Against Leochares

For when he failed to get his own name inscribed, he entered his own son Leochares as an adopted son of Archiades, in defiance of all the laws, before the scrutiny[*](For this scrutiny see note 3 of Dem. 27.) of the deme had taken place. But Leochares had not yet been introduced to the clansmen of Archiades; yet when his name had been entered on the list of the deme, only then did Leostratus, by bringing influence to bear upon a certain member of the clan, get the name inscribed upon the clan register.[*](This should have normally have been done shortly after birth, for the enrollment in the clan marked the acceptance of the child as a member of the family, as the enrollment in the deme marked a youth’s assumption of the status of citizenship.)

And after that, in his affidavit before the archon he inscribed Leochares as being the lawfully born son of the man who had been dead many years past—Leochares, who had been registered with the clan only a day or two before! So it results that they both lay claim to the inheritance; for Leostratus here made the deposit for costs in the inheritance suit as being the lawfully born son of Archiades, and Leochares here has filed the affidavit, as being the lawfully born son of the same father!

And in neither case is it to a living man, but to one that is dead, that each of them makes himself an adopted son! But in our opinion, men of the jury, you ought, when you shall have cast your vote concerning the present case, then, and not till then, to find from among us, who are nearest of kin, an adopted son for the deceased, in order that the family may not become extinct.

First, men of the jury, to prove that Leostratus here has returned to the Eleusinians from the demesmen of Otrynê, leaving a lawfully born son in the family of Archiades; and that his father at an earlier date had done this same thing; and that the son so left has died without issue; and that the one who has now sworn the affidavit was enrolled among the demesmen before he had been enrolled among the members of the clan—to prove these facts the clerk shall read you the depositions of the members of the clan and of the deme; and in proof of all the other things I have mentioned which these men have done I shall produce testimony concerning each several fact.

(To the clerk.) Please call the witnesses to come forward.

The Witnesses

All the facts of the case, then, you have heard, men of the jury, all that took place at the first in connection with this inheritance, and all that occurred subsequently, as soon as we commenced our suit. It remains to speak of the affidavit itself and the laws in accordance with which we claim to inherit; and furthermore, if the water holds out and we shall not be troubling you too much, to refute the arguments which our opponents are going to advance, proving to you that they are neither just nor sound. And first let the clerk read the affidavit; and I beg you to give it close attention; for it is regarding this that your votes are presently to be cast.

The Affidavit

Well, then, the defendant has sworn, as you have heard, that the inheritance of Archiades is not open to litigation, since he has children lawfully born and rightfully established according to the statute. Let us, then, inquire if there are any, or if the defendant has sworn to what is false. The aforesaid Archiades, whose estate is in question, adopted as his son the grandfather of the one who has now sworn this affidavit; he, leaving a lawfully born son, Leostratus, the father of the defendant, returned to the Eleusinians.

After this, Leostratus here himself returned to the house of his fathers, leaving a son in the adoptive house; and the son whom he left, and who was the last of all the adopted children, has died without issue, so that the house thereby becomes extinct and the inheritance has reverted again to those originally nearest of kin.

How, then, could Archiades still have any sons, as the affidavit claims, when it is admitted that his adopted children returned to their original family and the last one left has died without issue? It follows, then, of necessity that the family is extinct. But when the family is extinct, there cannot be lawfully born sons still living. The fellow, then, has sworn that non-existent persons exist, and has written in the affidavit since he has children, alleging that he himself is one of them.

But surely, when he says lawfully born and rightfully established according to the statute, he is quibbling and defying the laws. For the lawfully born exists, when it is born of the body; and the law bears testimony to this, when it says, Lawfully born are children of a woman whom her father or brother or grandfather has given in marriage. But rightfully established the lawgiver understood of adoptions, considering that when a man, being childless and master of his property, adopts a son, this action ought to be rightful. Well, our opponent says that Archiades had no son of the body, but in the affidavit he has sworn to the words since there are lawfully born children, thus making a sworn statement that is contrary to the truth.

He admits that he is an adopted son, yet it is manifest that he was not adopted by the dead man himself; so how can you claim that this status is rightfully established according to the statute? Because, he will say, he was registered as the son of Archiades. Yes, by the arbitrary act of these men, and that only the other day, when the suit for the estate had already been instituted. Surely it is not right for a man to regard as evidence his own illegal act.

