Against Aphobus III

Pray note that in regard to this matter also I was ready to give over to him for torture the slave who had written the deposition, who would know his own handwriting, and who clearly remembered that Aphobus had made the deposition. I was ready to do this, not for want of witnesses who were present, for there were some; but in order that he might not accuse these men of giving false testimony, and that the result of the torture might support them. Yet it is not fair to condemn the witnesses on his account. They alone of men who have as yet stood trial before you can show that the plaintiff himself has borne witness to their testimony as to these matters.

To prove that I am speaking the truth, take the challenge and the deposition.

The Challenge. The Deposition

Such are the legal tests which he has refused, and so numerous the proofs by which he is shown to be acting with malice and insincerity; yet he demands that you put credence in his own witnesses, and he slanders mine, and declares that their testimony is false.

I wish now to speak of the matter on the basis of probabilities. I am certain that you would all agree that those who give false testimony are led to do so by bribes through stress of poverty, or by friendship, or else by enmity toward the opposite party in the suit.

Now no one of these reasons would have led the men to testify in my favor. Not friendship; how could that be, seeing that they are not engaged in the same pursuits, nor are they of like age, I will not say with me, but with one another? Not enmity against my adversary, that is plain; for one of them is his brother and pleads on his side; Phanus is a close friend and a member of the same tribe; and Philip is neither friend nor enemy, so that this motive, too, cannot be justly charged against them.

Furthermore, no one could say that poverty was the ground, for they all possess means so ample that they willingly assume the expense of public services, and discharge whatever duties are laid upon them. Besides all this, they are well known to you, and you know nothing to their discredit; for they are worthy citizens. Yet, if they are not poor, nor enemies of the plaintiff, nor friends of mine, how can it be right to suspect them of bearing false witness? I certainly do not know.

My opponent was aware of all this, and knew better than anybody else that their testimony was true, but nonetheless he brings forward a malicious charge against them, and not only declares that he did not make the statement which I have proved in the most conclusive manner that he did make, but even asserts that the man, Milyas, is in fact a slave. I wish in a very few words to prove that in this, too, he is lying. I was ready, men of the jury, regarding this point also to give over to him to be tested by torture my female slaves, who remember that my father on his death-bed set this man free.

Besides this, my mother was ready to call to her side my sister and myself, and swear, with imprecations on our heads if she spoke falsely—we were her only children, and it was for our sakes that she gave herself up to a life of widowhood—that my father when he was about to die had set this man free, and that Milyas was regarded by us as free thereafter. Let no one of you assume that she would have been willing to make this oath with imprecations on our heads if she had not known well that what she was to swear to was true.

Come now, to prove that I am speaking the truth and that we were ready to do these things, call the witnesses thereto.

The Witnesses

So many were the just arguments we had to urge, and so ready were we to have recourse to the most infallible tests regarding the testimony given; and yet the plaintiff evades all these, and fancies that by slandering me regarding the trial which has already taken place, and bringing accusations against me, he can induce you to convict the witness,—a piece of trickery the most unfair and the most rapacious imaginable.

For he has himself suborned men to bear false witness about these matters, having as co-workers his brother-in-law Onetor, and Timocrates[*](Timocrates: possibly the same as the Timocrates against whom Demosthenes delivered Dem. 24); we had no forewarning of this, and supposed that the contest would be regarding the deposition alone, and therefore have not come prepared with witnesses regarding the guardianship accounts. Nevertheless, despite the fellow’s trickery, I think that, simply by reciting the facts, I shall easily convince you that no man was ever more justly convicted than he.

It was not because I refused to allow Milyas to be put to the torture, nor because he himself admitted the man to be a freeman, nor yet because these witnesses gave their testimony; but because he was proved to have taken possession of large sums belonging to me, and because he did not let the estate, though the laws so ordered and my father had so directed in his will, as I shall plainly show you. For these were things that anyone could see, the laws, namely, and the amount of my property which these men had taken as plunder; but as for Milyas, nobody knew even who he was. You will see from the charges brought against Aphobus that these things are so.

For, men of the jury, when I instituted my suit against him concerning his guardianship, I did not fix the damages at a lump sum, as one bringing forward a baseless charge out of malice would have done, but specified each item, stating the source of each, the precise amount, and the person from whom it had been received. In no case did I add mention of Milyas as having knowledge of any of these matters.

