On the Chersonese

Demosthenes

Demosthenes. Vol. I. Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Speeches, Speech Against Leptines, I-XVII, XX. Vince, J. H., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930 (printing).

It should be the duty of all speakers, men of Athens, to give no expression to their hatred or their partiality, but to put forward just what each thinks the best counsel, especially when you are debating a question of urgent public importance. But since there are speakers who are impelled to address you, either as partisans or from some other motive, whatever it may be, you citizens who form the majority ought to dismiss all else from your minds, and vote and act in such a way as you think will best serve our city.

The really serious problem is the state of the Chersonese and Philip’s Thracian campaign, now in its eleventh month; yet most of the speeches have been confined to what Diopithes is doing or what he is going to do. For my part, when charges are brought against any of those whom you can legally punish whenever you like, I hold that it is open to you either to deal with their case at once or to postpone it; and it is quite unnecessary for me or anyone else to take a strong line on the subject of such charges.

But when our national enemy, with a strong force, is trying to forestall us in the neighborhood of the Hellespont, and when, if we are once too late, we shall never again be able to save the situation, then I think it is to our interest to complete our plans and preparations as quickly as we can, and not be diverted from our purpose by clamorous accusations about extraneous matters.

I often wonder at the sort of speeches that are delivered here, but nothing, men of Athens, has surprised me more than what I heard uttered in the Council the other day, that your advisers are bound to put before you the plain alternative of fighting or observing the peace.

But the fact is, if Philip keeps quiet and does not retain any of our territory contrary to the terms of peace, and does not form a general coalition against us, there is nothing more to be said and we must simply observe the peace, and I perceive a readiness to do so on your part at any rate; but if the oath that we took and the terms on which we made peace are published for all men to read,

and if it is proved that from the first, even before Diopithes set sail with colonists, whom they now accuse of having started hostilities, Philip has unfairly taken much that is ours, about which your decrees denouncing him still stand good, and that he is all the time repeatedly seizing the property of the other Greeks and of the barbarians, and so equipping himself for an attack upon us, what do they mean by saying that we must either make war or keep peace?

For we have no choice in the matter, but there remains the most righteous and most necessary task of all, which these gentlemen deliberately pass over in silence. What then is that task? To defend ourselves against the aggressor. Or perhaps they mean that if Philip keeps his hands off Attica and the Piraeus, he is neither injuring our city nor provoking hostilities.

But if they ground their plea upon this principle, if this is their interpretation of the peace, it is obvious to all that their argument is assuredly impious and intolerable and dangerous to Athens; and it follows besides that their own words flatly contradict their indictment of Diopithes. For why on earth are we to give Philip leave to do everything else, provided he keeps clear of Attica, while Diopithes is not allowed to help the Thracians, or else we shall have to admit that he is starting a war?

Yes, you may say, as to that indeed the speakers are proved wrong, but the mercenaries are really acting abominably in ravaging the shores of the Hellespont, and Diopithes is wrong in detaining the merchantmen, and we must not sanction it. Very well; be it so. I have no objection.

Only I think that, if their advice is really given in perfect good faith, even as they are trying to break up the force belonging to our city by bringing charges before you against the commander, who provides for its maintenance, so they are bound to show that Philip’s force will also be disbanded, if you accept their advice. If not, you must observe that they are merely reducing our city to the same plight that has already caused her to forfeit all her existing advantages.

For I need not tell you that Philip owes his successes to nothing in the world more than to his being the first in the field. For the man who always keeps a standing army by him, and who knows beforehand what he wants to do, is ready in an instant for anyone that he chooses to attack, while it is only after we have heard of something happening that we begin to bustle about and make our preparations.

Hence, I believe, it results that Philip, quite at his leisure, keeps whatever he assails, while we are too late, and whatever we have spent has been lavished in vain; we have succeeded in showing our enmity and our will to thwart him, but by being too late for action we only incur additional ignominy.

Do not, therefore, fail to observe, Athenians, that at present all else is mere talk and pretence; the real object of this scheming and contriving is that you should stay at home, with no Athenian force in field, while Philip, without the least trouble, settles everything to suit his wishes. For you must first note what is going on at the present moment.

He is now established in Thrace with a large force, and is sending for considerable reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly, according to the statements of those on the spot. Now, if he waits for the Etesian winds to blow and marches to the siege of Byzantium, do you think that the Byzantines will remain in their present state of infatuation and will not call upon you and demand your help?

I think not. Nay, even if there are others whom they distrust more than us, I think they will rather admit such within their walls than surrender their city to Philip—if indeed he does not forestall them by capturing it. Therefore, if we cannot sail from Athens, and if there is no force ready to help them on the spot, their doom is sealed.

Because, you say, the wretched creatures are infatuated and stupid beyond measure. Quite so, but still we are bound to preserve them in the interests of Athens. And then again we are not certain of another thing, that he will not attack the Chersonese. Indeed, if we may judge from the letter which he sent you, he means to take vengeance on the settlers there.

If, therefore, our present force is still in being, it will be able both to save the Chersonese and to make raids upon Philip’s territory. But if it is once disbanded, what shall we do if he marches against the Chersonese? Bring Diopithes to trial, you say. And how will that help matters? Well, then, we will set out from Athens ourselves. But suppose the winds will not let us? But surely Philip will not attack.

And who will go bail for that? Do you not observe and consider, men of Athens, what season[*](The season of the Etesian winds; see Dem. 8.14.) of the year is upon us—the season at which certain people think it their duty to keep the Hellespont clear of you and hand it over to Philip? What if he quits Thrace and never approaches the Chersonese or Byzantium—for you must take that also into your reckoning—but turns up at Chalcis and Megara, just as he did at Oreus not long ago? Will it be better to make our stand here and let the war spread to Attica, or to contrive some employment for him away yonder? I prefer the latter.

Therefore, knowing and weighing these facts, it is the duty of all of you, not surely to try to disparage and break up the force that Diopithes is doing his best to provide for the state, but to provide an additional force yourselves and to keep him well supplied with funds and in every way to give him your loyal co-operation.

For suppose someone should ask Philip, Tell me, which would you prefer? That the troops now serving with Diopithes, whatever their character may be—for I am not discussing that—should prosper and win credit at Athens and grow in numbers with the co-operation of the government, or that a few accusers and detractors should cause them to be broken up and destroyed? I think he would choose the latter. And what Philip would pray the gods to vouchsafe him, are some of us here trying to compass? And do you still ask how our interests are sacrificed everywhere?