Olynthiac 1

Then having settled Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, and the rest of that country to suit his purposes, off he went to Thrace, and there, after evicting some of the chiefs and installing others, he fell sick. On his recovery, he did not relapse into inactivity, but instantly assailed Olynthus. His campaigns against Illyrians and Paeonians and King Arybbas and any others that might be mentioned, I pass over in silence.

Well, some of you may say, why tell us this now? Because, men of Athens, I want you to know and realize two things: first, what an expensive game it is to squander your interests one by one; and secondly, the restless activity which is ingrained in Philip’s nature, and which makes it impossible for him ever to rest on his laurels. But if Philip adopts the principle that he ought always to be improving his position, and you the principle of never facing your difficulties resolutely, just reflect what is likely to be the end of it all.

Seriously, is anyone here so foolish as not to see that our negligence will transfer the war from Chalcidice to Attica? Yet if that comes to pass, I am afraid, men of Athens, that just as men who borrow money recklessly at high interest enjoy a temporary accommodation only to forfeit their estates in the end, so we may find that we have paid a heavy price for our indolence, and because we consult our own pleasure in everything, may hereafter come to be forced to do many of the dfficult things for which we had no liking, and may finally endanger our possessions here in Attica itself.

Now someone may tell me that to find fault is easy and in any one’s power, but that it needs a statesman to expound the policy demanded by our circumstances. But I am not unaware, men of Athens, that if anything goes wrong, you often vent your disappointment, not on the responsible agents, but on those who happen to have addressed you last. I shall not, however, consult my own safety by keeping back what I believe to be for your true interests.

I suggest then that the case calls for two distinct expeditions; one military force must be dispatched to rescue their cities for the Olynthians, and a second force, both naval and military, to ravage Philip’s territory. If you neglect either of them, I am afraid your campaign will prove abortive.

For if you send a marauding expedition, he will stand on the defensive until he has made himself master of Olynthus, and then he will easily march to the relief of his own territory; or if you confine yourselves to helping Olynthus, he will know that his base is secure and will give close and undivided attention to his operations, until at last he overcomes the resistance of the besieged. Our expedition, you see, must be on a large scale and twofold.

Such are my views on the expeditionary force. With regard to the supply of money, you have money, men of Athens; you have more than any other nation has for military purposes. But you appropriate it yourselves, to suit your own pleasure. Now if you will spend it on the campaign, you have no need of a further supply; if not, you have—or rather, you have no supply at all. What! someone will cry, do you actually move to use this money for military purposes? Of course I do not.

Only it is my opinion that we must provide soldiers and that there must be one uniform system of pay in return for service. Your opinion, however, is that you should, without any trouble, just appropriate the money for your festivals.[*](The Theoric Fund had been instituted by Pericles, nominally to enable the poorer citizens to attend the public festivals. It would seem that definite sums were alloted to the various departments of State expenditure, and the surplus was at the disposal of the democracy for special military or other objects. Somewhere about 354 Eubulus, who was one of the board which controlled the Theoric Fund, carried a law appropriating to it the whole of the surplus revenue. He does not seem to have starved the defensive services, but he left no provision for a war, except by means of an extraordinary levy or ἐσφορά. Either in 360, or perhaps in 349 before the delivery of the third Olynthiac, an attempt to revert to the earlier arrangement was followed by the usual γραφὴ παρανόμων, and Eubulus is alleged to have confirmed the bad system by making it a capital offence even to propose a diversion of the fund. Demosthenes approaches the subject with a studied show of embarrassment.) Then the only alternative is a war-tax, heavy or light, as circumstances demand. Only money we must have, and without money nothing can be done that ought to be done. There are other proposals before you for raising supplies; choose whichever of them you think expedient, and, while there is yet time, grapple with the problem.