Philippic 3

So our ancestors thought that they were bound to consider the welfare of all Greeks, for except on that assumption bribery and corruption in the Peloponnese would be no concern of theirs; and in chastising and punishing all whom they detected, they went so far as to set the offenders’ names on a pillar. The natural result was that the Greek power was dreaded by the barbarian, not the barbarian by the Greeks. But that is no longer so. For that is not your attitude towards these and other offences. What then is your attitude?

You know it yourselves. For why should you bear the whole blame, when all the other Greeks are just as bad as you? That is why I assert that the present crisis calls for earnest zeal and wise counsel. What counsel?[*](The last two words seem pointless. Perhaps τίνος; is the attempt of a scribe to join the longer to the shorter version.) Do you want me to tell you, and will you promise not to be angry?

The clerk reads from an official record[*](A frank description of the Athenian attitude, which should follow here, has dropped out, and the lemma, which is found in S and other good MSS., seems to be a poor attempt to fill the gap. It is difficult to imagine any official document that would be of use to the orator here.)

Now there is a foolish argument advanced by those who want to reassure the citizens. Philip, they say, after all is not yet what the Lacedaemonians were; they were masters of every sea and land; they enjoyed the alliance of the king of Persia; nothing could stand against them: and yet our city defended itself even against them and was not overwhelmed. But for my own part, while practically all the arts have made a great advance and we are living today in a very different world from the old one, I consider that nothing has been more revolutionized and improved than the art of war.

For in the first place I am informed that in those days the Lacedaemonians, like everyone else, would spend the four or five months of the summer season in invading and laying waste the enemy’s territory with heavy infantry and levies of citizens, and would then retire home again; and they were so old-fashioned, or rather such good citizens,[*](The Greek means true to the spirit of a free, constitutional state. Aristotle describes the πολιτικὸν πλῆθος as one which is naturally warlike and qualified to rule or be ruled according to laws which distribute offices by merit (Aristot. Pol. 3.17.4).) that they never used money to buy an advantage from anyone, but their fighting was of the fair and open kind.

But now you must surely see that most disasters are due to traitors, and none are the result of a regular pitched battle. On the other hand you hear of Philip marching unchecked, not because he leads a phalanx of heavy infantry, but because he is accompanied by skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops.

When, relying on this force, he attacks some people that is at variance with itself, and when through distrust no one goes forth to fight for his country, then he brings up his artillery and lays siege. I need hardly tell you that he makes no difference between summer and winter and has no season set apart for inaction.

Since, however, you all know this, you must take it into account and not let the war pass into your own country; you must not invite catastrophe through keeping your eyes fixed on the simple strategy of your old war with the Lacedaemonians, but arrange your political affairs and your military preparations so that your line of defence may be as far away from Athens as possible, give him no chance of stirring from his base, and never come to close grips with him.

For so far as a campaign is concerned, provided, men of Athens, we are willing to do what is necessary, we have many natural advantages, such as the nature of his territory, much of which may be harried and devastated, and countless others; but for a pitched battle he is in better training than we are.

But it is not enough to adopt these suggestions, nor even to oppose him with active military measures, but both from calculation and on principle you must show your hatred of those who speak publicly on his behalf; and you must reflect that it is impossible to defeat the enemies of our city until you have chastised those who within our very walls make themselves their servants.

And that, as all Heaven is my witness, you will never be able to do; but you have reached such a height of folly or of madness or—I know not what to call it, for this fear too has often haunted me, that some demon is driving you to your doom, that from love of calumny or envy or ribaldry, or whatever your motive may be, you clamor for a speech from these hirelings, some of whom would not even disclaim that title, and you derive amusement from their vituperations.

This is serious enough, but there is worse to follow; for you have granted to these men more security for the pursuance of their policy than to your own defenders. Yet mark what troubles are in store for those who lend an ear to such counsellors. I will mention some facts which will be familiar to you all.

At Olynthus there were two parties in the state: Philip’s men, entirely subservient to him, and the patriots, striving to preserve the freedom of their countrymen. Which, pray, ruined their country? Which betrayed the cavalry, whose betrayal sealed the doom of Olynthus? The partisans of Philip; the men who, when the city was still standing, tried to defame and slander the patriotic statesmen, until the Olynthian democracy was actually induced to expel Apollonides.[*](The democratic leader, afterwards honored with the citizenship of Athens.)

Now it was not at Olynthus only that this habit produced every kind of evil result; but at Eretria, when the democrats, ridding themselves of Plutarchus and his mercenaries, held the city together with Porthmus, some of them were for handing the government over to you, others to Philip. The latter on most points, or rather on all, gained the ear of the sorely tried and ill-starred Eretrians, and at last persuaded them to expel their real champions.

For of course Philip, whom they fancied their ally, sent Hipponicus with a thousand mercenaries, razed the walls of Porthmus, and set up three tyrants, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus. Twice since then they have tried to deliver themselves, and twice he has driven them from their homes on the first occasion sending Eurylochus with his mercenaries, on the second Parmenio.

And what need is there to mention most of the cases? But at Oreus Philistides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus, the very men who now control the city, were, as everyone knew, Philip’s agents, but Euphraeus, a man who once resided here at Athens, was working for the freedom and emancipation of his countrymen.

It would be a long story to tell you how this man was repeatedly outraged and insulted by the people; but a year before the capture of Eretria, detecting the machinations of Philistides and his party, he denounced him as a traitor. Then a number of fellows banded together, with Philip for their paymaster and managing director, and dragged Euphraeus off to prison for setting the city in an uproar.