For Phormio

You hear the law, men of Athens, stating other cases in which suit may not be brought, and in particular those in which anyone has given a release or discharge.[*](The two verbs ἀφιέναι and ἀπαλλάτειν seem at times to be virtual synonyms, used freely with the redundancy of legal usage. In some cases, however, ἀφιέναι refers clearly to the creditor’s act, and ἀπαλλάτειν to the effect on the debtor. Parallel passages are Dem. 37.1 and Dem. 37.19; and Dem. 38.1.) And with good reason. For if it is just that suit may not be brought again for cases which have once been tried, it is far more just that suit be not allowed for claims in which a discharge has been given. For a man who has lost his suit in your court might perhaps say that you had been deceived; but when a man has plainly decided against himself, by giving a release and discharge, what complaint can he bring against himself that will give him the right to bring suit again regarding the same matters? None whatever, of course. Therefore the man who framed this law placed first among cases in which suit may not be brought all those in which a man has given a release or discharge. Both of these have been given by the plaintiff; for he has released and discharged the defendant. That I am speaking the truth, men of Athens, has been proved to you by the evidence presented.

Take now, please, the statute of limitations.

The Law

The law, men of Athens, has thus clearly defined the time. But this man Apollodorus, when more than twenty years have gone by, demands that you pay more heed to his malicious charges than to the laws in accordance with which you have sworn to give judgement. You should have regard to all the laws, but to this one, men of Athens, above all others.