On the Crown

For Philip there could be no end or quittance of hostilities with Athens unless he should make the Thebans and Thessalians her enemies. Now, aIthough your commanders were conducting the war against him without ability and without success, he was vastly distressed both by the campaign and by the privateers; for he could neither export the products of his own country, nor import what he needed for himself.

At that time he had no supremacy at sea, nor could he reach Attica by land unless the Thessalians followed his banner and the Thebans gave him free passage. In spite of his successes against the commanders you sent out, such as they were—I have nothing to say of their failure—he found himself in trouble by reason of conditions of locality and of the comparative resources of the two combatants.

Now, if he should invite the Thebans or the Thessalians to take up his private quarrel and march against you, he could expect no attention; but if he should espouse their joint grievances and be chosen as their leader, he might hope to succeed by a mixture of deception and persuasion. Very well; he sets to work—and observe how cleverly he managed it—to throw the Pylaean Congress into confusion and to implicate the Amphictyonic Council in warfare, feeling certain that they would immediately beg him to deal with the situation.

If, however, the question should be introduced by any of the commissioners of religion sent by him or by any allies of his, the Thebans and Thessalians, as he expected, would be suspicious and all on their guard; but, if the operator should be an Athenian, representing his opponents, he conceived that he would easily escape detection. And such was the actual result.