For is it not an outrageous thing, men of tlie jury, that he should state—as he will presently in his speech—that he is an adopted son, while in his affidavit he did not dare to write this? Or that, while in the affidavit the protest is made as though for a son of the body, the speech that will presently be made will be on behalf of an adopted son? If they are going to make their defence conflict with the affidavit, surely either what they say, or what they swore, is false. It was with good reason that they did not add to the affidavit mention of the adoption, for in that case they would have had to add the words adopted by so-and-so. But Archiades never did adopt them; they adopted themselves, in order to rob us of the inheritance.

Now is not their next proceeding absurd as well as outrageous?—that Leostratus here should have made his deposit for costs in the inheritance suit before the archon, as being the son of Archiades (while he was an Eleusinian, and Archiades of the deme Otrynê), but that someone else should have sworn the affidavit, as you see for yourselves, alleging that he, too, was a son of Archiades? To which of the two should you pay attention, as telling the truth?

This very thing is the strongest proof of the falsehood of the affidavit—that it is not the same person who makes the claim about the same matter. And this is not strange for, I fancy, when Leostratus here made his deposit in the inheritance suit against us, the one who has now sworn the affidavit had not yet registered himself as a member of the deme. We should therefore be most cruelly treated if you should believe an affidavit made after the suit was begun.

Nay more, Leochares has in the affidavit sworn to facts actually older than himself. For how could a person who was not yet a member of the house of Archiades when this suit for the inheritance was instituted, know anything about these matters? Moreover, if he had sworn it of himself alone, there would have been some sense in his action; he would have written what was false, but nevertheless his statement would have concerned one of an age to know. But as it is, he has written that the aforesaid Archiades had lawfully born sons, meaning, of course, his own father and the one made such by the original adoption, not taking cognizance of the fact that they had returned to their original family. It follows, then, of necessity that he has sworn to events older than himself, and not to things which have happened in his own day. Are you, then, to credit one who has dared a thing like that, as though he were speaking the truth?

Ah, but he will say that he has heard from his father the facts to which he has sworn. But the law does not admit hearsay evidence, save in the case of deceased persons; whereas this fellow has dared to swear to acts done by his father, while that father is still alive. Then again, why did Leostratus here inscribe on the affidavit the name, not of himself, but of the defendant? For the older facts should have been sworn to by the older man. It was, he might say, because I have had this youth adopted as son to Archiades.

Well then, you who had him adopted and concocted the whole affair ought to have rendered an account of it, and made yourself responsible for what you have done. You ought absolutely to have done so. But you evaded this, and wrote over the affidavit the name of your son here, who knew nothing of the matter. You see, then, men of the jury, that the statements in the affidavit are false, and they are admitted by these men themselves to be so. Why, it would even be right for you to refuse to listen to this man Leostratus, when he presently undertakes to make statements to which he did not venture to swear in the affidavit.

Furthermore, that affidavits of objection are of all forms of trial the most unjust, and that those having recourse to them are most deserving of your resentment, one can see very clearly from the following facts. In the first place, they are not necessary as the other forms of procedure are, but they are instituted by the will and desire of the one swearing to them.[*](The affidavit of objection (διαμαρτύρια), like the special plea in bar of action (παραγραφή), afforded a means by which the defendant could prevent a case from being tried upon its merits, and so could be regarded as a means of thwarting the course of justice.) If in the matter of disputed claims there is no other way of getting a judgement than by such an affidavit, it is perhaps necessary to make one.

But, if it is possible without an affidavit of objections to obtain a hearing before all tribunals, is not the use of one a mark of recklessness and utter desperation? For the lawgiver did not make it obligatory on the contending parties, but granted them the privilege of putting in such an affidavit, if they chose, as though he were testing the character of each one of us, to see how we stand with reference to a reckless procedure.[*](There is, of course, the implication that those having recourse to this procedure thereby showed themselves either unscrupulous or in despair of their case.)

Further, if it rested with those who file these affidavits, there would be neither courts of justice nor trials; for the nature of affidavits of objections is to bIock all these things and to prevent all cases from being brought into the court-room—at least so far as the will of the one swearing the affidavit goes. Therefore I think we should regard such people as the common enemies of all men, and that they should never receive any indulgence when they are on trial before you; for each one of them comes into court, not under compulsion, but having chosen to incur the risk of the oath.

Well then, that the affidavit is false, you have learned pretty definitely from the statements contained in it and from the arguments which you have heard. But that the laws also give us this inheritance as our right, men of the jury, I wish to prove in a few words—not as though this had not been made clear to you in what I said at the outset, but that you may the better bear in mind the justice of our case, and so meet the false statements of our opponents.