Panathenaicus

“If anyone can point out an education which is more cherished by them or by which they set greater store than this, I am willing to grant that there is not a word of truth in what I have said about anything whatsoever. And yet what is there in such conduct that is good or admirable and not, on the contrary, shameful? How can we fail to condemn the folly of those who extol men who have so far departed from our common laws and are in no respect of the same way of thinking as either the Hellenes or the barbarians?

For the rest of the world looks upon malefactors and thieves as more depraved than slaves, whereas the Lacedaemonians regard those who stand first in such crimes as the best among their youths and honor them the most. And yet who that is in his right mind would not prefer to die many times rather than be known as seeking through such practices to school himself in virtue?”

When he heard this, he did not answer arrogantly any of the things which I had said, neither, on the other hand, was he altogether silent, but remarked as follows: “You”—meaning myself—“have spoken as if I applauded all of the ways of Sparta and considered them good. But in fact I think that you are right in condemning the Spartans for the licence practised by their youth and for many other things as well, but wrong in attacking me.

For I was troubled on reading your speech by what you had said about the Lacedaemonians, but much more by my own inability to utter a single word in their defence against what you had written, accustomed as I had been at all other times to commend you. And when I found myself in this perplexity, I said the only thing I could, namely, that for this reason at least, if for no other, they deserved the gratitude of all of us, because they followed the best ways of life.

However, I said this, not with any thought of reverence or justice or wisdom—the virtues which you mentioned[*](See 204.)—but having in mind the athletic practices which have been instituted among them, their training in courage, their spirit of concord, and, in a word, their discipline for war. These all men will commend, and will concede that the Spartans practise them most of all.”

When he had said this, I accepted his explanation, feeling that it did not break down any of the criticisms which I had made but that it covered up, not without tact, nay, with good taste, the crudeness of his previous utterance, and that his defence on the other points showed greater moderation than his former brusque assertion. Nevertheless, though I dismissed that matter, I stated that with reference to these very claims which he made for the Spartans I had an attack which was much more damaging than what I had said on the subject of stealing among their youths.

“For by that practice,” I said, “they ruined their own youths, and by these which you have just mentioned, they seek to destroy the Hellenes. And it is easy to see at a glance that this is so for I think that all men will agree that those men are the basest and deserve the severest punishment who take the discoveries which have been made for our benefit and use them for the injury,

not of the barbarians nor of those who wrong them nor of those who invade their territory, but of those who are their nearest kin and share the same blood with them.[*](The Perioeci, who, according to Isocrates, were of the Spartan blood, and their fellow-Dorians generally.) And this is what the Spartans have done. And yet with what conscience can we say that they make good use of their warlike practices who have at all times without ceasing sought to destroy those whom it behoved them to save?

“In truth, however, it is not you alone who fail to distinguish those who make good use of things, but, I might almost say, the great majority of the Hellenes. For whenever they see or hear from others that any people devote themselves zealously to what appear to be good practices, they extol them and make many speeches about them, without knowing what will be the effects of this devotion.

However, those who desire to form a correct judgement about such people should remain silent and have no opinion about them in the beginning, but when the time comes when they can observe them both speaking and taking action regarding both private and public affairs,

then they should take accurate note of what they do in each case; and when men make good use of the things which they have practised, they should praise and honor them, but when they go wrong and do evil they should censure and abhor them and guard themselves against their ways, bearing in mind that things do not of their own nature either help or harm us, but that the manner in which they are used and employed by men is the cause of all the things which befall us.[*](See Isoc. 3.3-4; Isoc. 15.251-252.) One may grasp the truth of this from the following consideration:

things which are in themselves always the same and never different are to some helpful and to others harmful. And yet it is not conceivable that each thing should have a nature which itself is contrary to itself and not the same. But, on the other hand, who that can reason correctly will not look upon it as natural that the consequences should be by no means the same in the case of those who act rightly and justly and in the case of those who act willfully and wickedly?