Against Leochares

This very thing is the strongest proof of the falsehood of the affidavit—that it is not the same person who makes the claim about the same matter. And this is not strange for, I fancy, when Leostratus here made his deposit in the inheritance suit against us, the one who has now sworn the affidavit had not yet registered himself as a member of the deme. We should therefore be most cruelly treated if you should believe an affidavit made after the suit was begun.

Nay more, Leochares has in the affidavit sworn to facts actually older than himself. For how could a person who was not yet a member of the house of Archiades when this suit for the inheritance was instituted, know anything about these matters? Moreover, if he had sworn it of himself alone, there would have been some sense in his action; he would have written what was false, but nevertheless his statement would have concerned one of an age to know. But as it is, he has written that the aforesaid Archiades had lawfully born sons, meaning, of course, his own father and the one made such by the original adoption, not taking cognizance of the fact that they had returned to their original family. It follows, then, of necessity that he has sworn to events older than himself, and not to things which have happened in his own day. Are you, then, to credit one who has dared a thing like that, as though he were speaking the truth?

Ah, but he will say that he has heard from his father the facts to which he has sworn. But the law does not admit hearsay evidence, save in the case of deceased persons; whereas this fellow has dared to swear to acts done by his father, while that father is still alive. Then again, why did Leostratus here inscribe on the affidavit the name, not of himself, but of the defendant? For the older facts should have been sworn to by the older man. It was, he might say, because I have had this youth adopted as son to Archiades.

Well then, you who had him adopted and concocted the whole affair ought to have rendered an account of it, and made yourself responsible for what you have done. You ought absolutely to have done so. But you evaded this, and wrote over the affidavit the name of your son here, who knew nothing of the matter. You see, then, men of the jury, that the statements in the affidavit are false, and they are admitted by these men themselves to be so. Why, it would even be right for you to refuse to listen to this man Leostratus, when he presently undertakes to make statements to which he did not venture to swear in the affidavit.

Furthermore, that affidavits of objection are of all forms of trial the most unjust, and that those having recourse to them are most deserving of your resentment, one can see very clearly from the following facts. In the first place, they are not necessary as the other forms of procedure are, but they are instituted by the will and desire of the one swearing to them.[*](The affidavit of objection (διαμαρτύρια), like the special plea in bar of action (παραγραφή), afforded a means by which the defendant could prevent a case from being tried upon its merits, and so could be regarded as a means of thwarting the course of justice.) If in the matter of disputed claims there is no other way of getting a judgement than by such an affidavit, it is perhaps necessary to make one.

But, if it is possible without an affidavit of objections to obtain a hearing before all tribunals, is not the use of one a mark of recklessness and utter desperation? For the lawgiver did not make it obligatory on the contending parties, but granted them the privilege of putting in such an affidavit, if they chose, as though he were testing the character of each one of us, to see how we stand with reference to a reckless procedure.[*](There is, of course, the implication that those having recourse to this procedure thereby showed themselves either unscrupulous or in despair of their case.)

Further, if it rested with those who file these affidavits, there would be neither courts of justice nor trials; for the nature of affidavits of objections is to bIock all these things and to prevent all cases from being brought into the court-room—at least so far as the will of the one swearing the affidavit goes. Therefore I think we should regard such people as the common enemies of all men, and that they should never receive any indulgence when they are on trial before you; for each one of them comes into court, not under compulsion, but having chosen to incur the risk of the oath.

Well then, that the affidavit is false, you have learned pretty definitely from the statements contained in it and from the arguments which you have heard. But that the laws also give us this inheritance as our right, men of the jury, I wish to prove in a few words—not as though this had not been made clear to you in what I said at the outset, but that you may the better bear in mind the justice of our case, and so meet the false statements of our opponents.