Panathenaicus

The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, about the same time were so far from carrying out the same policy as our ancestors—from waging war on the barbarians and benefiting the Hellenes—that they were not even willing to refrain from aggression, but although they held an alien city and a territory not only adequate but greater than any other city of Hellas possessed, they were not satisfied with what they had;

on the contrary, having learned from the actual course of events that while according to law states and territories are deemed to belong to those who have duly and lawfully acquired them, in fact, however, they fall into the hands of those who are most practised in the art of warfare and are able to conquer their enemies in battle—thinking upon these things, they neglected agriculture and the arts and everything else and did not cease laying siege to the cities in the Peloponnesus one by one and doing violence to them until they overthrew them all with the exception of Argos.[*](For the Spartan Conquest of the Peloponnese see Grote, History of Greece 2, pp. 418 ff.)

And so it resulted from the policy which we pursued that Hellas waxed great, Europe became stronger than Asia, and, furthermore, the Hellenes who were in straitened circumstances received cities and lands, while the barbarians who were wont to be insolent were expelled from their own territory and humbled in their pride; whereas the results of the Spartan policy were that their city alone became strong, dominated all the cities in the Peloponnesus, inspired fear in the other states, and was courted by them for her favor.

In justice, however, we should praise the city which has been the author of many blessings to the rest of the world but should reprehend the state which is ever striving to effect its own advantage; and we should cultivate the friendship of those who do by others just as they do by themselves, but should abhor and shun those who feel the utmost degree of self-love, while governing their state in a spirit inimical and hostile to the world at large. Such was the beginning made by each of these two states.

But at a later time, when the Persian War took place[*](For conduct of Athens and Sparta in the Persian Wars, 49-52, compare Isoc. 4.71-74, 85-98.)(Xerxes, who was then king, having gathered together a fleet of thirteen hundred triremes and a land force numbering five millions in all, including seven hundred thousand fighting men, and led this vast force[*](“An innumerable army” in Isoc. 4.93.) against the Hellenes),

the Spartans, although they were masters of the Peloponnesus, contributed to the sea-fight which determined the issue of the whole war only ten triremes, whereas our ancestors, although they were homeless, having abandoned Athens[*](See Isoc. 4.96; Isoc. 6.43.) because the city had not been fortified with walls at that time, furnished not only a greater number of ships, but ships with a greater fighting force, than all the rest combined who fought together in that battle.[*](See Isoc. 4.98, note.)

Again, the Lacedaemonians contributed to this battle the leadership of Eurybiades, who, had he carried into effect what he intended to do, could have been prevented by nothing in the world from bringing destruction upon the Hellenes, whereas the Athenians furnished Themistocles, who, by the common assent of all, was credited with being responsible for the victorious outcome of that battle as well as for all the other successes which were achieved during that time.[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.98. Erybiades and the Peloponnesians generally, including Corinth, favored the removal of the fleet from Salamis to the Isthmus of Corinth. Themistocles thwarted this retreat. Hdt. 8.57 ff. The account in Plut. Them. is closer to that of Isocrates.)

And the greatest proof of this is that those who then fought together took the hegemony away from the Lacedaemonians and conferred it upon our ancestors.[*](See Isoc. 4.72.) And yet what more competent or trustworthy judges could one find of what then took place than those who had a part in those very struggles? And what benefaction could one mention greater than that which was able to save all Hellas?

Now after these events it came about that each of these cities in turn gained the empire of the sea[*](For contrast between the empire of Athens and that of Sparta, 53-61, compare Isoc. 4.104 ff.)—a power such that whichever state possesses it holds in subjection most of the states of Hellas.[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.16.) As to their use of this power in general, I commend neither Athens nor Sparta; for one might find many faults with both. Nevertheless, in this supervision[*](Here is the inoffensive word e)pime/leia, supervision, to convey the feeling that the empire of Athens cared for the interests of the confederate states.) the Athenians surpassed the Lacedaemonians no less than in the deeds which I have just mentioned.

For our fathers tried to persuade their allies to establish the very same polity in their cities as they themselves had continually cherished;[*](See Isoc. 4.104-106.) and it is a sign of good will and friendship when any people urge it upon others to use those institutions which they conceive to be beneficial to themselves. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, set up in their subject states a polity which resembled neither that which obtained among themselves nor those which have existed anywhere else in the world; nay, they vested in ten men[*](For these “decarchies” and their misrule see Isoc. 4.110-114.) alone the government of each of the states—men of such a character that were one to attempt to denounce them for three or four days without pause he would appear to have covered not a fraction of the wrongs which have been perpetrated by them.

To attempt to review these wrongs in detail were foolish; they are so many and so grave. Were I a younger man, I might perhaps have found means to characterize all of their crimes in a few words which would have stirred in my hearers an indignation commensurate with the gravity of the things which these men have done; but as it is, no such words occur to me other than those which are on the lips of all men, namely, that they so far outdid all those who lived before their time in lawlessness and greed that they not only ruined themselves and their friends and their own countries but also brought the Lacedaemonians into evil repute with their allies and plunged them into misfortunes so many and so grave as no one could have dreamed would ever be visited upon them.

You can see at once from this instance best of all how much milder and more moderate we were in our supervision over the affairs of the Hellenes, but you can see it also from what I shall now say. The Spartans remained at the head of Hellas hardly ten years,[*](Isocrates elsewhere views the Spartan supremacy as lasting from the end of the Peloponnesian War, 405-404 B.C., to the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C. See Isoc. 5.47. But later in Isoc. 5.63-64 he speaks of Conon's naval victory at the battle of Cnidus, 394 B.C., as the end of the Spartan rule, since it re-established the maritime influence of Athens. The latter is the version followed here. It is reasonable to say that Sparta's supremacy by sea ceased with the battle of Cnidus and her supremacy by land with Leuctra.) while we held the hegemony without interruption for sixty-five years.[*](See Isoc. 4.106, note.) And yet it is known to all that states which come under the supremacy of others remain loyal for the longest time to those under which they suffer the least degree of oppression.