Against Leptines

Neither do anything that is unworthy of this court, nor, if a worthless person is found among those who enjoy the grant, let him keep it; only let each case be judged on its merits. But if Leptines shall say that that is all talk and humbug, this at any rate is not mere talk; let him bring in the amended law himself and cease to say that we will not do so. It is surely a greater honor to propose the law, stamped with your approval,[*](Demosthenes is a trifle premature here.) than this of his own devising.

It seems to me, Athenians, that Leptines—and pray, be not angry,[*](He addresses himself directly to Leptines.) for I am not going to say anything offensive about you—Leptines has either never read Solon’s laws or else does not understand them. For if Solon made a law that every man could grant his property to whomsoever he pleased, in default of legitimate offspring, not with the object of depriving the next of kin of their rights of consanguinity, but that by making the prize open to all he might excite a rivalry in doing good one to another;

and if you, on the contrary, have proposed a law that the people shall not be permitted to bestow on any man any part of what is their own, how can you be said to have read or understood the laws of Solon? You make the nation barren of would-be patriots by proclaiming unmistakably that those who benefit us shall gain nothing by it.

Again, there is another excellent law of Solon, forbidding a man to speak ill of the dead, even if he is himself defamed by the dead man’s children. You do not speak ill of our departed benefactors, Leptines; you do ill to them, when you blame one[*](i.e. of their descendants, whose demerits are no justification for cancelling a reward once given. But the Greek is not clear.) and assert that another is unworthy, though these charges have nothing to do with the dead men.[*](Or possibly, if ὦν is masculine, though the men thus charged have no connection with the dead.) Are you not very far from the intention of Solon?

Now I have been quite seriously informed that with regard to the absolute prohibition of all rewards,[*](Demosthenes here misrepresents the law, which only touched the immunities. Quite seriously is taken by some with prepared to use.) whatever a man’s services may be, our opponents are prepared to use some such argument as this. The Lacedaemonians, who are a well-organized state, and the Thebans grant no such reward to any of their citizens, and yet possibly there are some good men among them. In my opinion, men of Athens, all such arguments are provocative, and intended to persuade you to abolish the immunities, but just they are certainly not. For I am quite aware that the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians and ourselves do not observe the same laws and customs, nor the same form of government.

For in the first place, if this is their argument, they are about to do exactly what a man cannot do at Sparta—praise the laws of Athens or of any other state; nay, so far from that, he is obliged to praise, as well as do, whatever accords with his native constitution. Then again, though the Lacedaemonians do not hold with these customs, yet there are other honors at Sparta, which our citizens to a man would shrink from introducing here.

What, then, are those honors? Not to take each singly, I will describe one which comprises all the rest. Whenever a man for his good conduct is elected to the Senate, or Gerusia, as they call it, he is absolute master of the mass of citizens. For at Sparta the prize of merit is to share with one’s peers the supremacy in the State; but with us the people is supreme, and any other form of supremacy is forbidden by imprecations[*](At the opening of every meeting of the Assembly and of the Council a herald recited a curse on enemies of the State and on evil counsellors; see Dem. 19.70.) and laws and other safeguards, but we have crowns of honor and immunities and free maintenance and similar rewards, which anyone may win, if he is a good citizen.

And both these customs are right enough, the one at Sparta and the other here. Why? Because in an oligarchy harmony is attained by the equality of those who control the State, but the freedom of a democracy is guarded by the rivalry with which good citizens compete for the rewards offered by the people.

Again, with regard to the absence of honors at Thebes, I think I can express the truth thus. The Thebans, men of Athens, plume themselves more on brutality and iniquity than you on humanity and love of justice. If a prayer may be allowed, may they never cease to withhold honor and admiration from those who do them service, or to deal with kindred states in the same way (For you remember how they treated Orchomenus.[*](Wiped out by the Thebans in 364. The men were massacred, and the women and children sold into slavery.)) And never may you cease to do the opposite, honoring your benefactors and winning your rights from your fellow-citizens by debate and in harmony with the laws!

And in general, I think that then only ought you to praise the habits and character of other nations and decry your own, when it is possible to prove that they are more prosperous than you. As long as you (thank Heaven!) are more prosperous than they, in public policy, in internal harmony, and in every other way, why should you belittle your national institutions and imitate theirs? Even if theirs could be proved superior in theory, yet the good fortune that you have enjoyed under your own institutions makes it worth your while to retain them.

