Panathenaicus

Therefore all may justly charge the Lacedaemonians with having been the instigators and teachers of such deeds, but may with good reason make allowance for us, as for pupils who have been deceived by the false promises of their tutors and disappointed in their expectations.

I come now finally to those offences which they alone and by themselves committed.[*](That is, conduct of the Spartans which has no parallel in Athenian history. Compare, for the contrast here drawn between Sparta and Athens in their feeling for the barbarians, Isoc. 4.156-159, 120, 121.) Who does not know that the Spartans, notwithstanding that they and we harbor in common a feeling of hatred towards the barbarians and their kings, and notwithstanding that the Athenians, although beset by many wars and involved at times in great disasters, their territory being often ravaged and cut off by the enemy,[*](In the Peloponnesian War.) never once turned their eyes towards friendship and alliance with the barbarians, but continued steadfastly to cherish a stronger hatred against them because of what they plotted against the Hellenes than we feel towards those who now seek to injure Athens—

who does not know, I say, that the Spartans, although untroubled by any evil or even by any prospect or fear of evil, advanced to such a pitch of greed that they were not satisfied to hold the supremacy by land, but were so greedy to obtain also the empire of the sea that at one and the same time they were inciting our allies to revolt, undertaking to liberate them from our power, and were negotiating with the Persian king a treaty of friendship and alliance,[*](The Treaty of Miletus, 412 b.c. See Thuc. 8.18.) promising to give over to him all the Hellenes who dwelt on the Asiatic coast?

And yet, after they had given these pledges both to our allies and to the King and had conquered us in war, they reduced those whom they had sworn to set free to a state of slavery worse than that of the Helots,[*](See Isoc. 4.111 and note.) and they returned the favour of the King in such wise that they persuaded Cyrus, his younger brother, to dispute the throne with him, and collected an army to support Cyrus, placing Clearchus at its head, and dispatched it against the King[*](For this episode see Isoc. 8.98 and note.).

But having failed in this treachery and betrayed their purposes to the world and made themselves hated by all mankind, they were plunged into such a state of warfare and confusion as men should expect after having played false with both the Hellenes and the barbarians. I do not know what I need to take the time to say further about them except that after they had been defeated in the naval battle[*](The battle of Cnidus, 394 b.c., in which the Spartan fleet was defeated by the joint fleets of Conon, the Athenian admiral, and Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap.) by the forces of the King and by the leadership of Conon they made a peace[*](Peace of Antalcidas. See Isoc. 4.115 and note.)

of such a character that no one can point out in all history one more shameful, more reprehensible, more derogatory to the Hellenes, or more contradictory to what is said by certain eulogists of the virtue of the Lacedaemonians. For when the King had established them as masters over the Hellenes, they attempted to rob him of his kingdom and of all his good fortune, but when the King defeated them in battle on the sea and humbled them, they gave over to him, not a small contingent of the Hellenes, but all those who dwelt in Asia, explicitly writing into the treaty that he should do with these according to his pleasure;

and they were not ashamed of entering into such covenants regarding men by whose help as allies they prevailed over us, became masters of the Hellenes, and expected to subdue the whole of Asia; on the contrary, they inscribed such covenants in their own temples[*](See Isoc. 4.180.) and compelled their allies to do the same.

Now others will not care, I suppose, to hear about any further deeds, but will think that they have learned well enough from those which I have described what has been the character of each of these two states in their treatment of the Hellenes. I, however, do not share this feeling but consider that the subject which I undertook requires still many other arguments, and above all such as will show the folly of those who will attempt to refute what I have said, and these arguments I think I shall find ready at hand.

For of those who applaud all the actions of the Lacedaemonians, the best and the most discerning will, I think, commend the polity of the Spartans and remain of the same opinion about it as before, but will concede the truth of what I have said about the things which they have done to the Hellenes.

Those, however, who are inferior not only to these but to the great majority of men and who could not speak tolerably about any other subject, albeit they are not able to keep silent about the Lacedaemonians, but expect that if they extol them extravagantly they will gain a reputation equal to those who are reputed abler and much better than themselves—

these men, when they perceive that all the topics have been covered and find themselves unable to gainsay a single point which I have made, will, I think, turn their attention to the question of polities, comparing the institutions of Sparta and of Athens, and especially their sobriety and discipline with our carelessness and slackness, and will eulogize the Spartans on these grounds.

