Against Aristogeiton I

Demosthenes

Demosthenes. Vol. III. Orations, XXI-XXVI. Vince, J. H., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935 (printing).

But the Tanagran, a fresh-caught fish, was getting the better of the defendant, who was thoroughly pickled, having been long in jail. So when it came to this, he swallows the other man’s nose. Then the unfortunate victim of this outrage abandoned the search for his pocket-book, which was afterwards found in a chest of which the defendant possessed the key. After that the inmates of the prison passed a resolution not to share fire or light, food or drink with him, not to receive anything from him, not to give him anything.

To prove the truth of my statements, please call the man whose nose this monster bit off and swallowed.

The witness is called

What a fine performance for your popular orator! What a privilege to hear words of wisdom from a man with such a record as this! Now read also the precious resolution that was passed about him.

The resolution is read

Are you not ashamed then, men of Athens, if the men who had been thrown into prison for villainy and vice thought him so much more villainous than them selves that they forbade all intercourse with him, while you are ready to admit him to intercourse with yourselves, though the laws have placed him outside the pale of the constitution? What did you find to commend in his life or conduct? Which of all his actions has failed to move your indignation? Is he not impious, blood-thirsty, unclean, and a black mailer?

And yet, in spite of his performances and his character, he misses no opportunity in the Assembly of bellowing, I, only I, am your sincere well-wisher. All these others are in a cabal. You are betrayed. My patriotism is all you have left. I should like to examine the source and origin of this great and wonderful patriotism of his, so that, if it is as he says, you may trust it and benefit by it; but if not, that you may be on your guard.

Because you condemned his father to death and sold his mother when she was found guilty of defrauding her emancipator, do you suppose that that makes him well-disposed to you? By Zeus and all the gods, that is absurd. For if he is well-disposed towards father and mother, and so observes the great law of nature, which is laid down alike for man and beast, that all should love their parents,

then he must clearly be ill-disposed to those who have destroyed them and to their laws and their constitution. But if he has no regard for these things, I should like to know who that sees how he has renounced all affection for his parents, can believe in his pretended zeal for the people; for the man who neglects his parents I regard as unworthy of trust and hateful alike to gods and men.

But I shall be told it is because you condemned him on information laid and twice put him and his brother into prison; it is for this reason that he is your well-wisher. But that too is ridiculous. Or because you disqualified him for the office to which he had been allotted? Or because you found him guilty of a breach of the constitution? Or because you fined him ten talents? Or because you habitually point the finger of scorn at him as the vilest of all men in the world?

Or because, as long as the present laws and constitution stand, he cannot clear himself of these reproaches? Then why is he well-disposed to you? It is because, in his own words, he is impudent. Why is the impudent man so called save because, being lost to a sense of shame, he dares to state what is not, and never will be, true? And that is precisely what the defendant does.

Now there are some facts about the information laid against him which Lycurgus seems to have passed over, but which I had better lay before you; for I think you should examine the defendant and the rights of the present case as carefully as you would scrutinize a private debt. Suppose then that A accused B of owing him money, and B denied it. If the registered terms of the loan were still to be read, or if the pillars which marked the mortgaged property were still standing, you would clearly regard as impudent the man who denied the transaction; but if it was shown that these proofs no longer existed, then you would regard the accuser as impudent. That is natural.

Well, of Aristogeiton’s debt to the State the terms still exist, namely the laws under which all defaulters are registered; and the pillar is the wooden table of the law deposited in the temple of the Goddess. Now if these have been destroyed and the debt wiped out, we are talking nonsense, or rather telling lies; but if they are still in existence and will remain valid until he pays his debt, then there is no truth in his plea, but he is committing a serious crime in trying to suppress the rights of the State.

For the point to be argued and decided is not whether all his debts are unpaid, but whether he is still in debt. Otherwise it would be hard on those who are registered for a debt of one drachma, if their indebtedness is to tell against them, because they have done some trifling wrong or even no wrong at all, whereas if a man has committed serious wrongs, he is to regain his civic rights by paying one or two instalments. Moreover, there are three distinct debts registered and forming the ground of the information. Two Aristogeiton has entered in the register;[*](The defendant admitted these two debts by mortgaging his land for them.) the third he has not registered, but he is prosecuting Aristo of Alopece for malicious entry.

Yes, says he, for he has registered my name as a debtor unjustly. Of course it is evident that you have a right to satisfaction for this; but then you ought first to give satisfaction and abide by the penalty you have brought on yourself. Or again, for what do you expect to obtain satisfaction? If you are at liberty to do everything that other citizens do, how are you wronged?

I beg the jury in Heaven’s name to consider this point also. If he convicts Aristo of malicious intent, what will it mean? His name, of course, will be erased and Aristo’s substituted, because that is the law. Good! Then henceforward will this man, whose name has been erased, be a State-debtor, and will the other man, registered as a debtor, retain his full citizenship? That is what follows from the defendant’s claim, for if he is not a debtor when his name has been registered, then, when his name has been erased, he will obviously be a debtor. But that is absolutely untrue. No; when his name is erased, then he will be no longer a debtor. In that case the defendant is a debtor now.[*](To the reader who fails to follow the argument of this paragraph it may perhaps occur that the jury were not intended to follow it either.)

Again; if Aristo is acquitted, to whom is the State to look for compensation for the defendant’s illegal acts? And what about the men whose execution and imprisonment he tries to procure, as he bustles to and fro in the court? How will they recover their lives or escape from the sufferings they have already endured? For this man, to whom the laws refuse a share in our common everyday privileges, is the cause of intolerable wrongs to others by methods that are neither correct nor constitutional nor convenient.

When I see all this, I wonder what meaning you attach to the phrase upside down. Is it for the earth to be up there and the stars down here? That is impossible, and let us hope it always will be. But when those who have no rights enjoy rights at your pleasure, when villainy is honored and virtue spurned, when justice and expediency are sacrificed to personal spite, then we must suppose that the universe has indeed been turned upside down.

I have before now seen men on their trial, who were being convicted by the actual facts and were unable to prove their innocence, taking refuge some of them in the respectability and moderation of their lives, others in the achievements or public services of their ancestors, or in similar pleas, by which they succeeded in moving their judges to compassion and goodwill. But I cannot see that any one of these topics offers an easy path for the defendant; there is nothing before him but precipices, ravines, and gulfs.

What true plea can he find? Something perhaps that his father did? But you yourselves condemned that father to death in these very courts as a detected rascal who deserved his doom. Or perhaps, if there is a difficulty about his father, he will appeal to the sobriety and respectability of his own life. What life? Where has he lived it? For the life that you have all seen him leading is not of that description.

But, my dear sir, he will rely on public services. When and where performed? His father’s? Why, there are none. His own? You will find record of delations, arrests, informations—but no services. Or perhaps, putting these aside, his numerous and highly respectable kinsmen will come forward and beg him off. But there are none and never were. How could there be, when he is not even a free-born citizen?

No; I am wrong. He has a brother, who is present here in court and who brought that precious action against him. What need to say anything about him? He is own brother to the defendant, born of the same father and mother, and, to add to his misfortunes, he is his twin. It was this brother—I pass over the other facts—who got possession of the drugs and charms from the servant of Theoris of Lemnos, the filthy sorceress whom you put to death on that account with all her family.

She gave information against her mistress, and this rascal has had children by her, and with her help he plays juggling tricks and professes to cure fits, being himself subject to fits of wickedness of every kind. So this is the man who will beg him off! This poisoner, this public pest, whom any man would ban at sight as an evil omen rather than choose to accost him, and who has pronounced himself worthy of death by bringing such an action.