Panathenaicus

that you chose, and chose wisely, to eulogize your own city in order that you might gratify the multitude of your fellow-citizens and that you might win the acclaim of those who are friendly disposed towards you. But having so decided, you conceived that if you confined your discourse to Athens alone and repeated the fables about her which fall easily from the lips of everyone, your speech would appear no different from those which had been composed by the other orators (which would cause you extreme humiliation and distress),

whereas if you discarded these fables and dealt with her acknowledged achievements, which have brought many blessings to the Hellenes, and compared these with the deeds of the Lacedaemonians, praising the achievements of your ancestors and censuring the things which have been done by the Lacedaemonians, not only would your discourse make a more striking impression upon your hearers but you yourself would lose no ground, and many would admire such a treatment of the theme more than what had been written by the other orators.

“At the first, then, so it appears to me, this was the manner in which you reviewed and thought upon your problem. But since you knew that you had praised the government of the Spartans more than any other man,[*](An exaggeration. But see Isoc. 6; Isoc. 7.7; Isoc. 3.24; Isoc. 8.142 ff.) you feared lest you might impress those who had heard this praise as no different from the orators who speak without conviction or principle, if, that is to say, you censured on the present occasion those whom you formerly were wont to praise above all others. Pondering this difficulty, you proceeded to study in what light you could represent each of these two cities in order that you might seem to speak the truth about them both and that you might be able to praise your ancestors, just as you purposed to do, and at the same time to appear to be censuring the Spartans in the eyes of those who have no liking for them, while in reality doing nothing of the sort but covertly praising them instead.

Seeking such an effect, you found without difficulty arguments of double meaning, which lend themselves no more to the purpose of those who praise than of those who blame, but are capable of being turned both ways and leave room for much disputation—arguments the employment of which, when one contends in court over contracts for his own advantage, is shameful and no slight token of depravity but, when one discourses on the nature of man and of things, is honorable and bespeaks a cultivated mind.[*](Surely this is ironical.)

Even such is the discourse which has been read, in which you have represented your ancestors as devoted to peace and lovers of the Hellenes and champions of equality in the government of states, but have painted the Spartans as arrogant and warlike and self-seeking, as indeed they have been conceived by all men to be. “Such being the nature of each of these two cities, the Athenians are extolled by all men and are credited with being friendly to the masses, while the Spartans are envied and disliked by the majority of men.

There are, however, those who praise them and admire them and make bold to say that they have greater advantages than were possessed by your ancestors. For arrogance partakes of dignity—a quality held in high esteem—and men of that character are regarded as more high-minded than those who champion equality, just as those who are warlike are regarded as superior to those who are peaceable. For the latter are neither seekers after what they do not have nor staunch guardians of what they possess, while the former are effective in both respects—both in seizing whatever they covet and in keeping whatever they have once made their own.

And this is what is done by those who are men in the complete sense.[*](Manifestly Isocrates in this passage imitates Plat. Rep. 344, where Thrasymachus, maintaining that “justice is the interest of the stronger,” bids Socrates not to mark the consequences of injustice practised on a petty scale but those of the “most complete injustice,” such as a despotism. Cf. Plat. Gorg. 483.) But the eulogists of Sparta think they have even a stronger plea for self-seeking than what I have said. For they do not consider that men who break contracts and cheat and falsify accounts deserve to be termed self-seeking; for because they are in bad repute with all men they come off worse in all circumstances, whereas the self-seeking of the Spartans and of kings and despots is a gift from heaven which all men crave.

It is true that those who hold such power are the objects of abuse and execration but no man is so constituted by nature that he would not pray to the gods to be granted this power, preferably for himself, but, failing that, for those nearest and dearest to him. And this fact makes it manifest that all men regard it as the greatest good in the world to have the advantage over others. “It was, then, with such thoughts, as it seems to me, that you planned the general scope of your discourse.

But if I believed that you would refrain from revising what has been said and would let this discourse stand without criticism, I would not myself attempt to speak further. As it is, however, I do not suppose that you will feel disturbed in the least because I did not speak out my opinion on the question about which I was called in to advise you, for even at the time when you called us together you did not seem to me to be really concerned about it.

I suppose rather that you will object that, whereas you have deliberately chosen to compose a discourse which is not at all like any other, but which to those who read it casually will appear to be ingenuous and easy to comprehend, though to those who scan it thoroughly and endeavor to see in it what has escaped all others it will reveal itself as difficult and hard to understand, packed with history and philosophy, and filled with all manner of devices and fictions—not the kind of fictions which, used with evil intent, are wont to injure one's fellow-citizens, but the kind which, used by the cultivated mind, are able to benefit or to delight one's audience,—

you will object, I say, that, whereas you have chosen to do this, yet I have not allowed any of this to stand as you resolved that it should, but that I fail to see that in seeking both to explain the force of your words and to expound your real thoughts I thereby lessen the reputation of the discourse in proportion as I make it more patent and intelligible to its readers; for by implanting understanding in those who are without knowledge I render the discourse naked and strip it of the honor which would otherwise attach to it through those who study hard and are willing to take pains.

“But, while I acknowledge that my own intelligence is vastly inferior to your own, yet as surely as I appreciate this fact so surely do I know that in times when your city deliberates on matters of the greatest import those who are reputed to be the wisest some times miss the expedient course of action, whereas now and then some chance person from the ranks of men who are deemed of no account and are regarded with contempt hits upon the right course and is thought to give the best advice.