For the Liberty of the Rhodians

Demosthenes

Demosthenes. Vol. I. Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Speeches, Speech Against Leptines, I-XVII, XX. Vince, J. H., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930 (printing).

Your duty, men of Athens, when debating such important matters, is, I think, to allow freedom of speech to every one of your counsellors. Personally, I never thought it a difficult task to point out to you the best policy—for, to speak plainly, you all seem to me to have discerned it already—but rather to induce you to put it into operation; for when a resolution has been approved and passed, it is no nearer accomplishment than before it was approved.

Now, it is one of the blessings for which, I think, the gods deserve your gratitude, that the same men who not long ago attacked you in the wantonness of their pride, now find in you alone the hope of their salvation. You ought to be delighted at your present opportunity, because, if you decide aright, you will in fact succeed, with honor to yourselves, in silencing the evil tongues that traduce our city.

For we were charged by the Chians, Byzantines and Rhodians with plotting against them, and that was why they concerted the last war against us; but we shall be able to prove that whereas Mausolus, the prime mover and instigator in the business, while calling himself the friend of the Rhodians, has robbed them of their liberty, and whereas the Chians and Byzantines, who posed as their allies, never helped them in distress,

it is to you, whom they dreaded, to you alone of all the states that they owe their deliverance. By making this clear to all, you will teach the democrats in every state to consider friendship with you as the pledge of their safety, and no greater advantage could you have than to win from all men their voluntary and unsuspecting goodwill.

I am surprised to see the same men urging the city, in the interests of the Egyptians, to oppose the King of Persia, but dreading him where the Rhodian democracy is concerned. Yet everyone knows that the Rhodians are Greeks, while Egypt is a division of the Persian Empire.

Some of you, I suppose, remember that when you were discussing Persian affairs, I was the first to come forward with advice,[*](In the speech On the Navy-boards., Dem. 14) and I believe I was the only speaker, or perhaps one out of two, to say that I should think it prudent in you not to make your hostility to the King the pretext for your preparations, but while equipping yourselves against your existing enemies, to defend yourselves against him too, if he attempted to do you wrong. Nor did I fail to convince you that I was right, but you, too, approved of my suggestion.

My present speech, then, is the sequel of my former one. For indeed, if the King admitted me to his presence and asked me for my advice, I should give him the same that I gave you—to defend his own subjects, if any of the Greeks attacked them, but to claim no sovereignty over those who owed him no allegiance.

Now if you make it a general principle, men of Athens, to abandon to the King all places that he has got into his power, whether by surprise or by deceiving some of the inhabitants, then your principle is, I think, a wrong one; but if you feel that in the cause of justice you are bound to go to war and face the consequences, then, in the first place, the more you are determined on such action, the less frequently will it be necessary, and secondly, you will be showing the proper spirit.

To prove that there is precedent both for my proposal to free the Rhodians and for your action, if you adopt it, I will remind you of some things that you have done, and that successfully. You are the men, Athenians, who once sent Timotheus to the help of Ariobarzanes,[*](The satrap of Phrygia, who joined the revolt of the satraps in 362. He was soon afterwards betrayed and crucified.) adding this clause to your instructions, provided that he does not violate our treaty with the King. Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes was in open revolt from the King and that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, who had been stationed there by Tigranes, the King’s viceroy, abandoned his intention of helping the satrap, but invested the island and used his force to liberate it;

and to this very day you have not been involved in war on those grounds. For no one would go to war as readily for aggrandizement as for the defence of his own possessions; but while all men fight desperately to keep what they are in danger of losing, it is not so with aggrandizement men make it, indeed, their aim, but if prevented, they do not feel that they have suffered any injustice from their opponents.

But since I believe that neither would Artemisia now oppose this action on our part, if our State were once committed to it, give me your attention for a little and consider whether my reasoning is sound or not. I think that if the King’s designs in Egypt were meeting with any success, Artemisia would make a big effort to secure Rhodes for him, not from any goodwill towards him, but because, while he is in her neighborhood, she would like to put him under a great obligation, so that he may give her as cordial a recognition[*](Acknowledging her as the successor of Mausolus.) as possible.

But if the reports are true and he has failed in all his attempts, she must argue that this island would be of no use to him at present-which is true enough—but might serve as a fortress to overawe Caria and check any move on her part. Therefore I think she would rather that you had the island, if not too obviously surrendered by her, than that he should get it. I do not, indeed, expect that she will send any help to the Rhodian government, or if she does, it will be feeble and half-hearted;

while as to the King, I should not like to say that I know what he is actually going to do, but that it is to our advantage that he should at once make it clear whether he is going to claim Rhodes or not—that I should maintain positively. For when he does claim it, you will have to take counsel, not for the Rhodians only, but for yourselves and all the Greeks.

And yet, even if the party at present in possession held Rhodes by their own strength, I should not have advised you to take their side, even if they promised to do everything you wished. For I notice that at the start, in order to overthrow the democracy, they enlisted some of the citizens on their side, and when they had succeeded, sent them into banishment again. Now men who have been faithful to neither side could never, I am sure, become steadfast allies to you.

Moreover I should never have made this proposal, had I thought that it would benefit the Rhodian democrats alone, for I am not the official patron of that party, nor do I count any of them among my private friends. Yet even if both these motives had been present, I should not have proposed it, if I had not thought that it would benefit you, since I share in your satisfaction at the fate of the Rhodians—if one who is pleading for their deliverance may be permitted to say so. For they grudged you the recovery of your rights, and now they have lost their own liberty; they spurned an alliance with you who are Greeks and their betters, and now they are slaves of barbarians, slaves of slaves, whom they admitted into their citadels.

I am almost inclined to say, if you choose to help them, that this has been a salutary lesson for them; for in prosperity I doubt whether they would ever have chosen to show their good sense, being Rhodians, but when tested by experience and taught that folly is in most cases a fruitful source of evil, they may perhaps with luck grow more sensible for the future; and that I regard as no small advantage for them. Accordingly, I say that it is your duty to try to save them and to let bygones be bygones, remembering that you too have in many cases been led by schemers into errors, for none of which you would yourselves admit that you ought to pay the penalty.

You may also observe, Athenians, that you have been engaged in many wars both with democracies and with oligarchies. You do not need to be told that; but perhaps none of you considers what are your motives for war with either. What, then, are those motives? With democracies, either private quarrels, when they could not be adjusted by the State, or a question of territory or boundaries, or else rivalry or the claim to leadership; with oligarchies you fight for none of these things, but for your constitution and your liberty.

Therefore I should not hesitate to say that I think it a greater advantage that all the Greeks should be your enemies under democracy than your friends under oligarchy. For with free men I do not think that you would have any difficulty in making peace whenever you wished, but with an oligarchical state I do not believe that even friendly relations could be permanent, for the few can never be well disposed to the many, nor those who covet power to those who have chosen a life of equal privileges.

Seeing that Chios and Mytilene are ruled by oligarchs, and that Rhodes and, I might almost say, all the world are now being seduced into this form of slavery, I am surprised that none of you conceives that our constitution too is in danger, nor draws the conclusion that if all other states are organized on oligarchical principles, it is impossible that they should leave your democracy alone. For they know that none but you will bring freedom back again, and of course they want to destroy the source from which they are expecting ruin to themselves.

Now, all other wrongdoers must be considered the enemies of those only whom they have wronged, but when men overthrow free constitutions and change them to oligarchies, I urge you to regard them as the common enemies of all who love freedom.