Panathenaicus

“In truth, however, it is not you alone who fail to distinguish those who make good use of things, but, I might almost say, the great majority of the Hellenes. For whenever they see or hear from others that any people devote themselves zealously to what appear to be good practices, they extol them and make many speeches about them, without knowing what will be the effects of this devotion.

However, those who desire to form a correct judgement about such people should remain silent and have no opinion about them in the beginning, but when the time comes when they can observe them both speaking and taking action regarding both private and public affairs,

then they should take accurate note of what they do in each case; and when men make good use of the things which they have practised, they should praise and honor them, but when they go wrong and do evil they should censure and abhor them and guard themselves against their ways, bearing in mind that things do not of their own nature either help or harm us, but that the manner in which they are used and employed by men is the cause of all the things which befall us.[*](See Isoc. 3.3-4; Isoc. 15.251-252.) One may grasp the truth of this from the following consideration:

things which are in themselves always the same and never different are to some helpful and to others harmful. And yet it is not conceivable that each thing should have a nature which itself is contrary to itself and not the same. But, on the other hand, who that can reason correctly will not look upon it as natural that the consequences should be by no means the same in the case of those who act rightly and justly and in the case of those who act willfully and wickedly?

“This same argument applies also to the matter of concord; for this is not different in its nature from the things which I have discussed; on the contrary, we shall find that it is in some instances the cause of very many blessings, but in others of the greatest evils and misfortunes. And I contend that the concord of the Spartans is of the latter sort. For I shall speak the truth even at the risk of appearing to some to say what is quite contrary to the general opinion.

For by being of one mind amongst themselves regarding the outside world they have always striven to set the Hellenes at variance with each other, reducing this practice, as it were, to a fine art and they have always looked upon the cruellest of evils which befell the other states as of all things in the world the greatest of boons to themselves; for when the states were in such stress, they found it possible to manage them as they pleased. So that no one could justly praise them because of their concord, any more than one could praise pirates or brigands or men given to other forms of injustice. For such men also enjoy concord among themselves[*](For this concord “honor among thiefs” see Plat. Rep. 351c.) and thereby seek to destroy all others.

But if I appear to some to use a comparison which is not in keeping with the reputation of the Spartans, I discard this and instance the Triballians,[*](See 50, note.) who, according to what all men say, are of one mind as are no other people on earth, but are bent on destroying not only those who border upon their territory and those who live in their neighborhood but also all others whom they are able to reach.

But men who pretend to excellence must not imitate their example but much rather the power of wisdom and of justice and of the other virtues. For these do not work for the benefit of their own natures,[*](See the argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Plat. Rep. 1.) but whomsoever they visit and abide with—these they bless with prosperity and happiness. But the Lacedaemonians do the very opposite: whomsoever they approach they seek to destroy and they are ever striving to appropriate all the good things which belong to the world at large.”

Having said these things, I silenced the man to whom I had addressed my remarks, albeit he was able and experienced in many things and had been trained in speaking no less than any of those who had been under my instruction. However, the youths who had been present at all this discussion did not form the same judgement as myself, but, while they applauded me both for having spoken more vigorously than they anticipated and for having debated well, they disparaged my opponent, although in fact they judged neither of us correctly

but missed the truth as to us both. For he went his way, having grown wiser and feeling chastened in spirit, as is becoming to men of intelligence he had experienced the force of the inscription at Delphi and come to know both himself and the nature of the Lacedaemonians better than before. I, on the other hand, remained, having perhaps debated effectively, but having because of this very fact shown less understanding, cherishing a greater pride than befits men of my age, and given over to youthful confusion.

Manifestly I was in such a state of mind; for when I seized a moment of quiet, I did not cease until I had dictated to my boy[*](The common term for a servant. Slaves were often employed as secretaries.) the speech which a short time before I had delivered with pleasure but which a little later was to cause me distress. For when, after three or four days had elapsed, I was reading and going over it, I found that, while I was not troubled about the things which I had said about Athens (for in everything which had reference to her I had written well and justly),

yet I was distressed and uncomfortable about what I had said with reference to the Lacedaemonians. For it seemed to me that I had not spoken of them with moderation nor in the same manner as the rest of the world but with contempt and with extreme bitterness and altogether without understanding. The result was that I was often on the point of blotting out or burning what I had written and as often changed my mind when I thought with pity of my old age and of the labour which had been spent upon my discourse.