Besides all this, if I must say what I think is right, I would put it in this way. It is not right, Athenians, to cite the laws of the Lacedaemonians or of the Thebans in order to undermine the laws established here; it is not right that you should want to put a man to death for transplanting to Athens any of the institutions that have made those nations great, and yet lend a willing ear to those who propose to destroy the institutions under which our democracy has flourished.

Then they have another argument ready; that even at Athens in former generations men who had rendered great services met with no recognition of this sort, but were content with an inscription in the Hermes-Portico.[*](In the Agora. The inscription (quoted by Aeschin. 3.83) was in honor of Cimon’s capture of Eion on the Strymon in 476.) Perhaps indeed the inscription will be read to you. But in my opinion, Athenians, this argument is in many ways prejudicial to the State, besides being unjust.

For if anyone says that even these men deserved no honor, let him say who does deserve it, if there is no one either before or after them. If he shall say no one, I should be very sorry for our city, if no one in the course of its history has proved worthy of reward. Again, if while admitting their merit he points out that they got nothing by it, assuredly he accuses the city of ingratitude. But that is not the truth or anything like it; but whenever a man maliciously gives a wrong twist to his arguments, I think they must appear hateful.

I, however, will explain the case to you, as truth and justice demand. There were, men of Athens, plenty of zealous citizens in former generations, and our city even then honored its good men; only honors then, like everything else, reflected the temper of the times, just as they now reflect the temper of today. And why do I say this? Because for myself I should be inclined to assert that they did get from the State everything that they wished.

What is my evidence? Lysimachus,[*](Son of Aristides the just, pensioned for his father’s merits.) only one of the worthies of that day, received a hundred roods of orchard in Euboea and a hundred of arable land, besides a hundred minas of silver and a pension of four drachmas a day. And the decree in which these gifts are recorded stands in the name of Alcibiades. For then our city was rich in lands and money, though now—she will be rich some day[*](A euphemism for she is poor.); for I must put it in that way to avoid anything like obloquy. Yet today who, think you, would not prefer a third of that reward to mere immunity? To prove the truth of my words, please take the decree.

[The decree is read]

Now this decree, Athenians, proves that your ancestors, like yourselves, were accustomed to honor good men; if they used different methods from ours today, that is another matter. So even if we should admit that neither Lysimachus nor anyone else gained anything from our ancestors, does that make it any fairer in us to rob the men whom we have just rewarded?

For there is nothing outrageous in withholding what one never dreamed of giving; but it is an outrage to give and afterwards take back one’s gift, with no fault alleged. Prove to me that our ancestors ever took back the gifts they had bestowed, and you too have my leave to do the same, though the disgrace remains none the less; but if no one can cite an instance from the whole course of our history, why is such a precedent to be set in our generation?

Again, men of Athens, you must also consider well and carefully the fact that you have come into court today, sworn to give your verdict according to the laws, not of Sparta or Thebes, nor those of our earliest ancestors, but those under which immunities were granted to the men whom Leptines is now trying to rob by his law; and where there are no statutes to guide you, you are sworn to decide according to the best of your judgement. So far, so good. Then you must apply these principles to the law as a whole.

Is it right, Athenians, to honor your benefactors? It is. Well then, is it right to allow a man to keep what has once been given him? It is. Then, to observe your oaths, act on that principle yourselves; resent the imputation that your ancestors acted otherwise; and as for those who cite such instances, alleging that your ancestors rewarded no man for great benefits received, look upon them as both knaves and dullards—knaves, because they falsely charge your ancestors with ingratitude; fools, because they do not see that were the charge proved to the hilt, it would better become them to deny than to repeat it.

Now I expect that another argument of Leptines will be that his law does not deprive the recipients of their inscriptions and their free maintenance, nor the State of the right to confer honor on those who deserve it, but that it will still be in your power to set up statues and grant maintenance and anything else you wish, except this one privilege. But with respect to the powers that he will pretend to leave to the State, I have just this to say. As soon as you take away one of the privileges you have already granted, you will shake the credit of all the rest. For how can the grant of a statue or of free maintenance be more indefeasible than that of an immunity, which you will seem to have first given and then taken away?