Against Androtion

Gentlemen of the jury, Euctemon finding himself wronged by Androtion, thinks it his duty to obtain satisfaction for himself and at the same time to up hold the constitution; and that is what I also shall essay to do, if I am equal to the task. As a matter of fact the outrages that Euctemon has endured, many and serious and utterly illegal as they were, are slighter than the trouble that Androtion has caused me. Euctemon was the object of a plot to get money out of him and to eject him unfairly from an office of your appointment; but if the charges that Androtion trumped up against me had been accepted in your courts, not a single living man would have opened his door to me,

for he accused me of things that anyone would have shrunk from mentioning, unless he were a man of the same stamp as himself, saying that I had killed my own father. He also concocted a public indictment for impiety, not against me directly, but against my uncle, whom he brought to trial, charging him with impiety for associating with me, as though I had committed the alleged acts, and if it had ended in my uncle’s conviction, who would have suffered more grievously at the defendant’s hands than I? For who, whether friend or stranger, would have consented to have any dealings with me? What state would have admitted within its borders a man deemed guilty of such impiety? Not a single one.

Of these charges, then, I cleared myself in your court, not by a narrow margin but so completely that my accuser failed to obtain a fifth of the votes; and upon Androtion I shall endeavor, with your help, to avenge myself today and on every other occasion.

I shall pass over a great deal that I might say about private matters; but there are other matters on which you are now going to give your votes, including not a few injuries which the defendant has done you in dealing as a citizen with public affairs, and these, which Euctemon chose to pass over, but which it is better for you to understand, I shall now try to explain briefly.

If I could see any straightforward defence that he could offer to these charges, I would not make any reference to them; but I am quite certain that he cannot have any simple and honest plea to put forward, but will try to hoodwink you, inventing malicious answers to each charge and so leading you astray. For he is a skillful rhetorician, men of Athens, and has devoted all his life to that one study. Therefore, that you may not be deceived and persuaded to vote contrary to the spirit of your oath and to acquit a man whom you have every reason to punish, pray attend to what I shall say, so that when you have heard me, you may have the right reply to every argument that he will advance.

There is one plea which he thinks a clever defence of the omission of the preliminary decree. There is a law, he says, that if the Council by its performance of its duties seems to deserve a reward, that reward shall be presented by the people. That question, he says, the chairman of the Assembly put, the people voted, and it was carried. In this case, he says, there is no need of a preliminary decree, because what was done was in accordance with law. But I take the exactly contrary view-and I think you will agree with me—that the preliminary decrees should only be proposed concerning matters prescribed by the laws, because, where no laws are laid down, surely no proposal whatever is admissible.

Now he will say that all the Councils that have ever received a reward from you, have received it in this way, and that in no case has a preliminary decree ever been passed. But I think—or rather, I am certain—that this statement is untrue. Even if it were absolutely true, yet surely where the law says the opposite, we ought not to transgress the law now because it has often been transgressed before; on the contrary we ought to enforce the observance of the law, beginning with you, Androtion, first.

You must not tell us that this has often been done before; you must show us that it is right to do it. If the practice has at any time been contrary to the laws and you have only followed precedent, you cannot in fairness escape, but ought all the more to be convicted; for if any of the former delinquents had been condemned, you would never have proposed the resolution, and in the same way, if you are punished now, no one else will propose it in the future.

Coming now to the law which explicitly denies to the Council the right to ask a reward, if they have not built the warships, it is worth while to hear the defence that he will set up, and to get a clear view of the shamelessness of his behavior from the arguments that he attempts to use. The law, he says, forbids the Council to ask for the reward, if they have not built the ships. But, he adds, the law nowhere prohibits the Assembly from giving it. If I gave it at their request, my motion was illegal, but if I have never mentioned the ships in the whole of my decree, but give other grounds for granting a crown to the Council, where is the illegality of my motion?

It is surely not difficult for the jury to find the right answer to this: that in the first place the Committee of the Council and the chairman, who puts these proposals to the vote, duly put the question and called for a show of hands—those who are of opinion that the Council have deserved a reward, to vote aye; on the contrary, no. Yet surely men who neither ask nor expect a reward should never have put the question at all.

Besides this, when Meidias and others brought certain accusations against the Council, the Councillors fairly leaped up on to the platform and begged not to be robbed of their reward. There is no need for me to tell the jury this, for you were present in the Assembly and know what happened there. So when he says that the Council did not ask for it, have that answer ready for him. But I will also prove to you that the people are forbidden by the law to give the reward, if the Council have not built the ships.

