Against Timocrates

Stop. Tell me; hearing that, what would all of you name as the most terrible misfortune?Against what would you pray most earnestly? I suppose that your prayer would be that the state of things under the Thirty Tyrants should never recur. Anyhow, that, as I understand it, is the misfortune against which this statute provides, by ordaining that the acts of that time shall be invalid. Well, the defendant condemns as illegal acts done under popular government, exactly as you condemned the acts of the tyranny; or at least he makes them equally invalid.

Then what are we to say for ourselves, men of Athens, if we allow this law to be confirmed? That our tribunals, composed under popular government of men who have taken the judicial oath, are guilty of the same iniquities as the tribunals of the Thirty Tyrants? Preposterous! That they give righteous judgements? Then what reason can we allege for enacting a law to reverse those judgements? Unless indeed we plead that we were out of our minds. We have no other excuse to offer.—

Read another statute.

The Law

Nor shall it be lawful to propose a law applying to a particular man, unless the same be applicable to all Athenian citizens, except by the votes of not less than six thousand citizens voting in the affirmative by ballot.

It forbids the introduction of any law that does not affect all citizens alike,—an injunction conceived in the true spirit of democracy. As every man has an equal share in the constitution generally, so this statute asserts his equal share in the laws. You know as well as I do for whose sake Timocrates introduced his law; but, leaving those names out of the question, we have his own admission that his law is not of universal application, for he added a clause excepting from its operation tax-farmers, lessees, and their sureties.—When, sir, there are certain persons whom you have put outside your law, you cannot claim that you have made the same law for all alike.

And there is another thing that you cannot say,— that of all persons punished by imprisonment tax farmers are the greatest offenders and do us the gravest wrong, and that that is why you do not give them the benefit of your law. Surely men who are traitors to the commonwealth, men who maltreat their own parents, men who enter the market-place with unclean hands, offend far more heinously; and all those criminals are threatened with imprisonment by the standing laws, while your law offers them instant release. But here again you reveal the men in whose favour you moved your law. They got into our debt not by tax-farming, but by embezzling, or rather by plundering, our money; and that, I warrant you, is the true reason why you had no consideration for the tax-farmers.

Many other excellent statutes might be cited, all contradicted by the law he has proposed. However, if I discuss every one of them, I shall, perhaps, be robbed of my chance of arguing that the law is altogether disadvantageous to the citizens. On the other hand, even if it is repugnant to one only of the existing laws, you can have no doubt that it is open to the indictment. What, then, is my decision? To pass over all the other laws, but to discuss one law proposed on a former occasion by the defendant himself, before I proceed to that part of my accusation in which I allege that the law, if operative, will be most injurious to the commonwealth.

To have introduced a law contrary to the laws of others is a serious offence, but one which requires accusation by someone else; but, when a man legislates in opposition to a former enactment of his own, he is really making himself his own accuser. To show you that such is really the case, the clerk will read to you the actual law proposed by him, while I hold my peace.—Read.

The Law

Moved by Timocrates: if any Athenian citizens are now in jail or shall hereafter be imprisoned on impeachment by the Council, if the judgement against such prisoners be not delivered to the Judges by the Secretary of the Presidency in pursuance of the law of impeachment, be it enacted that the Eleven shall bring them before the Court within thirty days of the day on which they receive them into custody, unless prevented by public business, and, if so prevented, as soon as possible. Any Athenian qualified as a prosecutor may prosecute. If the culprit be convicted, the Court of Heliaea shall assess such penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, as he appears to deserve. If the penalty assessed be pecuniary, he shall be imprisoned until he has paid the full amount of the fine inflicted.

You hear that, gentlemen of the jury?—Read those words again.

The Law

If the penalty assessed be pecuniary he shall be imprisoned until he has paid the full amount—

That will do.—Could a man possibly propose two more contradictory enactments than these,—that convicted malefactors shall be kept in jail until they have paid their fines, and that these same malefactors may put in sureties, but must not be imprisoned. Here, then, is an accusation brought against Timocrates by Timocrates, not by Diodorus nor by any other of the great multitude of citizens.