Hence this is the beginning of the complaint: Demosthenes makes the following charges against Aphobus. Aphobus has in his possession moneys of mine, received by him in his capacity as guardian, as follows: eighty minae, which he received as the marriage-portion of my mother in accordance with the terms of my father’s will. This is the first of the sums of which I claim to have been defrauded. Now what was the declaration of the witnesses? That they were present before the arbitrator, Notharchus, when Aphobus admitted that Milyas was a freeman, having been emancipated by the father of Demosthenes.

Consider now for yourselves whether in your judgement there could be an orator, or sophist or magician so wondrously clever in speaking as by means of this testimony to convince any man on earth that Aphobus is in possession of the marriage-portion of the speaker’s mother. What in heaven’s name would he say? Aphobus has admitted that Milyas is a freeman. And why on that account is he any the more in possession of the marriage-portion? The statement would surely not seem to prove it.

But how was it proved? In the first place, Therippides, his co-trustee, testified that he had given him the money. Secondly, Demo, his uncle, and the rest of the witnesses who were present, testified that he agreed to supply my mother with maintenance, as being in possession of her portion. Against these men he has lodged no charges, plainly because he knew that their testimony was true. Besides this, my mother was ready to call to her side my sister and myself, and swear with imprecations on our heads, if she spoke falsely, that Aphobus had received her marriage-portion according to the terms of my father’s will.

Shall we, then, say, or shall we not, that he has possession of these eighty minae? And was it on the evidence of these witnesses here or of those that he was convicted? I think it was on the evidence of truth. He has enjoyed the interest on this sum for ten years, and even though judgement has been given against him, cannot bring himself to pay it back. Despite this, he declares that he has been outrageously treated and that he lost the suit by reason of these witnesses. Yet not one of them testified that he had received the marriage-portion.

With regard to the maritime loan,[*](With reference to these items see Dem. 27) the sofa-makers, and the iron and the ivory that were left me, and my sister’s marriage-portion, at the purloining of which Aphobus connived in order to secure for himself the right to take whatever he pleased of my goods, listen, and see how just was the verdict given against him, and how absurd it would have been to examine Milyas by torture regarding any of these matters.

For as regards the purloining of funds at which you connived there is a law which expressly declares that you are responsible for them exactly as if you had them in your own possession. So what has the law to do with the testing of a slave by torture? But in the matter of the maritime loan you made common cause with Xuthus,[*](In the inventory of the estate of the father of Demosthenes, given in Dem. 27, there is mention of a bottomry loan to Xuthus, amounting to seventy minae.) divided the money with him, and destroyed the contract, and now that you have arranged everything to suit your wish, and have done away with the documentary evidence (as Demo testified against you), you have recourse to trickery, and endeavor to mislead these gentlemen.

Regarding the sofa-makers, if you took money, and made large profits for yourself by making loans on security that was mine—you, who should rather have prevented others from doing so—and finally made away with the slaves altogether, what, pray, can the witnesses do in your behalf? These men at any rate have not testified that you admitted lending money on the security of my slaves, and that you appropriated the slaves to yourself. On the contrary, it was you who acknowledged this in your account, and the witnesses testified to the fact against you.

Now look you, as to the ivory and iron, I have this to say: all the slaves of the household know that the plaintiff used to sell these articles. I am ready now, as I was then, to give over to him any one of these slaves whom he may choose to be examined by torture. If then, he alleges that I refuse to surrender the man who has knowledge of the facts, and offer him others who have no such knowledge, he will but show that he ought all the more to have accepted my offer. For if those whom I offered to him as having knowledge of the facts, declared that he had none of these articles in his possession, he would of course have been acquitted of the charge.

But nothing of the sort is the truth. It would have been proved past all question that he had sold the goods, and appropriated the profits. Therefore, he passed over those who were admittedly slaves, and demanded that a freeman be examined by torture, whom it would have been a crime for me to surrender; for it was not his purpose that he should sift out the matter, but that he might make a specious argument out of the fact that his demand was refused.

Regarding, therefore, all these facts, first the marriage-portion, then his connivance with fraud, then all the rest, there shall be read to you the laws and the depositions, that you may have full knowledge.

The Laws. The Depositions

Not only from the facts already adduced can you see that Aphobus was not in any respect whatever prejudiced by my refusal to give the man up for torture, but also from a consideration of the matter itself. Let us suppose that Milyas is being racked upon the wheel, and consider what Aphobus would most wish him to say. Would it not be that he was not aware that the plaintiff had any of the property in his possession? Well, suppose he says so. Does that prove that the plaintiff has none? Far from it; for I produced men who knew, men who paid him the money, men who were present in person, as witnesses. It is convincing proof, not if one is ignorant that a man has something in his possession (for there might be many such), but if one knows that he has it.