Against Stephanus I

Demosthenes

Demosthenes. Vol. V. Private Orations, XLI-XLIX. Murray, A. T., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939 (printing).

For if the inscription on the will had been the property of Pasio and Phormio or in the matter of Phormio, or something of that sort, he would naturally have kept it for him; but if, as he has testified, the inscription was the will of Pasio, I should certainly have appropriated it, knowing that I was about to go to law, and knowing further that, if its contents were as represented, it was prejudicial to my interests; for I was the heir, and if the will was my father’s, it belonged to me, as did also all the rest of my father’s estate.

Well then, by its having been produced to Phormio, by its having been inscribed the will of Pasio, and yet ignored by me, it is proved that the will is a forgery and that the testimony of Cephisophon is false. But no more of Cephisophon; it is not with him that I have to do at present, and he has given no testimony as to the contents of the will.

And yet, men of Athens, I would have you consider how strong a proof this also is that these men have given false testimony. For when the witness who stated that he had the document in his own possession did not dare to say that the one produced by Phormio was a copy of the one in his own keeping; and when these men cannot state that they were present in the first instance or that they saw the document opened before the arbitrator, but have themselves actually deposed that I refused to open it, to have testified now that the one is a copy of the other, is not this to have accused themselves of falsifying?

More than all this, men of Athens, any man by examining the wording of the deposition can see that it is nothing but a contrivance of theirs to the end that rightly or wrongly it may appear that my father made this will.

(To the clerk.) But take the deposition itself, and read, stopping wherever I bid you, that from its own wording I may prove my point.

The Deposition

--- depose that they were present before the arbitrator Teisias, when Phormio challenged Apollodorus, if he declared that the document was not a copy of the will of Pasio ---

Stop reading. Bear in mind that the words are of the will of Pasio. Now persons who wished to bear witness to the truth—assuming that it is absolutely established that the challenge was tendered, which it was not—ought to have given their testimony in the following way.

(To the clerk.) Read the deposition again from the beginning.

The Deposition

--- depose that they were present before the arbitrator Teisias ---

We do depose; for we were present. Read on.

--- when Phormio challenged Apollodorus ---

This, too, they might properly have stated, assuming that he really tendered the challenge.

--- if he declared that the document was not a copy of the will of Pasio ---

Stop right there. There is not a person in the world, I presume, who would have proceeded to give this testimony, unless he had been present when my father drew up the will. Instead, he would have said at once, How do we know if there is any will of Pasio’s?—and he would have demanded that Phormio write, as in the beginning of the challenge: If I declared that the document was not a copy of the will which Phormio stated that Pasio had left,—not of the will of Pasio. For this was to testify that there was a will (which was their intention), the other that Phormio said that there was. And, I take it, there is a world of difference between a thing’s being so, and Phormio’s saying that it is.

So, in order that you may know how many and how important objects were to be secured by the fabrication of the will, listen for a moment. The first, men of Athens, was this, that Phormio should escape paying the penalty for corrupting one whom it is not proper for me to name, but whom you know of yourselves, even if I do not name her[*](This assumption of reluctance to speak of his mother is in glaring contrast with the gross accusation made against her later in the speech.); next, that he might get possession of my father’s property which was in my mother’s keeping; and in addition to this, that he might become master of everything else which belonged to us. That this is so, you will be convinced when you hear the will. For it will be found, not like that of a father writing in the interest of his sons, but like that of a slave who has shamefully misused what belonged to his master, and who is seeking how he may escape punishment.

(To the clerk.) Read them the will itself, to which these men have deposed along with the challenge; and do you mark well what I say.

The Will

This is the will of Pasio of Acharnae. I give my wife Archippê to Phormio, and I give as dowry to Archippê the talent due to me at Peparethus,[*](Peparethus is a small island north of Euboea, on which was an Athenian colony. Its modern name is Skopelos.) the talent due to me here in Athens, a lodging-house worth one hundred minae, the female slaves and jewelry, and all else that she has in the house. All these things I give to Archippê.

You have heard, men of Athens, the large amount of the dowry,—a talent from Peparethus, a talent from Athens, a lodging-house worth a hundred minae, female slaves and jewelry, and all else that she has in her possession—I give it all, says the will; and by this clause he precludes us even from searching for any of the property that was left.

Now let me show you the lease under which Phormio had taken the bank from my father; for from this also, spurious though it is, you will see that the will is fabrication through and through. I will set forth for you, not a different lease, but the one which Phormio produced, in which there is an added clause setting down my father as owing Phorniio eleven talents on the deposits.

This had, I think, the following purpose. Of the effects in the house he made himself master by the will, on the ground that they had been given as a dowry with my mother, as you have just heard; but the money in the bank, about which everybody knew, and which could not be hidden, he got into his hands by representing that our father owed it, so that whatever sums he might be proved to have in his possession he might claim to have received in payment. You have perhaps imagined, because he solecizes[*](σόλοικος is a word of narrower meaning than βάρβαρος, and is applied mainly to faults of pronunciation or mistakes in grammar, especially syntax, due to foreign origin (Sandys). It would, however, be quite futile to look for a specific error in the, very probably spurious, lease inserted in the oration.) in his speech, that he is a barbarian and a man readily to be despised. The fellow is indeed a barbarian in that he hates those whom he ought to honor; but in villainy and in bringing matters to ruin[*](The metaphor is from house-breaking.) he is second to none.