Yet from what gain do you think that such a man would restrain his hand, or what would he hesitate to do for lucre’s sake, when he did not disdain to legislate in contradiction of himself, though the laws forbid contradiction even of others? It seems to me that, so far as effrontery goes, such a man is ready to do anything. Inasmuch, therefore, as the laws provide that evil doers of other kinds shall upon confession be punished without trial, you, men of Athens, have a right to give your verdict against this man without allowing him to speak or giving him a hearing, now that he has been caught in the act of maltreating the laws; for by proposing this law in contravention of the former law, he has pleaded guilty.

That the law he has proposed is contrary to the statutes just read, to those which I cited before, and, I may almost say, to every law in Athens, is now, I suppose, manifest to every one of you. I really wonder what he will have the face to say about those statutes. He cannot show that his law does not contradict the others; and he will not be able to convince you that he is a simple layman who did not know what he was doing through lack of experience, because for a long time past he has been celebrated for composing and introducing laws at so much apiece.

Moreover, there is another course that is not open to him: he cannot admit that he has done wrong and then plead that he deserves forgiveness; for it is quite clear that he did not propose his law unwillingly, or to help the distressed, or his own family, or people who have a claim upon him. He did it by intention, on behalf of men who have done you a grave injury, and who are in no way related to him,—unless he pretends that payment of wages is a bond of kinship.

I will now do my best to prove that the law he introduced is unacceptable and disadvantageous to the citizens. I presume that you will all agree with me that a really wholesome law, such as is calculated to benefit the people, ought, in the first place, to be drawn simply and intelligibly, not in such terms that one man thinks it means this and another that; and, secondly, that the proceedings prescribed by the law ought to be practicable, for if a law, though well-meant, were to enjoin what is impossible, it would be attempting the work not of a law, but of a prayer.

Furthermore, it should plainly appear that it does not offer an easy time to any wrongdoer. For if anyone supposes that indulgent laws are the mark of popular government, let him ask this further question: to whom are they to be indulgent? If he will look at the matter rightly, he will find that the answer is, to persons who are going to be tried, not to persons already convicted. For of the former we may say that it is still uncertain whether they have been unjustly calumniated; but the latter can no longer plead that they are not evil-doers.

Now it shall be made clear that the law before us exhibits none of the traits I have enumerated, but the very opposite, taking them one by one. There are many ways in which I might make good that statement; the best will be to go through the law itself, phrase by phrase. It is not a law well-conceived in parts, and defective in parts; from beginning to end, from the first syllable to the last, it is enacted to your detriment.—

The clerk shall take the actual manuscript, and read the law to the jury as far as the end of the first section.—That is the easiest way for me to explain, and for you to apprehend, what I mean.

The Law of Timocrates

During the first presidency, namely, that of the Pandionid Tribe, on the twelfth day of that presidency, the question was put by Aristocles of Myrrhinus, one of the Commissioners: moved by Timocrates, that if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury, it shall be competent for him or for any person on his behalf to nominate as sureties for the debt—

Stop; you shall read it clause by clause presently. This, gentlemen of the jury, is very nearly the most scandalous provision of the whole statute. I do not think that any other man, when introducing a law for the use of his fellow-citizens, ever ventured upon an attempt to rescind judgements passed under earlier statutes. Yet that is what the defendant Timocrates has done without shame and even without concealment, inserting these plain words: if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury.

If he had merely advised us of the right course for the future, there would have been no harm in it but, when a court of justice has given its verdict and determined the issue, is it not outrageous to introduce a law by which that verdict is to be rescinded? It is as though, after allowing the law of Timocrates to become operative, someone should draft a second law to this effect: if any persons being indebted, and having had the further penalty of imprisonment passed upon them, shall have put in sureties as the law directs, they shall not be entitled to such bail, and it shall not be lawful hereafter to release anyone on bail.

I suppose that no man in his senses would do such a thing; and you, sir, were guilty when you tried to annul those other provisions. For if he thought it a fair thing to do, his proper course was to introduce a law governing future transactions; not to lump together all offences, past and future, proven and unproven, and then register an indiscriminate judgement upon all together. Surely it is outrageous that men who have already been convicted of offences against the common weal should be deemed worthy of the same judicial treatment as men of whom it is not yet known whether they will ever do anything that deserves prosecution?