On the Chersonese

Demosthenes

Demosthenes. Vol. I. Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Speeches, Speech Against Leptines, I-XVII, XX. Vince, J. H., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930 (printing).

Only I think that, if their advice is really given in perfect good faith, even as they are trying to break up the force belonging to our city by bringing charges before you against the commander, who provides for its maintenance, so they are bound to show that Philip’s force will also be disbanded, if you accept their advice. If not, you must observe that they are merely reducing our city to the same plight that has already caused her to forfeit all her existing advantages.

For I need not tell you that Philip owes his successes to nothing in the world more than to his being the first in the field. For the man who always keeps a standing army by him, and who knows beforehand what he wants to do, is ready in an instant for anyone that he chooses to attack, while it is only after we have heard of something happening that we begin to bustle about and make our preparations.

Hence, I believe, it results that Philip, quite at his leisure, keeps whatever he assails, while we are too late, and whatever we have spent has been lavished in vain; we have succeeded in showing our enmity and our will to thwart him, but by being too late for action we only incur additional ignominy.

Do not, therefore, fail to observe, Athenians, that at present all else is mere talk and pretence; the real object of this scheming and contriving is that you should stay at home, with no Athenian force in field, while Philip, without the least trouble, settles everything to suit his wishes. For you must first note what is going on at the present moment.

He is now established in Thrace with a large force, and is sending for considerable reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly, according to the statements of those on the spot. Now, if he waits for the Etesian winds to blow and marches to the siege of Byzantium, do you think that the Byzantines will remain in their present state of infatuation and will not call upon you and demand your help?

I think not. Nay, even if there are others whom they distrust more than us, I think they will rather admit such within their walls than surrender their city to Philip—if indeed he does not forestall them by capturing it. Therefore, if we cannot sail from Athens, and if there is no force ready to help them on the spot, their doom is sealed.

Because, you say, the wretched creatures are infatuated and stupid beyond measure. Quite so, but still we are bound to preserve them in the interests of Athens. And then again we are not certain of another thing, that he will not attack the Chersonese. Indeed, if we may judge from the letter which he sent you, he means to take vengeance on the settlers there.

If, therefore, our present force is still in being, it will be able both to save the Chersonese and to make raids upon Philip’s territory. But if it is once disbanded, what shall we do if he marches against the Chersonese? Bring Diopithes to trial, you say. And how will that help matters? Well, then, we will set out from Athens ourselves. But suppose the winds will not let us? But surely Philip will not attack.

And who will go bail for that? Do you not observe and consider, men of Athens, what season[*](The season of the Etesian winds; see Dem. 8.14.) of the year is upon us—the season at which certain people think it their duty to keep the Hellespont clear of you and hand it over to Philip? What if he quits Thrace and never approaches the Chersonese or Byzantium—for you must take that also into your reckoning—but turns up at Chalcis and Megara, just as he did at Oreus not long ago? Will it be better to make our stand here and let the war spread to Attica, or to contrive some employment for him away yonder? I prefer the latter.

Therefore, knowing and weighing these facts, it is the duty of all of you, not surely to try to disparage and break up the force that Diopithes is doing his best to provide for the state, but to provide an additional force yourselves and to keep him well supplied with funds and in every way to give him your loyal co-operation.

For suppose someone should ask Philip, Tell me, which would you prefer? That the troops now serving with Diopithes, whatever their character may be—for I am not discussing that—should prosper and win credit at Athens and grow in numbers with the co-operation of the government, or that a few accusers and detractors should cause them to be broken up and destroyed? I think he would choose the latter. And what Philip would pray the gods to vouchsafe him, are some of us here trying to compass? And do you still ask how our interests are sacrificed everywhere?

I want therefore to examine frankly the present state of our affairs, and to find out what we are doing ourselves now and how we are dealing with the situation. We refuse to pay war-taxes or to serve in person; we cannot keep our hands off the public funds; we will not pay Diopithes the allowances agreed upon, nor sanction the sums that he raises for himself;

but we grumble and criticize his methods, and ask what he intends to do, and all that sort of thing; and yet, while maintaining that attitude, we refuse to perform our own tasks; with our lips we praise those whose speeches are worthy of our city, but our actions serve only to encourage their opponents.

Now, you have a habit of asking a speaker on every occasion, What then must be done?; but I prefer to ask you, What then must be said? Because, if you are not going to pay your contributions, nor serve in person, nor keep your hands off the public funds, nor grant Diopithes his allowances, nor sanction the sums that he raises for himself, nor consent to perform your own tasks, I have nothing to say. You who have gone so far in granting license to those whose object is fault-finding and calumny, that even about what they say he is going to do, even on that ground they accuse him in advance and you listen to them—what can anyone say?

Now, some of you ought to be told the possible result of all this. I shall speak freely, for indeed I could not speak otherwise. All the generals that have ever set sail from your land—if I am wrong, I submit myself to any penalty—raise money from the Chians, from the Erythraeans, from whatever people they can, I mean of the Greeks of Asia Minor.

Generals with only one or two ships raise less; those with a larger fleet raise more. Also those who pay do not pay the sum, be it large or small, for nothing; they are not such madmen. No, they purchase for the merchants sailing from their own harbors immunity from injury or robbery, or a safe conduct for their own ships, or something of that sort. They say that they are granting benevolences. That is the name for these exactions.

And so too in this case, while Diopithes has a force with him, it is perfectly plain that all these people will pay up. For where else do you suppose that he looks for the maintenance of his troops, if he gets nothing from you and has no private fortune to furnish their pay? To the sky? No, indeed; it is from what he can collect or beg or borrow that he keeps things going.