For the law, that the Council should not ask for the reward if they have not built the war ships, was framed in that way, men of Athens, to prevent the possibility of the people being influenced or misled. The legislator held that the question should not depend on the abilities of the speakers, but that whatever he could devise that was at once just and expedient for the people, should be fixed by law. You have not built the ships? Then don’t ask for the reward. Where the law does not permit the asking, does it not absolutely forbid the giving?

Now there is another question, men of Athens, which is worth going into. Why is it that when the Council have performed all their other duties satisfactorily, and no one has any complaint to make, yet, if they have not built the ships, they are not allowed to ask for the reward? You will find that this stringent enactment is in the interests of the people. For I suppose no one would deny that all that has happened to our city, in the past or in the present, whether good or otherwise—I avoid an unpleasant term—has resulted in the one case from the possession, and in the other from the want, of warships.

Many instances might be given, ancient and modern, but of those that are most familiar to your ears, take if you please this. The men who built the Propylaea and the Parthenon, and decked our other temples with the spoils of Asia, trophies in which we take a natural pride,—you know of course from tradition that after they abandoned the city and shut themselves up in Salamis, it was because they had the war galleys that they won the sea-fight and saved the city and all their belongings, and made themselves the authors for the rest of the Greeks of many great benefits, of which not even time can ever obliterate the memory.

Well, you say, but that is ancient history. But take something that you have all seen. You know that lately you sent help to the Euboeans within three days and got rid of the Thebans by an armistice.[*](In 357.) Could you have done all this so promptly, if you had not had new vessels to convey your force? You would have found it impossible. Many other successes might be mentioned that have resulted from our being provided with these ships in sound condition.

Yes, and how many disasters from unsound ships? I will pass over most of them; but in the Decelean war[*](The last stage of the Peloponnesian War, 413 to 404.)—I am reminding you of a bit of old history which you all know better than I do—though many serious disasters befell our city, she did not succumb till her fleet was destroyed. But why need me cite ancient instances? You know how it stood with our city in the last war with the Lacedaemonians[*](Terminated by the peace of Callias in 371.) when it seemed unlikely that you could dispatch a fleet. You know that vetches were sold for food. But when you did dispatch it, you obtained peace on your own terms.

Therefore, men of Athens, seeing that warships have such weight in either scale, you nave done rightly to set this strict limit to the Council’s claim to the reward. For if they should discharge all their other duties satisfactorily, but fail to build these ships, by which we gained our power at the first and by which we retain it today, all their other services are of no avail, for it is the safety of the whole State that must be ensured for the people before every thing. Now the defendant is so obsessed with the idea that he can make any speech or proposal he wishes, that though the Council has discharged its other duties in the way that you have heard, but has not built the warships, he moved to grant them their reward.

That this is not a violation of the law, he could not possibly assert nor could you be brought to believe it. But I understand that he will put before you some such plea as this—that the Council was not to blame for the shortage of ships, but the treasurer of the shipbuilders, who absconded with two and a half talents, and so the business ended in a fiasco. But I must first express my surprise that he should have demanded a crown for the Council to reward a fiasco. I thought such honors were reserved for successes. Next, I have another consideration to put before you.

I submit that it is not fair to combine the two pleas, that the gift was not illegal and that the Council are not responsible for the lack of ships. For if it is right to give them the reward even when they have not built the ships, what need is there to say who is responsible for the omission? But if it is not right, why were the Council any the more entitled to it, because he can point to this or that man as responsible for the shortage?

Apart from that, it seems to me that such arguments offer you a choice, whether you think you ought to hear excuses and pleas from men who have done you harm, or whether you ought to have some ships. For if you accept the defendant’s plea, it will be clear to every future Council that their business is to find you plausible excuses, not to build you ships, with the result that your money will be spent, but there will be no ships for you.

But if, as the law says and as your oath enjoins, you sternly and absolutely reject their excuses, and make it clear that you have withheld the reward because they have not built the ships, then every Council, men of Athens, will deliver to you the ships duly built, because they will see that in your eyes everything else is of less consequence than the law. Now I shall show you clearly that no other human being is responsible for the shortage of ships; for the Council, having made the law null and void, elected this treasurer themselves.[*](The treasurer should have been elected by the people; the Council, by appointing him illegally, made themselves responsible for his defalcations. The corruption of this passage is as old as Harpocration. Mss. have ἁυτῇ or ἁυτήν . With the latter and a comma after τοῦτον, editors have tried to translate ἐχειποτόνησεν voted itself guilty. Jurinus was the first to suggest αὐτὴ and to refer τοῦτον to the treasurer.)