To Philip

And do not be surprised (as I said in my letter to Dionysius after he had made himself master of Sicily) that I, who am not a general nor a public orator nor in any other position of authority, have expressed myself to you more boldly than the others. The fact is that nature has placed me more at a disadvantage than any of my fellow-citizens for a public career:[*](Isocrates dwells on his disabilities repeatedly. Cf. Isoc. Letter 1.9; Isoc. Letter 8.7; and Isoc. 12.9-10. See General Introd. p. xix.) I was not given a strong enough voice nor sufficient assurance to enable me to deal with the mob, to take abuse, and bandy words with the men who haunt the rostrum;

but, though some will condemn my taste in saying so, I do lay claim to sane judgement and good education, and I would count myself in comparison with others not among the last, but among the foremost. And that is why I endeavor in this way, for which my nature and powers are suited, to give advice to Athens and to the Hellenes at large and to the most distinguished among men.

Now regarding myself, and regarding the course which you should take toward the Hellenes, perhaps no more need be said. But as to the expedition against Asia, we shall urge upon the cities which I have called upon you to reconcile that it is their duty to go to war with the barbarians, only when we see that they have ceased from discord. For the present, I shall address myself to you, not, however, with the same confidence as I had at that period of my life when I was writing on this same subject.

For then I challenged my audience to visit their ridicule and contempt upon me if I did not manifestly treat the question in a way which was worthy of the matter in hand and of my reputation and of the time which I had devoted to the discourse.[*](Isoc. 4.14.) But now I dread lest what I say may fall far short of every claim I then made; for, apart from the other disabilities under which I labor, my Panegyricus, which has enriched the other men who make philosophy their business,[*](Not an empty boast. See Havet, Introduction to Cartelier's Isoc. 15 pp. lxxv ff.) has left me quite impoverished, because I am neither willing to repeat what I have written in that discourse nor am I at my age able to cast about for new things.

However, I must not shirk my task, but must say in support of the enterprise which I have proposed whatever occurs to me as likely to persuade you to undertake it. For even if I fall short in any degree, and am not able to write in the style of my former publications, I think that I shall at any rate present an attractive sketch for those who have the energy to elaborate the details and carry the work to completion.

The point of departure, then, which I have taken for my whole discussion is, I believe, the one which is proper for those who urge an expedition against Asia.[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.15.) For one must undertake nothing until he finds the Hellenes doing one of two things: either actually supporting the undertaking or according it their entire approval. It was this which Agesilaus, for all that he was looked upon as the most sagacious of the Lacedaemonians, disregarded, not because of incapacity but because of ambition.

For he had two aims, which, though laudable, were not consistent, and could not he carried out at the same time, since he was resolved both to make war against the King and to restore his friends to their cities and put them in control of affairs.[*](The same explanation of Agesilaus's failure is given in Isoc. Letter 9.13.) Naturally the result of his efforts in behalf of his friends was that the Hellenes were involved in troubles and perils, and, owing to the confusion which arose at home, had neither the time nor the power to make war upon the barbarians.

So from the mistakes of inadvertence at that time it is easy to draw the lesson that those who would take sane counsel must not begin a war against the King until someone has composed the quarrels of the Hellenes and has cured them of the madness which now afflicts them. And this is just what I have advised you to do.

On these points no man of intelligence would venture to contradict me. But I think that if any of the others should be prompted to advise you in favor of the expedition against Asia, they would resort to a plea of this kind: that it has been the fortune of all who have undertaken a war against the King, without exception, to rise from obscurity to brilliant distinction, from poverty to wealth, and from low estate to be masters of many lands and cities.

I, however, am not going to urge you on such grounds, but by the example of men who were looked upon as failures: I mean those who took the field with Cyrus and Clearchus.[*](See Isoc. 4.145-149, where the same episode is used to the same point in similar language.) Every one agrees that these won as complete a victory in battle over all the forces of the King as if they had come to blows with their womenfolk, but that at the very moment when they seemed to be masters of the field they failed of success, owing to the impetuosity of Cyrus. For he in his exultation rushed in pursuit far in advance of the others; and, being caught in the midst of the enemy, was killed.