(To the clerk.) Take the lease and read it—the lease which they put in, as they did the will, by means of a challenge.

The Lease of The Bank

On the following terms Pasio has let the bank to Phormio: Phormio is to pay to the sons of Pasio as rental for the bank two talents and forty minae each year above the daily expenditure, and it shall not be lawful for Phormio to carry on a banking business independently unless he first obtains the consent of the sons of Pasio. And Pasio owes the bank eleven talents upon the deposits.

This, men of the jury, is the agreement which Phormio produced, alleging that he had leased the bank upon these terms. You learn from hearing it read that Phormio, over and above the daily expenditure, was to pay as rent two talents and forty minae each year, and that it was not to be permitted him to carry on a banking business, unless he obtained our consent; and there is added as a final statement, Pasio owes eleven talents upon the deposits.

Now, is there any man who would have submitted to the payment of so large a rental for the counter, the site, and the books? And is there any man who would have entrusted the rest of the assets to a man thanks to whom the bank had incurred so great a liability?[*](Pasio is stated by Phormio to have owed the bank eleven talents (Dem. 36.4). This debt may be assumed to have been properly secured, so that it was in no sense a deficit. The present speaker, however, represents it as such, and implies that the bank had been brought to insolvence through Phormio’s incompetence.) For, if there was a shortage of so large an amount, it was incurred while Phormio was manager. For you all know that, while my father was engaged in the banking business, Phormio sat at the counter and was his manager; so that he ought rather to be in the mill[*](Slaves were often condemned to the heavy labor of turning the millstone.) than to become master of the rest of the property.

However, I pass over this and all else that I might find to say about the eleven talents, to show that my father did not owe them but that Phormio secretly appropriated them.

But let me remind you of the purpose for which I read the lease, namely, to prove that the will is spurious. For it stands written in the lease that it shall not be lawful for Phormio to engage in banking business, unless he obtains our consent. This clause absolutely proves the will to be spurious. For what man, who had taken precautions that the profits which Phormio might make by banking should accrue to his own children and not to Phormio himself, and to secure this end had stipulated that it should not be permitted him to engage in banking for himself, lest his interests might be separated from ours—what man, I ask, in these circumstances would have provided that Phormio should get possession of what he had himself won by his labor and left in his house?

And would he have begrudged him the banking business, in which he might have given him a share without disgrace, and yet have given him his wife, a bequest disgraceful above all others? Yes, after receiving from you the gift of citizenship, he gave his wife (if indeed he gave her) as a slave giving to his master, and not, on the contrary, as a master to a slave, and he added such a dowry as no man in Athens was ever known to give.[*](The mother of Demosthenes brought to her husband a dowry of only 80 minae (Dem. 27.5); the mother of Mantitheus one of 60 minae (Dem. 40.6); and the two daughters of Polyeuctus dowries of 40 minae each (Dem. 41.3 and Dem. 41.27).)

And yet, to have been honored with the hand of his mistress was of itself enough to make this fellow content, whereas in my father’s case, even if he received as much money as these people allege that he gave, it was not reasonable for him to make this arrangement.[*](That is, it would not have been reasonable for him to leave his wife to his former slave even if he had received as a bribe the large sum which he is alleged to have given as a marriage portion.) Nevertheless, to things which are proved to be false by the probabilities, the dates and the facts, to these this man Stephanus has not hesitated to depose.

Then he goes about, saying that Nicocles testified that he had served as guardian under the will, and Pasicles that he had lived as ward under the will. But for my part I hold that these very facts are proofs that neither these witnesses nor those have testified to the truth. For a person who testifies that he served as guardian under a will should certainly know what the nature of the will was, and a person who testifies that he lived as ward under a will should certainly know what the nature of the will was.

Why in the world, then, Stephanus, did you people depose to the will under the form of a challenge, instead of leaving the matter to them? If they on their part shall declare that they do not know the contents of the will, how is it possible for you to know them, you who have never in any way been connected with the matter? Why, pray, is it that one group of witnesses testified to these facts, and another group to those? It is as I have already told you: they divided the fraud. The one so testifying saw no danger in deposing that he served as guardian under the will, or that he lived as ward under the will,

each one of them omitting to state what had been written in the will by Phormio,—no danger in deposing that one’s father had left him a document with the word will written on it, or anything of that sort. But to testify to the existence of a will in which were involved the theft of such vast sums, the corruption of a lady, the marriage of a mistress with her slave, matters which entailed such shame and disgrace—nobody was ready to do this save these men who got up the challenge; and from them it is right to exact the penalty for the whole of this villainous fraud.

Now, men of Athens, that it may be made clear to you that this fellow Stephanus has given false testimony—made clear not merely by my accusations and proofs, but also by the acts of the person who brought him forward as a witness—I wish to tell you what that person has done. As I said at the beginning of my speech, I shall show that they are their own accusers. In the suit in which this testimony was given, Phormio entered a special plea to estop me on the ground that the suit was not admissible, alleging that I had released him from all claims.