Against Pantaenetus

for how could it be fair that it should depend upon the body and life of a slave, whether I should be condemned to pay two talents, or the bringer of this malicious suit get off scot-free? But I, wishing to prevail by a preponderance of fair play, made this concession)—after this he again summoned me in the suit, as soon as he had taken back his deposits;[*](There is much obscurity here. The acceptance of the challenge by Nicobulus should have put an end to the action. The plaintiff had then the right to take back the sum deposited (as court-fees πρυτανεῖα?) when the suit was brought.) so clear did he make it at once that he would not abide by the conditions which he had himself laid down.

But when we had come before the torturer, instead of opening the challenge, showing its contents, and proceeding in accordance with its terms to do what seemed right (for on account of the turmoil at that time and the fact that the case was about to be called, it was like this: I offer you this challenge.—I accept it.—Let me have your ring.—Take it.—Who is your surety?—This man here.—and I had taken no copy or anything else of that sort); instead of acting in the way of which I speak, he had brought with him a different challenge, insisting that he should himself torture the man, and he laid hold of him, dragged him this way and that, and went beyond all bounds in blackguardly action.

On my part, men of the jury, I was led to reflect what gain there is in a life molded to serve one’s ends.[*](His own desire to live simply and naturally had caused him to be imposed upon, and to be despised as one lacking in spirit. The passage is variously interpreted, and the text is uncertain. The MSS. have καταπεπλῆχθαι, which yields no satisfactory sense, unless with Wolf we insert the negative μή. The meaning in that case would be that a life of ruthless self-assertion is a great gain.) For it seemed to me that I was suffering this treatment because I was despised as one who lived a simple and natural life, and that I was paying a heavy penalty in having to submit to this.

However, to prove that I was compelled to give a counter-challenge contrary to what I thought was right, that I offered to give up the slave, and that I am speaking the truth in this, read the challenge.

The Challenge

Since he refused this, and refused the challenge which he himself gave at the first, I wonder what in the world he will have to say to you. But that you may know who it is at whose hands he claims to have suffered these indignities—behold him This is the man who dispossessed Pantaenetus; this is the man who was stronger than the friends of Pantaenetus, and stronger than the laws. For I myself was not in Athens; even he does not make that charge.

I wish to tell you also the means by which he misled the former jury, and convicted Evergus, that you may realize that in this trial also there will be no limit to his impudence and that he will shrink from no falsehoods. More than this; in regard to his present suit against me, you will find my means of defence[*](Possibly, the charges against me.) are the same as those of Evergus, which is the most convincing proof that Evergus has been the victim of a malicious and baseless charge. For in addition to all the other accusations the plaintiff charged that Evergus came to his home in the country, and made his way into the apartments of his daughters, who were heiresses, and of his mother; and he brought with him into court the laws concerning heiresses.

And yet up to this day he has never had the case examined before the Archon, whom the law appoints to have charge of such matters, and before whom the wrongdoer runs the risk of having punishment or fine adjudged against him, while by the prosecutor redress is sought without risk;[*](Whereas in the court the plaintiff ran the risk of having to pay the heavy penalty of the ἐπωβολία, if he failed to make good his case. See note on Dem. 27.67.) nor has he impeached either me or Evergus as wrongdoers, but he made these charges in the court-room, and secured a verdict for two talents.

For, I take it, it would have been an easy matter for Evergus, if he had known in advance (as under the laws he should have known) the charge on which he was being tried, to set forth the truth of the matter and the justice of his cause, and so win acquittal; but in a mining suit regarding matters concerning which he could never have imagined that he would be accused, it was hard to find, offhand, means to free himself from the false charges; and the indignation[*](Due to the alleged intrusion into the women’s apartment.) of the jurymen, who were misled by the plaintiff, found him guilty in the matter upon which they sat in judgement.

And yet do you think that the man who deceived those jurymen will hesitate to try to deceive you?—or that he comes into court with his confidence fixed upon the facts, and not rather upon assertions and upon the witnesses who are in league with him (that foul blackguard Procles, the tall fellow there, and Stratocles, the smoothest-tongued of men and the basest), and in his readiness to weep and wail without disguise or shame?

But you are so far from deserving pity, that more than any man in the world you should rightly be detested for the deeds you have wrought—you who, owing one hundred and five minae and not being able to satisfy your creditors, and then finding men who helped you to raise the money and enabled you to do what was right by those who originally made the loan, are seeking, quite apart from the wrongs you committed against them in regard to the loan itself, also to deprive them of their civic rights. In the case of other men one may see borrowers having to give up their property, but in your case it is the lender who has come to this plight, and, having lent a talent, has been forced to pay two talents as the victim of a baseless charge;

and I, who lent forty minae, am defendant in this suit for two talents. Again, on property on which you were never able to borrow more than one hundred minae, and which you sold outright for three talents and two thousand drachmae,[*](That is, in round numbers. In Dem. 37.31 the sum is given as three talents, twenty-six hundred drachmae.) you have, as it seems, sustained damages to the amount of four talents! From whom? From my slave, you will say. But what citizen would let himself be ousted from his own property by a slave? Or who would say that it is right that my slave be held responsible for acts, for which the plaintiff has brought action against Evergus and obtained a verdict?

