Panathenaicus

on the contrary, they saw to it that each and everyone should look upon it as his duty to debar all such men from giving counsel to the public, and not only such men, but those also who assert that the possessions of the rest of the world belong to the state but do not scruple to plunder and rob the state of its legitimate property, who pretend to love the people but cause them to be hated by all the rest of mankind,

and who in words express anxiety for the welfare of the Hellenes but in fact outrage and blackmail and make them so bitter against us[*](Cf. Isoc. 15.318.) that some of our states when pressed by war would sooner and more gladly open their gates to the besiegers than to a relief force from Athens. But one would grow weary of writing were he to attempt to go through the whole catalogue of iniquities and depravities.

Abhorring these iniquities and the men who practise them, our forefathers set up as counsellors and leaders of the state, not any and everyone, but those who were the wisest and the best and who had lived the noblest lives among them, and they chose these same men as their generals in the field[*](Cf. Isoc. 8.54.) and sent them forth as ambassadors, wherever any need arose, and they gave over to them the entire guidance of the state, believing that those who desired and were able to give the best counsel from the platform would, when by themselves, no matter in what regions of the world or on what enterprise engaged, be of the same way of thinking.

And in this they were justified by events. For because they followed this principle they saw their code of laws completely written down in a few days—laws, not like those which are established to-day, nor full of so much confusion and of so many contradictions that no one can distinguish between the useful and the useless, but, in the first place, few in number, though adequate for those who were to use them and easy to comprehend; and, in the next place, just and profitable and consonant with each other; those laws, moreover, which had to do with their common ways of life having been thought out with greater pains than those which had to do with private contracts, as indeed they should be in well regulated states.[*](See Isoc. 7.39.)

At the same time they appointed to the magistracies those who had been selected beforehand by the members of their respective tribes[*](Aristotle (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 8) states that Solon enacted that the election to the offices should be by lot from candidates selected by each of the tribes. For example, each tribe selected then candidates for the nine archonships, and among these the lot was cast. Cf. Isoc. 7.22.) and townships,[*](The numerous “demes” into which Attica was divided.) having made of the offices, not prizes to fight for or to tempt ambition,[*](See Isoc. 7.24-25 and notes.) but responsibilities much more comparable to the liturgies,[*](See Introduction to the Antidosis.) which are burdensome to those to whom they are assigned, although conferring upon them a kind of distinction. For the men who had been elected to office were required to neglect their own possessions and at the same time to abstain no less from the gratuities which are wont to be given to the offices than from the treasures of the gods. (Who under the present dispensation would submit to such restrictions?)

Furthermore, those who proved conscientious in the performance of these duties, were moderately praised and then assigned to another similar responsibility, whereas those who were guilty of the slightest dereliction were involved in the deepest disgrace and the severest punishment. So that no one of the citizens felt about the offices as they now do, but they then sought to escape from them much more than they now seek to obtain them,

and all men were agreed that no truer democracy could be found, nor one more stable or more beneficial to the multitude, than that which gave to the people at the same time exemption from such cares and sovereign power to fill the offices and bring to justice those who offended in them[*](See Isoc. 7.27 and note.)—exactly the position which is enjoyed also by the most fortunate among despots.

And the greatest proof that they were even better satisfied with this regime than I say is this: we see the people at war with other polities which fail to please them, overturning them and slaying those at their head, but continuing to enjoy this polity for not less than a thousand years,[*](A very round number indeed. Tradition dated Theseus, whom Isocrates seems here to regard as the last of the kings, about 600 years before this time.) remaining loyal to it from the time when they received it down to the age of Solon and the tyranny of Pisistratus, who, after he had placed himself at the head of the people and done much harm to the city and driven out the best of her citizens as being partizans of oligarchy, brought an end to the rule of the people and set himself up as their master.[*](A pleasanter picture of the “tyranny” of Pisistratus is found in Aristot. Ath. Pol. 14 ff.)

But perhaps some may object—for nothing prevents breaking into my discourse—that it is absurd for me to presume to speak as though I had exact knowledge of events at which I was not present when they transpired. I, however, do not see anything unreasonable in this. I grant that if I were alone in relying on traditions regarding what happened long ago or upon records which have been handed down to us from those times I should with good reason be open to attack. But in fact many men—and men of discernment, too—will be seen to be in the same case with me.

