Against Boeotus I

You hear then, men of Athens, that I have always been in possession of the name Mantitheus; but that my father, when he was compelled to enter him, entered the defendant in the list of clansmen as Boeotus. I should be glad, then, to ask him in your presence, If my father had not died, what would you have done in the presence of your demesman? Would you not have allowed yourself to be registered as Boeotus? But it would have been absurd to bring suit to force this and then afterwards to seek to prevent it. And yet, if you had allowed him, my father would have enrolled you in the register of demesmen by the same name as he did in that of the clansmen. Then, O Earth and the Gods, it is monstrous for him to claim that Mantias is his father, and yet to have the audacity to try to make of none effect what Mantias did in his lifetime.

He had the effrontery, moreover, to make before the arbitrator the most audacious assertions, that my father kept the tenth day after birth for him, just as for me, and gave him the name Mantitheus; and he brought forward as witnesses persons with whom my father was never known to be intimate. But I think that not one of you is unaware that no man would have kept the tenth day for a child which he did not believe was rightly his own; nor, if he had kept the day and shown the affection one would feel for a son, would afterward have dared to deny him.

For even if he might have got into some quarrel with the mother of these children, he would not have hated them, if he believed them to be his own.[*](This passage is repeated with slight changes in the following oration, Dem. 40.29.) For man and wife are much more apt, in cases where they are at variance with one another, to become reconciled for the sake of their children, than, on the ground of the injuries which they have done one to the other, to hate their common children also. However, it is not from these facts alone that you may see that he will be lying, if he makes these statements; but, before he claimed to be a kinsman of ours, he used to go to the tribe Hippothontis to dance in the chorus of boys.[*](That is, to the tribe to which his mother belonged, not to that of Mantias, which was the Acamantis. The speaker would have this indicate that the mother was conscious that the boy was not the son of Mantias.)

And yet, who among you imagines that his mother would have sent him to this tribe, if, as she alleges, she had been cruelly treated by my father, and knew that he had kept the tenth day, and afterward denied it? Not one, I am sure. For it would have been just as much your right to go to school to the tribe Acamantis, and then the tribe would have been in manifest agreement with the giving of the name.

To prove that I am speaking the truth in this, I shall bring before you as witnesses those who went to school with him, and know the facts.

The Witnesses

Nevertheless, although it is so plain that by his mother’s oath and the simplicity of him who tendered the oath to her, he has obtained a father and established his birth in the tribe Acamantis, instead of Hippothontis, the defendant Boeotus is not content with this, but has actually entered two or three suits against me for money, in addition to the malicious and baseless actions which he brought against me before. And yet I think you all know what sort of a man of business my father was.[*](He was so poor a man of business that after his death his heirs had to pay off indebtedness incurred by him.)

I will say nothing about this; but if the mother of these men has sworn truly, it absolutely proves that the fellow is acting as a malicious pettyfogger in these suits. For if my father was so extravagant that after having married my mother in lawful wedlock, he kept another woman, whose children you are, and maintained two establishments, how pray if he were a man of this sort, could he have left any money?

I am well aware, men of Athens, that the defendant, Boeotus, will have no valid argument to advance, but will have recourse to the statements he is always making, that my father was induced by me to treat him with despite; and he claims the right, alleging that he is older than I, to bear the name of his paternal grandfather. As to this, it is better for you to listen to a few statements. I remember seeing him, before he became a relative of mine, casually, as one might see anyone else, and thought him younger than I, and to judge by appearances, much younger; but I will not insist upon this, for it would be silly to do so.

However, suppose one should ask this Boeotus the following questions: When you thought it right to join the chorus in the tribe Hippothontis before you claimed to be the son of my father, what name would you have set down as rightly belonging to you? For if you should say, Mantitheus, you could not do so on the plea that you are older than I, for since at that time you did not suppose you had any connection even with my tribe, how could you claim to be related to my grandfather?

Besides, men of Athens, not one of you knows the number of the years, for I shall say that I am the elder, and he will say that he is, but you all understand the just way of reckoning. And what is this? That these men should be considered children of my father from the date when he adopted them. Well then, he entered me on the register of the demesmen as Mantitheus, before he introduced this man to the clansmen. Therefore not by virtue of time only, but also by virtue of justice I have the right to bear this name as a mark of seniority.

Very well. Now, suppose one should ask you this question? Tell me, Boeotus, how is it that you have now become a member of the tribe Acamantis, and of the deme Thoricus, and a son of Mantias, and have your share in the property left by him? You could give no other answer than, Mantias while living acknowledged me, too, as his son. If one should ask you what proof you had of this or what evidence, you would say, He introduced me to the clansmen. But if one asked under what name he enrolled you, you would say, Boeotus, for that is the name by which you were introduced.