Since I was in this state of confusion, shifting frequently from one impulse to the other, I decided that the best thing for me to do was to call in those of my former disciples who lived in the city and take counsel with them as to whether my discourse was to be entirely destroyed or to be distributed among those who desired to have it, and to follow their judgement whatever it might be. Having so resolved, I lost no time; they whom I have mentioned were summoned at once; I announced to them beforehand the object of their coming together the speech was read aloud, was praised and applauded and accorded even such a reception as is given to successful declamations.[*](“Epideictic” speeches—orations composed to display the powers of the speaker.)

But when all this demonstration had come to an end, the others present began to talk among themselves, presumably about the discourse which had been read. But the man whom I had sent for at first to obtain his advice (the panegyrist of the Lacedaemonians, to whom I had spoken at greater length than I should), having remained silent in the meantime, turned to me and said that he was in doubt what to do in the present situation, for he desired neither to discredit the words which I had spoken nor was he able to credit them entirely.

“For I wonder,” he continued, “whether you were as distressed and uncomfortable about the things which you had said concerning the Lacedaemonians as you allege—for I see nothing in what you have written to indicate such a feeling—and whether you really brought us together because you desired to get our advice about your discourse, since you knew well enough that we always commend whatever you say or do. Men of intelligence are accustomed to take common counsel with others regarding matters about which they are concerned, preferably with those who are wiser than themselves, but, at any rate, with those who will express their own judgement. But you have done the very opposite.

Therefore I accept neither of these explanations but am rather of the opinion that you summoned us here and pronounced your encomium on Athens, not ingenuously nor for the reason you stated to us, but because you wanted to test us to see if we were true to the cultivated life, if we remembered what had been said to us under your tutelage, and if we could grasp at once the manner in which your speech was written—

that you chose, and chose wisely, to eulogize your own city in order that you might gratify the multitude of your fellow-citizens and that you might win the acclaim of those who are friendly disposed towards you. But having so decided, you conceived that if you confined your discourse to Athens alone and repeated the fables about her which fall easily from the lips of everyone, your speech would appear no different from those which had been composed by the other orators (which would cause you extreme humiliation and distress),

whereas if you discarded these fables and dealt with her acknowledged achievements, which have brought many blessings to the Hellenes, and compared these with the deeds of the Lacedaemonians, praising the achievements of your ancestors and censuring the things which have been done by the Lacedaemonians, not only would your discourse make a more striking impression upon your hearers but you yourself would lose no ground, and many would admire such a treatment of the theme more than what had been written by the other orators.

“At the first, then, so it appears to me, this was the manner in which you reviewed and thought upon your problem. But since you knew that you had praised the government of the Spartans more than any other man,[*](An exaggeration. But see Isoc. 6; Isoc. 7.7; Isoc. 3.24; Isoc. 8.142 ff.) you feared lest you might impress those who had heard this praise as no different from the orators who speak without conviction or principle, if, that is to say, you censured on the present occasion those whom you formerly were wont to praise above all others. Pondering this difficulty, you proceeded to study in what light you could represent each of these two cities in order that you might seem to speak the truth about them both and that you might be able to praise your ancestors, just as you purposed to do, and at the same time to appear to be censuring the Spartans in the eyes of those who have no liking for them, while in reality doing nothing of the sort but covertly praising them instead.

Seeking such an effect, you found without difficulty arguments of double meaning, which lend themselves no more to the purpose of those who praise than of those who blame, but are capable of being turned both ways and leave room for much disputation—arguments the employment of which, when one contends in court over contracts for his own advantage, is shameful and no slight token of depravity but, when one discourses on the nature of man and of things, is honorable and bespeaks a cultivated mind.[*](Surely this is ironical.)