Against Leptines

Put it thus. Of aliens there are exempt—I will assume ten. And by Heaven, as I said before, I do not believe there are five. Moreover of the citizens there are not half a dozen. Sixteen of both, then. Let us call it twenty, or thirty, if you like. How many, pray, are there that annually perform the regularly recurring services—chorus-masters, presidents of gymnasia, and public hosts? Perhaps sixty in all, or a trifle more.

In order, then, that we may have thirty more men for the public services, spread over the whole period,[*](As there was a list of 300 citizens qualified for the προεισφοράand of 1200 for the trierarchy, we may perhaps assume a list of 600 for the regular services. At the rate of 60 a year, it would take 10 years to work through the list, if the contributors were called upon strictly in rotation by the officials of their respective tribes. Therefore the outside estimate of 30 additional contributors, rendered available by abolishing the immunities, would provide only 3 more each year; i.e. 3 citizens out of 60 would be relieved annually. In case of a real shortage of qualified contributors, Demosthenes would prefer the adoption of the system, first instituted for the trierarchy in 357, whereby the 1200 were divided into 20 companies (συμμορίαι) of 60 each, further subdivided into syndicates (συντέλειαι), each responsible for one ship. This was the system reformed at a later date by Demosthenes himself.) is it worth our while to excite the distrust of all? But surely we must know this, that as long as Athens stands, there will be plenty of citizens, without fail, to perform the services, but not a soul will want to do us a good turn, if he sees our previous benefactors wronged.

So far, so good. But if there were the most serious shortage of possible contributors, in Heaven’s name, which would you prefer—to organize syndicates for those services as for the equipment of war-vessels, or to rob your benefactors of what you have given them? I think I should prefer the syndicates. By the present law, while each of these thirty is performing a public service, Leptines affords a respite for the others, and that is all; after that, each of them will have to spend as much as before; but in the other case, each would pay a small contribution, proportioned to his means, and none would be hardly treated, even if his property were quite small.

Now some of our opponents, men of Athens, are so illogical that they make no attempt to answer these arguments, but take a different line, saying for instance how monstrous it is that on the one hand there is nothing left in the Exchequer, but on the other hand private individuals will grow wealthy because they have secured an immunity. But it is not fair to combine both these statements. For if a man has great wealth without doing you any wrong, there is surely no need to look on him with envy; but if they are prepared to say that he has stolen it or gained it in some other disreputable way, there are laws by which he can be suitably punished. But as long as they do not prosecute him, neither have they any right to make this allegation.

Further, with regard to the alleged poverty of the Exchequer, you must reflect that you will not be a whit the better off if you abolish these exemptions, for the expenditure on these services has nothing to do with the revenues or the surplus of the State. And apart from all this, of two possible advantages—wealth and credit with the rest of the world—our State today enjoys the latter. But if anyone imagines that because we have no money we need not also keep our honor bright, his judgement is at fault. For myself indeed, I pray Heaven that, if so it may be, our wealth also may increase, but if not, then at least that our reputation for good faith and constancy may remain sure.

Now take the large fortunes which, according to our opponents, some citizens will amass if relieved of the services, but which I will show to be available for your needs. For of course you are aware that no one is exempt from the equipment of war-galleys or from the special contributions for war. So this person, whoever he may be, who owns much, contributes much to those objects; there is no getting out of it. And again, all would agree that the resources which the State can rely on for these objects should be as great as possible. For money spent by the chorus-masters affords those of us who are in the theater gratification for a fraction of a day; but money lavished on equipment for war gives security to the whole city for all time.

Therefore whatever you remit with one hand, you receive with the other; and you grant as an honor exemptions which even those who receive them cannot enjoy, if they have wealth sufficient for the equipment of a war-vessel. But although I suppose you all know that no one is exempt from the latter service, the clerk shall read to you the actual statute. Take the law about the trierarchy and read this clause only.

[The clause is read]

[And none shall be exempt from the trierarchy except the nine archons.]

You see, Athenians, how explicitly the law lays down that none shall be exempt from the equipment of a war-galley except the nine archons. So those whose wealth falls short of the qualification for that service will contribute by groups to the special war-tax, but those who reach that qualification will be available both for the war-galleys and for the war-tax. Then what relief does your law, Leptines, afford to the main body of citizens, if from one or two tribes it provides a single contributor, who, having relieved one other citizen on one occasion, will thereafter be exempt?[*](According to Demosthemes’ lowest estimate, there would be 5 or 6 citizens exempt: total 16. This number he is willing to double, making the full total 30 and the total of citizens presumably 10 or 12. If spread over the l0 tribes, the lower estimate would give, roughly, one contributor for 2 tribes; and the higher, one for each tribe.) I can see no relief. On the other hand it taints the honor and credit of the whole State. Therefore, when the damage it will inflict is greater than the benefit it confers, ought it not to be repealed by this court? Such would be my verdict.

My next point is this, gentlemen of the jury. The law of Leptines explicitly states that none, whether citizen or enfranchised alien or foreigner, shall be exempt, and does not specify from what, whether from the public service or from any other charge, but simply that none shall be exempt except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton. The word none must be taken to include all classes, and foreigner is not further defined as resident at Athens.