But apart from this, were I put to the test and the proof I could show that all men are possessed of more truth gained through hearing than through seeing and that they have knowledge of greater and nobler deeds which they have heard from others than those which they have witnessed themselves. Nevertheless it is wise for a speaker neither to ignore such false assumptions—for they might perhaps confuse the truth were no one to gainsay them—nor again to spend too much time refuting them, but only enough to indicate to the rest of the audience the arguments by which they might prove that the critics speak beside the mark, and then to go back and proceed with the speech from the point where he left off. And this is what I shall do.

I have now sufficiently discussed the form of the polity as it was in those days and the length of time during which our people continued to enjoy it. But it remains for me to recount the actions which have resulted from the excellence of their government. For from these it will be possible to see still more clearly that our ancestors not only had a better and sounder polity than the rest of the world but also employed the kind of leaders and advisers which men of intelligence ought to select.

Yet I must not go on speaking even on this point, without first prefacing it with a word of explanation. For if, disdaining to take notice of the criticisms of people who are able to do nothing but find fault, I were to review one after the other not only the other achievements of our ancestors but also the ways and practices in warfare by which they prevailed over the barbarians and attained to glory among the Hellenes, inevitably some will say that I am really speaking of the ordinances which Lycurgus laid down and the Spartans follow.

I acknowledge that I am going to speak at length of the institutions of Sparta, not taking the view, however, that Lycurgus invented or conceived any of them, but that he imitated as well as he could the government of our ancestors,[*](See Isoc. 4.39 and note.) establishing among the Spartans a democracy tempered with aristocracy—even such as existed in Athens—, enacting that the offices be filled, not by lot, but by election,

ordaining that the election of the Elders, who were to supervise all public affairs, should be conducted with the very same care as, they say, our ancestors also exercised with regard to those who were to have seats in the Areopagus, and, furthermore, conferring upon the Elders[*](For the Spartan Gerousia, Council of Elders, see Gilbert, Greek Constitutional Antiquities p. 47.) the very same power which he knew that the Council of the Areopagus also had in Athens.

Now that the institutions of Sparta were established after the manner of our own as they were in ancient times may be learned from many sources by those who desire to know the truth. But that skill in warfare is something which the Spartans did not practise earlier than our ancestors or employ to better advantage than they I think I can show so clearly from the struggles and the wars which are acknowledged to have taken place in those days that none will be able to contradict what I say—neither those who are blind worshippers of Sparta nor those who at once admire and envy and strive to imitate the ways of Athens.

I am going to begin what I shall say on this topic with a statement which will perhaps be unpleasant for some to hear, although it will not be without profit to have it said. For if anyone were to assert that Athens and Sparta had been the causes both of the greatest benefits and, after the expedition of Xerxes, of the greatest injuries to the Hellenes, without doubt he would be thought by those who know anything about the history of those times to speak the truth.

For they contended with the utmost possible bravery against the power of that King, but, having done this, although they ought then to have adopted sound measures also for the tasks which followed upon that achievement, they fell into such a degree, not of folly, but of madness, that they made peace with the man who had led an army against them and who had purposed to annihilate both these cities utterly and to enslave the rest of the Hellenes—

with such a man, I repeat, although they could easily have conquered him on both land and sea, they drew up a peace[*](The Peace of Antalcidas.) for all time, as though he had been their benefactor, whereas, having grown jealous of each other's merits and fallen into mutual warfare and rivalry, they did not cease attempting to destroy each other and the rest of the Hellenes until they had placed their common enemy in a position to reduce Athens, through the power of the Lacedaemonians, and again Sparta, through the power of Athens, to a state of the utmost peril.

And although they were so far outstripped in shrewdness by the barbarian, they then experienced no such resentment as the things which they suffered should have provoked nor such as it behoved them to feel; nor at the present time are the greatest of the states of Hellas ashamed to vie with each other in fawning upon the wealth of the King; nay, Argos and Thebes joined forces with him in the conquest of Egypt[*](See Isoc. 4.161, note.) in order that he might be possessed of the greatest possible power to plot against the Hellenes, while we and the Spartans, although allied together, feel more hostile to each other than to those with whom we are each openly at war.

And of this we have a not insignificant proof. For in common we deliberate about nothing whatsoever, but independently we each send ambassadors to the King, expecting that the one of these two states to which he inclines in friendship will be invested with the place of advantage among the Hellenes,[*](See General Introduction.) little realizing that those who court his favour he is wont to treat insolently while with those who oppose themselves to him and hold his power in contempt he endeavors by every means to come to terms.[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.154-155.)