It is, then, an outrage that whereas thanks to that name you have a share in the right of citizenship and in the estate left by my father, you should see fit to fling it aside and take another name. Come; suppose my father were to rise from the grave and demand of you either to abide by the name under which he adopted you, or to declare yourself the son of some other father, would his demand not be thought a reasonable one? Well then, I make this same demand of you, either to add to your name that of another father, or to keep the name which Mantias gave you.

Ah, you may say, but that name was given you by way of derision or insult. No; very often, during the time when my father refused to acknowledge them, these men used to say that the kinsfolk of the defendant’s mother were quite as good as those of my father. Boeotus is the name of his mother’s brother; and when my father was compelled to bring them into the clan, when I had already been introduced as Mantitheus, he introduced the defendant as Boeotus, and his brother as Pamphilus. For I challenge you to show me any Athenian who ever gave the same name to two of his sons. If you can, I will grant that my father gave you this name by way of insult.

And yet, if your character was such that you could force him to adopt you, but not study how you might please him, you were not what a true son ought to be toward his parents; and, if you were not, you would have deserved, not only to be treated with indignity, but even to be put to death. It would indeed be an outrageous thing, if the laws concerning parents are to be binding upon children whom the father recognizes as his own, but are to be of no effect against those who have forced themselves in[*](The word chosen is the one properly used of aliens who seek to arrogate to themselves the rights of citizenship.) and compelled an unwilling adoption.

You unconscionable Boeotus, do, pray, give up your present ways; but, if indeed you are unwilling to, do, in Heaven’s name, accept advice in this at least; cease to make trouble for yourself, and cease bringing malicious and baseless charges against me; and be content that you have gained citizenship, an estate, a father. No one is trying to dispossess you of these things; certainly not I. Nay, if, as you claim to be a brother, you also act as a brother, people will believe that you are of our blood; but if you go on plotting against me, suing me, evincing malice toward me, slandering me, you will be thought to have intruded yourself into what belonged to others, and then to be treating it as though it were not rightly yours.

I certainly am doing you no wrong, even if it were never so true that my father refused to recognize you, though you were really his son. It was not my part to know who were his sons, but it was his to show me whom I must regard as a brother. Therefore, during the time in which he refused to recognize you, I also counted you as no relative; but ever since he, adopted you, I too regard you as a kinsman. What is the proof of this? You possess your portion of my father’s estate after his death; you share in the religious rites, and civic privileges. No one seeks to exclude you from these. What is it that you would have? But if he says that he is being outrageously treated, if he weeps and wails, and makes charges against me, do not believe what he says. It is not right that you should, since our argument is not now about these matters. But take this attitude—that he can just as well get satisfaction under the name of Boeotus.

Why are you, then, so fond of wrangling? Desist, I beg you; do not be so ready to cherish enmity against me. I am not so minded toward you. For even now—lest the fact escape your notice—I am speaking rather in your interest than in my own, in insisting that we should not have the same name. If there were no other reason, at least anyone hearing it must ask which of us is meant if there are two Mantitheuses, sons of Mantias. Then he will say, The one whom he was compelled to adopt, if he means you. How can you desire this?

Now take, please, and read these two depositions, proving that my father gave me the name Mantitheus, and him the name Boeotus.

The Depositions

It remains, I think, to show you, men of Athens, that not only will you be fulfilling your oaths, if you give the verdict for which I ask, but also that the defendant has given judgement against himself, that he should rightly bear the name of Boeotus, and not Mantitheus. For when I had entered this suit against Boeotus, son of Mantias, of Thoricus, at the first he accepted service of the suit, and put in an oath for delay, as being Boeotus; but finally, when there was no longer room for evasion, he allowed the arbitrators to give judgement against him by default, and then, in Heaven’s name, see what he did—

he got this judgement for non-appearance set aside, entitling himself Boeotus. And yet he ought in the first place to have allowed me to get my suit finished as against Boeotus, if that name did not, in fact, pertain to him at all, and not subsequently be found getting the judgement for non-appearance set aside under this name. When, a man has thus given judgement against himself that he is properly Boeotus, what verdict can he demand that you sworn jurors shall give?

To prove that I am speaking the truth in this, take the decision setting aside the judgement for non-appearance and this complaint.

The Decision

The Complaint

If, now, my opponent can point out a law which gives children the right to choose their own names, you would rightly give the verdict for which he asks. But if the law, which you all know as well as I, gives parents the right not only to give the name in the first place, but also to cancel it and renounce it by public declaration, if they please; and if I have shown that my father, who had this authority under the law, gave to the defendant the name Boeotus, and to me the name Mantitheus, how can you render any other verdict than that for which I ask?

Nay, more, in cases which are not covered by the laws, you have sworn that you will decide as in your judgement is most just, so that even if there were no law concerning these matters, you would have been bound to cast your votes in my favor. For who is there among you who has given the same name to two of his children? Who, that is as yet childless, will do so?