It follows that Leptines deprives Leucon,[*](Leucon, son and succesor of Satyrus, reigned over the Cimmerian Bosporus (Crimea) from 393 to 353. In return for his services here describd, the Athenians had made him a citizen, voted him a golden crown, and allowed him exemption not only from public services but also from the payment of customs at the Piraeus. His sons were Spartacus and Paerisades, who succeeded him as joint rulers, and Apollonius. An inscription in their honor was voted in the years 347-346. It was discovered at Athens and published in 1877. See Hicks, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, no. 111.) the ruler of the Bosporus, and his children of the reward which you bestowed on them. For, of course, Leucon is a foreigner by birth, though by adoption an Athenian citizen, but on neither ground can he claim exemption, if this law stands. And yet, while of our other benefactors each has made himself useful to us on one occasion, Leucon will be found on reflection to be a perpetual benefactor, and that in a matter especially vital to our city.

For you are aware that we consume more imported corn than any other nation. Now the corn that comes to our ports from the Black Sea is equal to the whole amount from all other places of export. And this is not surprising; for not only is that district most productive of corn, but also Leucon, who controls the trade, has granted exemption from dues to merchants conveying corn to Athens, and he proclaims that those bound for your port shall have priority of lading. For Leucon, enjoying exemption for himself and his children, has granted exemption to every one of you.

See what this amounts to. He exacts a toll of one-thirtieth from exporters of corn from his country. Now from the Bosporus there come to Athens about four hundred thousand bushels; the figures can be checked by the books of the grain commissioners. So for each three hundred thousand bushels he makes us a present of ten thousand bushels, and for the remaining hundred thousand a present of roughly three thousand.[*](To help his audience in this piece of mental arithmetic, Demosthenes divides his 400,000 into two parts, of 300,000 (of which the thirtieth is easily calculated) and of 100,000, the thirtieth of which is 3333 1/3 or roughly 3000. It should be remembered that the medimnus is more strictly about a bushel and a half.)

Now, so little danger is there of his depriving our state of this gift, that he has opened another depot at Theudosia, which our merchants say is not at all inferior to the Bosporus,[*](Here not the district, but the capital, Panticapaeum, the modern Kertch. Sixty miles west lies Theudosia (Kaffa), an ancient colony of Miletus.) and there, too, he has granted us the same exemption. I omit much that might be said about the other benefits conferred upon you by this prince and also by his ancestors, but the year before last, when there was a universal shortage of grain, he not only sent enough for your needs, but such a quantity in addition that Callisthenes had a surplus of fifteen talents of silver to dispose of.[*](Callisthenes, as σιτώνηςor Food Controller (an office held by Demosthenes himself,Dem. 18.248), received so much corn from Leucon that, after supplying the needs of Athens, he was able to make 16 talents for the treasury by selling the surplus elsewhere.)

What, then, men of Athens, do you expect of this man, who has proved himself such a friend to you, if he learns that you have deprived him by law of his immunity, and have made it illegal to bestow it hereafter, even if you change your minds? Are you not aware that this same law, if ratified, will take away the immunity, not only from Leucon, but from those of you who import corn from his country?[*](Because Leucon will, of course, retaliate by imposing the dues again.)

For surely no one dreams that he will tolerate the cancelling of your gifts to him, and let his own gifts to you stand good. So to the many disadvantages that this law will obviously entail upon you, may be added the immediate loss of part of your resources. In view of this, are you still considering whether you ought to erase it from the statute-book? Have you not made up your minds long ago? Take and read them the decrees touching Leucon.

[The decrees are read]

How reasonable and just was the immunity which Leucon has obtained from you, these decrees have informed you, gentlemen of the jury. Copies of all these decrees on stone were set up by you and by Leucon in the Bosporus, in the Piraeus, and at Hierum.[*](On the Asiatic side of the entrance to the Thracian Bosporus from the Euxine.) Just reflect to what depths of meanness you are dragged by this law, which makes the nation less trustworthy than an individual.

For you must not imagine that the pillars standing there are anything else than the covenants of all that you have received or granted; and it will be made clear that Leucon observes them and is always eager to benefit you, but that you have repudiated them while they still stand; and that is a far worse offence than to pull them down[*](Both nouns being feminine plural, Demosthenes is able to fuse completely the literal and metaphorical meanings.); for when men wish to traduce our city, there will stand the pillars to witness to the truth of their words.

Now mark! Suppose Leucon sends and asks us on what charge or for what fault we have taken away his immunity; what, in the name of wonder, shall we say, or in what terms will the proposer of your reply draft it? He will say, I suppose, that some of those who obtained immunity did not deserve it!

If, then, Leucon replies to this, Yes; I dare say some of the Athenians are scoundrels, but I have not made that a reason for robbing the good citizens; on the contrary, because I think the Athenians, as a nation, are good men, I allow them all a share; will there not be more fairness in his words than in ours? To me, at least, it seems so. For it is the custom of all nations, for the sake of their benefactors, rather to include some bad men in their rewards, than to make the worthless men an excuse for withholding their rewards from those who are acknowledged to merit them.

Nay more, upon consideration, I cannot even see why anyone should not, if he wishes, challenge Leucon to an exchange of property.[*](By the legal process known as ἀντίδοσις, a citizen called upon to perform a public service, if he thought that a richer man had been unfairly passed over, could challenge him either to perform the service in his stead or to exchange properties. Demosthenes is here putting an extreme case, for it is difficult to believe that an honorary citizen like Leucon, resident elsewhere, could be called upon for a service, even though he had wealth deposited at Athens.) For there is always property of his at Athens, and by this law, if anyone tries to lay hands on it Leucon will either forfeit it or be compelled to perform public service. And it is not the question of expense that will trouble him most, but the reflection that you have robbed him of his reward.