On the Chersonese

Therefore you must needs bear in mind that this is a life-and-death struggle, and the men who have sold themselves to Philip must be abhorred and cudgelled to death, for it is impossible to quell the foes without, until you have punished those within your gates who are Philip’s servants; but if you are tripped by these stumbling-blocks, you are sure to be baulked of the others.

What do you imagine is his motive in outraging you now—I think no other term describes his conduct—or why is it that, in deceiving the others, he at least confers benefits upon them, but in your case he is already resorting to threats? For example, the Thessalians were beguiled by his generosity into their present state of servitude; no words can describe how he formerly deceived the miserable Olynthians by his gift of Potidaea and many other places;

the Thebans he is now misleading, having handed over Boeotia to them and relieved them of a long and trying war. So each of these states has reaped some benefit from him; some of them have already paid the penalty, as all men know; the rest will pay it whenever the day of reckoning comes. As for you, I say nothing of your losses in war,[*](Some such words seem necessary to avoid a contradiction. The Greek is probably corrupt, though the same reading is found in Dem. 10.65.) but in the very act of accepting the peace, how completely you were deceived, how grievously you were robbed!

Were you not deceived about Phocis, Thermopylae, the Thraceward districts, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself? Is not Philip now holding the city of the Cardians, and admitting that he holds it? Why then does he deal thus with the other Greeks, but not with you in the same way? Because ours is the one city in the world where immunity is granted to plead on behalf of our enemies, and where a man who has been bribed can safely address you in person, even when you have been robbed of your own.

It would not have been safe in Olynthus to plead Philip’s cause, unless the Olynthian democracy had shared in the enjoyment of the revenues of Potidaea. It would not have been safe in Thessaly to plead Philip’s cause, if the commoners of Thessaly had not shared in the advantages that Philip conferred when he expelled their tyrants and restored to them their Amphictyonic privileges. It would not have been safe at Thebes, until he gave them back Boeotia and wiped out the Phocians.

But at Athens, though Philip has not only robbed you of Amphipolis and the Cardian territory, but is also turning Euboea into a fortress to overawe you, and is even now on his way to attack Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip’s behalf. Indeed, of these politicians, some who were beggars are suddenly growing rich, some unknown to name and fame are now men of honor and distinction; while you, on the contrary, have passed from honor to dishonor, from affluence to destitution. For a city’s wealth I hold to be allies, credit, goodwill, and of all these you are destitute.

Because you are indifferent to these advantages and allow them to be taken from you, Philip is prosperous and powerful and formidable to Greeks and barbarians alike, while you are deserted and humiliated, famous for your well-stocked markets, but in provision for your proper needs, contemptible. Yet I observe that some of our speakers do not urge the same policy for you as for themselves; for you, they say, ought to remain quiet even when you are wronged; they themselves cannot remain quiet among you, though no man does them wrong.[*](They want you to remain passive, though they themselves lead an active political life, in Philip’s interests. See the expansion of this passage in Dem. 10.70-74.)

Then some irresponsible person comes forward and says, Of course, you decline to make a definite proposal or to run any such risk. You are a coward and a milksop. I am not foolhardy, impudent, and shameless, and I pray that I may never be; nevertheless I think myself more truly brave than many of your neck-or-nothing politicians.

For if anyone, Athenians, disregarding what will benefit the State, traffics in trials, confiscations, bribes, and indictments, he shows in this no true bravery, but, ensuring his own safety by the popularity of his speeches and measures, he is bold without risk. But whoever in your best interests often opposes your wishes, and never speaks to win favor, but always gives you of his best, and makes choice of that policy which is more under the dominion of chance than of calculation, and yet accepts the responsibility of either, he is the brave man.

Yes, and it is he who is the useful citizen, not those who for a moment’s popularity have made havoc of the chief resources of the State. These men I am so far from envying or deeming them worthy citizens of our city, that if a man should say to me, Speak for yourself, and tell us what good you have ever done the State, though I might speak, men of Athens, of the equipment of war-galleys and of choruses, of money contributions and of the ransom of captives, and of other instances of liberality,

I would say not a word of them, but only reply that my policy has never been the policy of these men; that though I could, perhaps as well as the rest, accuse and bribe and confiscate and act in general as they are acting, I have never applied myself to any of these arts nor obeyed the promptings of greed or ambition, but continue to offer advice which does indeed lower me in your esteem, but which, if you will follow it, would contribute to your greatness. So much perhaps I may say of myself without offence.

Nor indeed does it seem to me the part of an honest citizen to devise political measures by which I shall at once take the highest place among you, but you the lowest among the nations. No, the advancement of the State must always go along with the measures proposed by good citizens, and they must always support the best and not the easiest policy; for towards the latter nature herself will lead the way, but to instruct you by speech and guide you to the former is the duty of the good citizen.

Now I have even heard some such remark as this: that I, of course, always speak for the best, but that you get nothing from me except words, while what the city wants is deeds and a practical policy of some sort. I will myself explain how I stand in this matter, and I will be perfectly candid. I do not think that your adviser has any business except to give the best counsel he can, and I think I can easily prove that this is so.

For you know, of course, that the famous Timotheus[*](One of the most successful of the Athenian generals, from 378 till his eclipse in 354, when he was condemned and fined for failure in the Social War. His intimacy with Isocrates had made him also an effective speaker. His biography is included in the collection of Cornelius Nepos. The occasion here referred to is the Euboean expedition of 357, when Demosthenes served as trierarch.) once harangued you to the effect that you ought to send an expedition to save the Euboeans, when the Thebans were trying to enslave them, and his words ran something like this: Tell me, he said, when you have got the Thebans in the island, are you deliberating how you will deal with them and what you ought to do? Will you not cover the sea with your war-galleys, men of Athens? Will you not rise up at once and march down to the Piraeus and drag them down the slips?

That, then, was what Timotheus said, and that was what you did, and the union of the two brought about the practical result. But if Timotheus had given you the best advice he could (as indeed he did), but you had shirked your duty and paid no heed to him, would the State have reaped any of the effects that then followed? Not a bit of it. So the same applies to whatever I utter now and whatever this man or that utters. For deeds you must look to yourselves, but for advice, the best that skill in speech can command, look to the speaker who rises to address you.

Let me sum up before I leave the platform. I say that we must pay our contributions and keep together the force now in the field, rectifying whatever seems to be amiss, but not disbanding the whole for any adverse criticism. We must send ambassadors in every direction to instruct, to exhort, to act. While doing all this, we must also punish those politicians who take bribes, and we must hate them wherever found, in order that those who prove their own virtue and honesty may find that their advice has been beneficial to themselves as well as to the citizens at large.

If you deal thus with public affairs and cease to neglect them entirely, perhaps, yes, perhaps even now there may be a change for the better. If, however, you sit here, confining your zeal to cries of dissent or approval, and drawing back from every call to duty, I see not that any words, divorced from the necessary action on your part, can ever save the State.