If, however, they attempt anything of the sort, all intelligent men should condemn them as speaking beside the point. For I undertook my subject with the avowed purpose, not of discussing polities, but of proving that our city has been of much greater service to the Hellenes than has the city of the Lacedaemonians. If, then, they can overthrow any of these proofs or cite other achievements common to both these cities in which the Spartans have shown themselves superior to us, naturally they should be commended. But if they attempt to bring in matters of which I have made no mention, they will deserve the censure of all for their lack of perception.

Nevertheless, since I anticipate that they will inject the question of polities into the debate, I shall not shirk from discussing it. For I think that I shall prove that in this very matter our city has excelled more than in those which I have already mentioned.

And let no one suppose that I have said these things with reference to our present polity, which we were forced by circumstances to adopt, but rather with reference to the polity of our ancestors,[*](The democracy of Solon and Cleisthenes, much praised in the Isoc. 7..) from which our fathers[*](Beginning with Aristides and Themistocles, especially the latter, who made Athens a sea-power.) changed over to that which is now in force, not because they condemned the older polity—on the contrary, for the other activities of the state they preferred it as much superior—, but because they considered that for the exercise of supremacy by sea this polity was more expedient by adopting which and wisely administering it they were able to fend off both the plots of the Spartans and the armed forces of all the Peloponnesians, over whom it was of vital import to Athens, especially at that time, to have the upper hand in war.

So that no one could justly condemn those who chose our present polity.[*](This making a virtue of necessity is inconsistent with Isocrates' uncompromising attitude toward the excesses of the later democracy in the Isoc. 7., the Isoc. 8., and even in this discourse.) For they were not disappointed in their expectations, nor were they at all blind to both the good and the bad features attached to either form of rule, but, on the contrary, saw clearly that while a land-power is fostered by order and sobriety and discipline and other like qualities,[*](Cf. Isoc. 8.102.) a sea-power is not augmented by these

but by the crafts which have to do with the building of ships and by men who are able to row them—men who have lost their own possessions and are accustomed to derive their livelihood from the possessions of others.[*](The homeless refugees who enlisted in the naval service of Athens for pay and the chance to pillage. See especially Isoc. 8.44 ff. and Isoc. Letter 9.9.) Our fathers did not fail to foresee that with the introduction of these elements into the state the order and discipline of the former polity would be relaxed[*](Cf. Eur. Hec. 607: nautikh/ t' a)narxi/a.) and that the good will of our allies would soon undergo a change when the Athenians should compel the Hellenes, to whom they had previously given lands and cities, to pay contributions and tribute to Athens in order that she might have the means to pay the kind of men whom I mentioned a moment ago.

Nevertheless, although they were not blind to any of the things which I have mentioned, they considered that it was both advantageous and becoming to a state so great in size and reputation to bear with all difficulties rather than with the rule of the Lacedaemonians. For having the choice between two policies, neither of them ideal, they considered it better to choose to do injury to others rather than to suffer injury themselves and to rule without justice over others rather than, by seeking to escape that reproach, to be subject unjustly to the Lacedaemonians—

a course which all sensible men would prefer and desire for themselves,[*](This cynicism accords ill with his plea for justice as a rule of conduct for states in Isoc. 8.28 ff., where he approaches the Platonic ideal that it is better to suffer than to do wrong (Plat. Gorg. 46c ff.). Here Isocrates inclines, for once, to the “practical” view of Demosthenes; that if all other states made justice the basis of their foreign policy it would be shameful for Athens not to observe it; but in a world where all other states are seeking the power to do injustice, for Athens alone to be governed by that ideal to her disadvantage would be “not justice but cowardice.” See Dem. 15.28-29.) albeit a certain few of those who claim to be wise men, were the question put to them, would not accept this view. These, then, are the reasons—I have perhaps gone into them at undue length—but, in any case, these are the reasons why they adopted the polity which is criticized by some in place of the polity which is commended by all.

I shall now proceed to speak about the polity which I took for my subject and about our ancestors, going back to the early times when neither the word oligarchy nor the word democracy was as yet in our speech, but when monarchies governed both the barbaric races and all the Hellenic states.

I have chosen to begin with a period rather remote for these reasons: first, because I consider that those who lay claim to superior excellence ought from the very beginning of their race to be distinguished above all others,[*](See Isoc. 4.25.) and, second, because I should be ashamed if, having spoken at undue length of men who, though noble,[*](See Isoc. 12.72 ff.) are nowise akin to me, I should not even briefly mention those of our ancestors who most excellently governed our city,