Against Leochares
Demosthenes
Demosthenes. Vol. V. Private Orations, XLI-XLIX. Murray, A. T., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939 (printing).
Furthermore, that affidavits of objection are of all forms of trial the most unjust, and that those having recourse to them are most deserving of your resentment, one can see very clearly from the following facts. In the first place, they are not necessary as the other forms of procedure are, but they are instituted by the will and desire of the one swearing to them.[*](The affidavit of objection (διαμαρτύρια), like the special plea in bar of action (παραγραφή), afforded a means by which the defendant could prevent a case from being tried upon its merits, and so could be regarded as a means of thwarting the course of justice.) If in the matter of disputed claims there is no other way of getting a judgement than by such an affidavit, it is perhaps necessary to make one.
But, if it is possible without an affidavit of objections to obtain a hearing before all tribunals, is not the use of one a mark of recklessness and utter desperation? For the lawgiver did not make it obligatory on the contending parties, but granted them the privilege of putting in such an affidavit, if they chose, as though he were testing the character of each one of us, to see how we stand with reference to a reckless procedure.[*](There is, of course, the implication that those having recourse to this procedure thereby showed themselves either unscrupulous or in despair of their case.)
Further, if it rested with those who file these affidavits, there would be neither courts of justice nor trials; for the nature of affidavits of objections is to bIock all these things and to prevent all cases from being brought into the court-room—at least so far as the will of the one swearing the affidavit goes. Therefore I think we should regard such people as the common enemies of all men, and that they should never receive any indulgence when they are on trial before you; for each one of them comes into court, not under compulsion, but having chosen to incur the risk of the oath.
Well then, that the affidavit is false, you have learned pretty definitely from the statements contained in it and from the arguments which you have heard. But that the laws also give us this inheritance as our right, men of the jury, I wish to prove in a few words—not as though this had not been made clear to you in what I said at the outset, but that you may the better bear in mind the justice of our case, and so meet the false statements of our opponents.