Panathenaicus
Isocrates
Isocrates. Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, by George Norlin, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1929-1982.
Nevertheless, since I anticipate that they will inject the question of polities into the debate, I shall not shirk from discussing it. For I think that I shall prove that in this very matter our city has excelled more than in those which I have already mentioned.
And let no one suppose that I have said these things with reference to our present polity, which we were forced by circumstances to adopt, but rather with reference to the polity of our ancestors,[*](The democracy of Solon and Cleisthenes, much praised in the Isoc. 7..) from which our fathers[*](Beginning with Aristides and Themistocles, especially the latter, who made Athens a sea-power.) changed over to that which is now in force, not because they condemned the older polity—on the contrary, for the other activities of the state they preferred it as much superior—, but because they considered that for the exercise of supremacy by sea this polity was more expedient by adopting which and wisely administering it they were able to fend off both the plots of the Spartans and the armed forces of all the Peloponnesians, over whom it was of vital import to Athens, especially at that time, to have the upper hand in war.
So that no one could justly condemn those who chose our present polity.[*](This making a virtue of necessity is inconsistent with Isocrates' uncompromising attitude toward the excesses of the later democracy in the Isoc. 7., the Isoc. 8., and even in this discourse.) For they were not disappointed in their expectations, nor were they at all blind to both the good and the bad features attached to either form of rule, but, on the contrary, saw clearly that while a land-power is fostered by order and sobriety and discipline and other like qualities,[*](Cf. Isoc. 8.102.) a sea-power is not augmented by these
but by the crafts which have to do with the building of ships and by men who are able to row them—men who have lost their own possessions and are accustomed to derive their livelihood from the possessions of others.[*](The homeless refugees who enlisted in the naval service of Athens for pay and the chance to pillage. See especially Isoc. 8.44 ff. and Isoc. Letter 9.9.) Our fathers did not fail to foresee that with the introduction of these elements into the state the order and discipline of the former polity would be relaxed[*](Cf. Eur. Hec. 607: nautikh/ t' a)narxi/a.) and that the good will of our allies would soon undergo a change when the Athenians should compel the Hellenes, to whom they had previously given lands and cities, to pay contributions and tribute to Athens in order that she might have the means to pay the kind of men whom I mentioned a moment ago.
Nevertheless, although they were not blind to any of the things which I have mentioned, they considered that it was both advantageous and becoming to a state so great in size and reputation to bear with all difficulties rather than with the rule of the Lacedaemonians. For having the choice between two policies, neither of them ideal, they considered it better to choose to do injury to others rather than to suffer injury themselves and to rule without justice over others rather than, by seeking to escape that reproach, to be subject unjustly to the Lacedaemonians—
a course which all sensible men would prefer and desire for themselves,[*](This cynicism accords ill with his plea for justice as a rule of conduct for states in Isoc. 8.28 ff., where he approaches the Platonic ideal that it is better to suffer than to do wrong (Plat. Gorg. 46c ff.). Here Isocrates inclines, for once, to the “practical” view of Demosthenes; that if all other states made justice the basis of their foreign policy it would be shameful for Athens not to observe it; but in a world where all other states are seeking the power to do injustice, for Athens alone to be governed by that ideal to her disadvantage would be “not justice but cowardice.” See Dem. 15.28-29.) albeit a certain few of those who claim to be wise men, were the question put to them, would not accept this view. These, then, are the reasons—I have perhaps gone into them at undue length—but, in any case, these are the reasons why they adopted the polity which is criticized by some in place of the polity which is commended by all.
I shall now proceed to speak about the polity which I took for my subject and about our ancestors, going back to the early times when neither the word oligarchy nor the word democracy was as yet in our speech, but when monarchies governed both the barbaric races and all the Hellenic states.
I have chosen to begin with a period rather remote for these reasons: first, because I consider that those who lay claim to superior excellence ought from the very beginning of their race to be distinguished above all others,[*](See Isoc. 4.25.) and, second, because I should be ashamed if, having spoken at undue length of men who, though noble,[*](See Isoc. 12.72 ff.) are nowise akin to me, I should not even briefly mention those of our ancestors who most excellently governed our city,