On the Crown

These distinctions and explanations I offer merely for the sake of accuracy; for if you should suppose that there was any guilt, or ever so much guilt, in that peace-making business, the suspicion does not concern me. The first man to raise the question of peace in a speech was Aristodemus, the actor, and the man who took up the cue, moved the resolution, and, with Aeschines, became Philip’s hired agent, was Philocrates of Hagnus—your confederate, Aeschines, not mine, though you lie till you are black in the face. Their supporters in the debate were Eubulus and Cephisophon—on whose motives I have at present nothing to say. I never spoke in favor of the peace.

And yet, though the facts are such and demonstrated to be such, he has the amazing impudence to tell you that I am to blame for the terms of peace, and that I stopped the city from arranging the terms in conjunction with a congress of the Greek states. Why, you, you—but I can find no epithet bad enough for you—was there any single occasion when you, having observed me in your presence trying to rob the state of a negotiation and of an alliance which you have just described as of the greatest importance, either made any protest, or rose to give the people any information whatsoever about the proceeding which you now denounce?

Yet if I had really intrigued with Philip to stop a Panhellenic coalition, it was your business not to hold your peace, but to cry aloud, to protest, to inform the people. You did nothing of the sort. No one ever heard that fine voice of yours. Of course not; for at that time there was no embassy visiting any of the Greek states, but all the states had long ago been sounded, and there is not an honest word in his whole story.

Moreover, his falsehoods are the worst of slanders upon Athens. If at one and the same time you were inviting the Greeks to make war and sending envoys to Philip to negotiate peace, you were playing a part worthy of Eurybatus[*](Eurybatus, of Ephesus, a proverbial knave, gave to Cyrus military money entrusted to him by Croesus.) the impostor, not of a great city or of honest men. But it is false; it is false! For what purpose could you have summoned them at that crisis? For peace? They were all enjoying peace. For war? You were already discussing terms of peace. Therefore it is clear that I did not promote, and was in no way responsible for, the original peace, and that all his other calumnies are equally false.

Now observe what policy we severally adopted after the conclusion of peace. You will thereby ascertain who acted throughout as Philip’s agent, and who served your interests and sought the good of the city. I proposed in the Council that the ambassadors should sail without delay to any place where they might learn that Philip was to be found, and there receive from him the oath of ratification; but in spite of my resolution they refused to go. What was the reason of that refusal?

I will tell you. It suited Philip’s purposes that the interval should be as long, and ours that it should be as short as possible; for you had suspended all your preparations for war, not merely from the day of ratification, but from that on which you first began to expect peace. That was just what Philip was contriving all the time, expecting with good reason that he would hold safely any Athenian possessions which he might seize before the ratification, as no one would break the peace to recover them.

Foreseeing that result, and appreciating its importance, I moved that the embassy should repair to the place where they would find Philip and swear him in without delay, in order that the oath might be taken while your allies the Thracians were still holding the places about which Aeschines was so sarcastic—Serrium, Myrtenum, and Ergisce—and that Philip might not get control of Thrace by seizing the positions of advantage and so providing himself amply with men and money for the furtherance of his ulterior designs.

That decree Aeschines neither cites nor reads; though he mentions to my discredit that I suggested in Council that the Macedonian ambassadors should be introduced. What ought I to have done? Objected to the introduction of men who had come expressly to confer with you? Ordered the lessee not to give them reserved seats in the theatre? But they could have sat in the threepenny seats, if I had not moved my resolution. Or was it my business to take care of the public pence, and put up the state for sale, like Aeschines and his friends? Surely not. Please take and read this decree, which the prosecutor omitted, though he knows it well.

(The Decree of Demosthenes is read)

In the archonship of Mnesiphilus, on the thirtieth day of Hecatombaeon, the tribe Pandionis then holding the presidency, Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, proposed that, whereas Philip has sent ambassadors and has agreed to articles of peace, it be resolved by the Council and People of Athens, with a view to the ratification of the peace as accepted by vote of the first Assembly, to choose at once five ambassadors from all the citizens; and that those so elected repair without delay wheresoever they ascertain Philip to be, and take and administer to him the oaths with all dispatch according to the articles agreed on between him and the People of Athens, including the allies on either side. The ambassadors chosen were Eubulus of Anaphlystus, Aeschines of Cothocidae, Cephisophon of Rhamnus, Democrates of Phlya, Cleon of Cothocidae.