Besides all this, the plaintiff has himself given him a release from all charges of this kind. He ought not to be stating these charges now, nor to have inserted them in the challenge in which he demanded the slave for torture, but to have instituted suit against him, and to have prosecuted me as his owner. As it is, he has instituted suit against me, but accuses him. This the laws do not permit. For whoever instituted suit against the master, and charged the facts against his slave—as though the slave had any authority of his own?

When anyone asks him, What valid charges will you be able to make against Nicobulus? he says, The Athenians hate money-lenders; Nicobulus is an odious fellow; he walks fast,[*](Compare Oration Dem. 45.77.) he talks loud, and he carries a cane; and (he says) all these things count in my favor. He is not ashamed to talk in this way, and also fancies that his hearers do not understand that this is the reasoning, not of one who has suffered wrong, but of a malicious pettifogger.

I, for my part, do not regard a money-lender as a wrongdoer, although certain of the class may justly be detested by you, seeing that they make a trade of it, and have no thought of pity or of anything else, except gain. Since I have myself often borrowed money, and not merely lent it to the plaintiff, I know these people well; and I do not like them, either but, by Zeus, I do not defraud them, nor bring malicious charges against them.

But if a man has done business as I have, going to sea on perilous journeys, and from his small profits has made these loans, wishing not only to confer favors, but to prevent his money from slipping through his fingers without his knowing it, why should one set him down in that class?—unless you mean this, that anyone who lends money to you ought to be detested by the public.

Read me, please, the depositions, to show what manner of man I am to those who lend money, and to those who need my help.

The Depositions

Such am I, Pantaenetus, the fast walker, and such are you, who walk slowly. However, regarding my gait and my manner of speech, I will tell you the whole truth, men of the jury, with all frankness. I am perfectly aware—I am not blind to the fact—that I am not one of those favored by nature in these respects, nor of those who are an advantage to themselves. For if in matters in which I reap no profit, I annoy others, surely I am to this extent unfortunate.

But what is to come of it? If I lend money to so-and-so, am I for this reason also to lose my suit? Surely not. The plaintiff cannot point out any baseness or villainy attaching to me, nor does a single one among you, many as you are, know any such thing against me. As to these other qualities, each one of us, I take it, is as nature happened to make him; and to fight against nature, when one has these characteristics, is no easy task (for otherwise we should not differ from one another); though to recognize them in looking on another and to criticize them is easy.

But which one of these qualities has any bearing on my dispute with you, Pantaenetus? You have suffered many grievous wrongs? Well, you have had satisfaction. Not from me? No; for you were not wronged in any way by me. Otherwise you would never have given me the release, nor, when you were making up your mind to bring suit against Evergus, would you have passed me by; nor would you have demanded that one who had done you many grievous wrongs should undertake to be vendor of the property. Besides, how could I have wronged you, when I was not present or even in the country?

Well then, suppose[*](The following passage is repeated almost verbatim in the next oration, Dem. 38.21-22.) one should grant that Pantaenetus has suffered the greatest possible wrongs, and that everything which he will now allege about these matters is true, this, at least, I presume, you would all admit: that it has happened to others ere now to have suffered many wrongs more serious than pecuniary wrongs. For involuntary homicides, outrages on what is sacred, and many other such crimes are committed; yet in all these cases the fact that they have yielded to persuasion and given a release is appointed for the parties wronged as a limit and settlement of the dispute.

And this just principle is so binding among all men, that if anyone having convicted another of involuntary homicide, and clearly shown him to be polluted,[*](Homicide, even if accidental, entailed pollution, which required expiation.) subsequently takes pity on him and releases him, he has no longer the right to have the same person driven into exile. Again, if the victim himself before his death releases the murderer from bloodguiltiness, it is not lawful for any of the remaining kinsmen to prosecute; but those whom the laws sentence to banishment and exile and death, upon conviction, if they are once released, are by that word freed from all evil consequences.

If, then, when life and all that is most precious are at stake, a release has this power and validity, shall it be without effect when money is at stake, or claims of lesser importance? Surely not. For the thing most to be feared is, not that I should fail to obtain justice in your court, but that you should now in our day do away with a just practice, established from the beginning of time.