evidence himself. If he consented, I should have had a responsible witness, and, if he refused, this very fact again would have been a convincing proof for me that the affair had been concocted. And in the former case the result would have been that I had one person with whom to deal, whereas according to the depositions of these men I have many. Is there anyone among you who would have chosen the latter course? I think not one of you would have.
Well then, you ought not to believe it of anyone else either. For, men of Athens, in all courses of action which involve anger or some getting of gain or exasperation or a spirit of jealousy, different persons will act in different ways in accordance with their several dispositions; but in all cases where none of these things is involved, but merely a calm calculation of one’s own interest, who would be so senseless as to dismiss what would help him and do what would make it more difficult for him to win his case? Yet a course of action which is neither natural nor reasonable, which, in short, no human being would have undertaken—this these witnesses have attributed to me.
Moreover, it is not only from what they have stated in their deposition regarding my refusal to open the document that one can tell that they are lying, but also from the fact that they have deposed at one and the same time both to a challenge and to a will. For I think you are all aware that challenges were devised for all transactions which it is impossible to bring before you;
for instance, a man may not be put to torture in your presence—for this it is necessary that there be a challenge; again, if anything has been transacted and has taken place somewhere out of the country, it is necessary that for this too there should be a challenge to go by sea or land to the place where the thing was done; and so for other things of that sort. But in cases where it is possible to produce the things themselves before your eyes, what could be simpler than to produce them publicly?