My object in moving this decree was to serve Athens, not Philip. Nevertheless these excellent envoys took so little heed of it that they loitered in Macedonia for three whole months, until Philip returned from Thrace, having subdued the whole country; though they might have reached the Hellespont in ten or perhaps in three or four days, and rescued the outposts by receiving the oaths of ratification before Philip captured them. He dared not have touched them in our presence, or we should not have accepted his oath, and so he would have missed his peace, instead of gaining both his objects—peace and the strongholds as well.

Such then is the history of the first act of knavery on Philip’s part, and venality on the part of these dishonest men at the time of the embassy. For that act I avow that I was then, am still, and ever shall be their enemy and their adversary. I will next exhibit an act of still greater turpitude which comes next in order of time.

When Philip had sworn to the peace, having first secured Thrace because of their disobedience to my decree, he bribed them to postpone our departure from Macedonia until he had made ready for his expedition against the Phocians. He was afraid that, if we reported that he intended and was already preparing to march, you would turn out and sail round with your fleet to Thermopylae, and block the passage, as you did before; and his object was that you should not receive our report until he had reached this side of Thermopylae and you were powerless.

He was so nervous, and so much worried by the fear that, in spite of his Thracian success, his enterprise would slip from his fingers if you should intervene before the Phocians perished, that he made a new bargain with this vile creature—all by himself this time, no t in common with his colleagues— to make that speech and to render that report to you, by which all was lost.

I earnestly beg you, men of Athens, to bear in mind throughout this trial that, if Aeschines had not gone outside the articles of indictment in his denunciation of me, I too would not have digressed; but as he has resorted to every sort of imputation and slander, I am compelled to reply briefly to all his charges in turn.

What then were the speeches he made at that crisis—the speeches that brought everything to ruin? He told you that you need not be excited because Philip had passed Thermopylae; that, if only you kept quiet, you would get all you wanted, and would within two or three days learn that Philip was now the friend of those to whom he came as enemy, and the enemy of those to whom he came as friend. The bonds of amity, he declared, with his most impressive eloquence, are fortified not by words but by community of interest; and it was an interest common to Philip, to the Phocians, and to all of you alike, to be quit of the unfeeling and offensive behavior of the Thebans.

Some of you were delighted to hear these remarks, for at that time we all disliked the Thebans. What was the result—not the distant, but the immediate result? That the Phocians perished and their cities were demolished; that you took his advice and kept quiet—and before long were carrying in your chattels from the country; and that Aeschines pocketed his fee. A further result was that Athens got all the ill will of the Thebans and Thessalians, and Philip all their gratitude for these transactions.

To prove the truth of these statements, please read the decree of Callisthenes and Philip’s letter, which will make every point clear.

(The Decree of Callisthenes is read)

In the archonship of Mnesiphilus, at an extraordinary assembly convened by the Generals and the Presidents, with the approval of the Council, on the twenty-first day of Maemacterion, Callisthenes, son of Eteonicus of Phalerum, proposed that no Athenian be allowed upon any pretext whatsoever to pass the night in the country, but only in the City and Peiraeus, except those stationed in the garrison; that the latter keep each the post assigned to him, leaving it neither by day nor by night.

Any person disobeying this decree shall be liable to the statutory penalty for treason, unless he can prove inability to obey in his own case, such plea of inability to be judged by the General of the Infantry, the Paymaster-General, and the Secretary of the Council. All property in the country shall be immediately removed, if within a radius of 120 furlongs, to the City and Peiraeus; if outside this radius, to Eleusis, Phyle, Aphidna, Rhamnus, or Sunium. Proposed by Callisthenes of Phalerum.

Was it with such expectation that you made the peace? Were these the promises of this hireling?

Now read the letter sent to Athens afterwards by Philip.

(Philip’s Letter is read)

Philip, King of Macedonia, to the Council and People of Athens, greeting. Know that we have passed within the Gates, and have subdued the district of Phocis. We have put garrisons in all the fortified places that surrendered voluntarily; those that did not obey we have stormed and razed to the ground, selling the inhabitants into slavery. Hearing that you are actually preparing an expedition to help them, I have written to you to save you further trouble in this matter. Your general policy strikes me as unreasonable, to agree to peace, and yet take the field against me, and that although the Phocians were not included in the ill terms upon which we agreed. Therefore if you decline to abide by your agreements, you will gain no advantage save that of being the aggressors.

Though the letter is addressed to you, it contains, as you hear, a distinct intimation intended for his own allies: I have done this against the wishes and the interests of the Athenians. Therefore, if you Thebans and Thessalians are wise, you will treat them as your enemies, and put your confidence in me. That is the meaning conveyed, though not in those words. By such delusions he carried them off their feet so completely that they had no foresight nor any inkling whatever of the sequel, but allowed him to take control of the whole business; and that is the real cause of their present distresses.