But the King, not withstanding that his foes had suffered so severe a loss, felt so thorough a contempt for his own forces that he invited Clearchus and the other captains to a parley, promising to give them great gifts and to pay their soldiers their wages in full and to give them safe convoy home; then, having lured them by such prospects, and having assured them by the most solemn pledges known to the Persians, he seized them and put them to death, deliberately choosing to outrage the gods rather than risk a clash with our soldiers, bereft though they now were of Cyrus's aid. And what challenge could be nobler or more convincing than this?

For it is evident that, if it had not been for Cyrus, even that army would have overthrown the power of the King. But for you it is easy both to guard against the disaster which befell at that time and to equip yourself with an armament much stronger than that which defeated the forces of the King. How, then, since you possess both these advantages, can you fail to undertake this expedition with all confidence?

And let no one suppose that I desire to conceal the fact that I have in some instances expressed myself in the same manner as upon a former occasion. For, coming to the same thoughts, I have preferred not to go through the effort of striving to phrase differently what has already been well expressed.[*](This apology is curious, since Greek orators habitually repeated identical passages in dealing with the same situations. Cf. Isoc. 15.74.) It is true that if I were making an epideictic speech[*](Cf. Isoc. 15.55. An “epideictic” speech was a lecture whose aim was to display the rhetorical powers of the speaker.) I should try to avoid scrupulously all such repetitions;

but now that I am urging my views upon you, I should have been foolish if I had spent more time on the style than on the subject matter, and if, furthermore, seeing that the other orators make free with my writings, I alone had abstained from what I have said in the past. So, then, I may perhaps be allowed to use what is my own, if at any time I am greatly pressed and find it suitable, although I would not now any more than in times past appropriate anything from the writings of other men.

We may, then, regard these points as settled. But next in order I think that I should speak of the war-strength which will he available to you as compared with that which Clearchus and his followers had. First and most important of all, you will have the good will of the Hellenes if you choose to abide by the advice which I have given you concerning them; they, on the other hand, found the Hellenes intensely hostile because of the decarchies[*](See Isoc. 4.110 ff.) which the Lacedaemonians had set up; for the Hellenes thought that, if Cyrus and Clearchus should succeed, their yoke would be heavier still, but that if the King conquered they would be delivered from their present hardships; and this is just what did happen to them.

Besides, you will find as many soldiers at your service as you wish, for such is now the state of affairs in Hellas that it is easier to get together a greater and stronger army from among those who wander in exile than from those who live under their own polities.[*](See Isoc. 4.168 and note.) But in those days there was no body of professional soldiers, and so, being compelled to collect mercenaries from the several states, they had to spend more money on bounties[*](Cyrus gave Clearchus about ten thousand pounds with which to levy mercenaries. Xen. Anab. 1.1.9.) for their recruiting agents than on pay for the troops.

And, lastly, if we should be inclined to make a careful review of the two cases and institute a comparison between you, who are to be at the head of the present expedition and to decide on every measure, and Clearchus, who was in charge of the enterprise of that day, we should find that he had never before been in command of any force whatever on either land or sea and yet attained renown from the misfortune which befell him on the continent of Asia;

while you, on the contrary, have succeeded in so many and such mighty achievements that if I were making them the subject of a speech before another audience, I should do well to recount them, but, since I am addressing myself to you, you would rightly think it senseless and gratuitous in me to tell you the story of your own deeds.

It is well for me to speak to you also about the two Kings, the one against whom I am advising you to take the field, and the one against whom Clearchus made war, in order that you may know the temper and the power of each. In the first place, the father[*](Artaxerxes II., 405-359 B.C.) of the present King once defeated our city[*](This is inexact. He is probably thinking of the defeat of the Athenians in the Peloponnnesian War in which Sparta had the assistance of Persia; but Artaxerxes II. came to the throne in the year of the battle of Aegospotami.) and later the city of the Lacedaemonians,[*](At the battle of Cnidus with the help of Conon, 394 B.C.) while this King[*](Artaxerxes III., 359-339 B.C.) has never overcome anyone of the armies which have been violating his territory.

Secondly, the former took the whole of Asia from the Hellenes by the terms of the Treaty[*](Treaty of Antalcidas. See Isoc. 4.115 ff., 175 ff.); while this King is so far from exercising dominion over others that he is not in control even of the cities which were surrendered to him; and such is the state of affairs that there is no one who is not in doubt what to believe—whether he has given them up because of his cowardice, or whether they have learned to despise and contemn the power of the barbarians.