To Philip

Furthermore, while I grant that no one else in the world could reconcile these cities, yet nothing of the sort is difficult for you; for I see that you have carried through to a successful end many undertakings which the rest of the world looked upon as hopeless and unthinkable, and therefore it would be nothing strange if you should be able single-handed to affect this union. In fact, men of high purposes and exceptional gifts ought not to undertake enterprises which any of the common run might carry out with success, but rather those which no one would attempt save men with endowments and power such as you possess.

But I marvel that those who think that none of these proposals could possibly be carried out are not aware, either by their own knowledge or by tradition, that there have been many terrible wars after which the participants have come to an understanding and rendered great services to one another. For what could exceed the enmity which the Hellenes felt toward Xerxes? Yet everyone knows that we and the Lacedaemonians came to prize his friendship[*](The expression is loose. He means that the hatred for Persia under Xerxes changed to friendship under Artaxerxes when the Peace of Antalcidas was made. Cf. Sparta's “love” for Persia mentioned in Isoc. 12.102-103.) more than that of those who helped us to establish our respective empires.

But why speak of ancient history, or of our dealings with the barbarians? If one should scan and review the misfortunes of the Hellenes in general, these will appear as nothing in comparison with those which we Athenians have experienced through the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians.[*](Especially at the close of the Peloponnesian War. See Isoc. 14.31; Xen. Hell. 3.5.8.) Nevertheless, when the Lacedaemonians took the field against the Thebans and were minded to humiliate Boeotia and break up the league of her cities, we sent a relief expedition[*](Under Chabrias, against Agesilaus, 378 B.C. Xen. Hell. 5.4; Grote, Hist. ix. p. 343.) and thwarted the desires of the Lacedaemonians.

And again, when fortune shifted her favor[*](Thebes became the supreme power in Greece by the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.) and the Thebans and the Peloponnesians were one and all trying to devastate Lacedaemon, we alone among the Hellenes formed[*](361 B.C.) an alliance with the Lacedaemonians and helped to save them from destruction.[*](In 362 B.C., when Epaminondas, at the head of the Thebans and their allies, including the Argives, Arcadians, Messenians, and the Eleans, marched on Sparta to destroy her, the Athenians dispatched Iphicrates with an army of twelve thousand to the rescue. See Isoc. 8.105; Xen. Hell. 6.5.23 ff.; Grote, Hist. x. pp. 89 ff.)

So then, seeing that such great reversals are wont to occur, and that our states care nothing about their former enmities or about their oaths or about anything else save what they conceive to be expedient for themselves, and that expediency is the sole object to which they give their affections and devote all their zeal, no man, unless obsessed by utter folly, could fail to believe that now also they will show the same disposition, especially if you take the lead in their reconciliation, while selfish interests urge and present ills constrain them to this course. I, for my part, believe that, with these influences fighting on your side, everything will turn out as it should.

But I think that you can get most light on the question whether these cities are inclined toward peace with each other or toward war, if I review, not merely in general terms nor yet with excessive detail, the principal facts in their present situation. And first of all, let us consider the condition of the Lacedaemonians.

The Lacedaemonians were the leaders of the Hellenes,[*](The hegemony of Sparta lasted from the battle of Aegospotami, 405 B.C., to the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.) not long ago, on both land and sea, and yet they suffered so great a reversal of fortune when they met defeat at Leuctra that they were deprived of their power over the Hellenes, and lost such of their warriors as chose to die rather than survive defeat at the hands of those over whom they had once been masters.

Furthermore, they were obliged to look on while all the Peloponnesians, who formerly had followed the lead of Lacedaemon against the rest of the world, united with the Thebans and invaded their territory; and against these the Lacedaemonians were compelled to risk battle, not in the country to save the crops, but in the heart of the city,[*](Epaminondas (see 44 and note) actually entered Sparta. Xen. Hell. 7.5.11.) before the very seat of their government, to save their wives and children—a crisis in which defeat meant instant destruction,

and victory has none the more delivered them from their ills; nay, they are now warred upon by their neighbors[*](The Argives and the Messenians were allied with Philip against Sparta. See Dem. 6.9, 15.); they are distrusted by all the Peloponnesians[*](Besides the Argives and Messenians, also the Arcadians, the Megalopolitans, the Eleans, and the Sicyonians. Dio. Sic. 16.39.); they are hated by most of the Hellenes[*](Especially by the Athenians and the Thebans. Dem. 16.22-23.); they are harried and plundered day and night by their own serfs[*](The Helots.); and not a day passes that they do not have to take the field or fight against some force or other, or march to the rescue of their perishing comrades.

But the worst of their afflictions is that they live in continual fear that the Thebans may patch up their quarrel with the Phocians[*](Thebes was the principal enemy of the Phocians in the Sacred War, which was now drawing to a close. For this war see Grote, Hist. xi. p. 45.) and, returning again,[*](As in the campaign referred to in 44, which ended with the battle of Mantinea.) ring them about with still greater calamities than have befallen them in the past. How, then, can we refuse to believe that people so hard pressed would gladly see at the head of a movement for peace a man who commands confidence and has the power to put an end to the wars in which they are involved?

Now as to the Argives, you will see that in some respects they are no better off than the Lacedaemonians, while in others their condition is worse; for they have been in a state of war with their neighbors[*](The Spartans.) from the day they founded their city, just as have the Lacedaemonians; but there is this difference, that the neighbors of the Lacedaemonians are weaker than they, while those of the Argives are stronger—a condition which all would admit to be the greatest of misfortunes. And so unsuccessful are they in their warfare that hardly a year passes that they are not compelled to witness their own territory being ravaged and laid waste.[*](This was done by the Spartans six years before this. Dio. Sic. 16.39.)

But what is most deplorable of all is that, during the intervals when their enemies cease from harrying them, they themselves put to death the most eminent and wealthy of their citizens;[*](The conflict between democracy and oligarchy, which raged with varying intensity in most of the Greek cities, in Argos was most bitter. In 371 B.C. occurred a massacre in which twelve hundred of the leading men were slain by the mob. Dio. Sic. 15.57-58; Grote, Hist. ix. p. 417.) and they have more pleasure in doing this than any other people have in slaying their foes. The cause of their living in such disorder is none other than the state of war; and if you can put a stop to this, you will not only deliver them from these evils but you will cause them to adopt a better policy with respect to their other interests as well.

And as for the condition of the Thebans, surely you have not failed to note that also. They won a splendid victory[*](Battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.) and covered themselves with glory, but because they did not make good use of their success they are now in no better case than those who have suffered defeat and failure. For no sooner had they triumphed over their foes than, neglecting everything else, they began to annoy the cities of the Peloponnese;[*](Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese in 369, 368, 366, 362, stirring up the cities there against Sparta. Dio. Sic. 15.62-75.) they made bold to reduce Thessaly to subjection;[*](By conquering Alexander of Pherae. Dio. Sic. 15.67.) they threatened their neighbors, the Megarians;[*](The Megarians sided with Sparta when Agesilaus invaded Boeotia in 378. Xen. Hell. 5.4.41.) they robbed our city of a portion of its territory;[*](The border town of Oropus, 366 B.C. Xen. Hell. 7.4.1.) they ravaged Euboea;[*](See Dem. 18.99.) they sent men-of-war to Byzantium,[*](One hundred ships under Epaminondas, 364 B.C. Dio. Sic. 15.78-79.) as if they purposed to rule both land and sea;

and, finally, they began war upon the Phocians,[*](Ten years, 356-346 B.C. See Isoc. 5.50.) expecting that in a short time they would conquer their cities, occupy all the surrounding territory, and prevail over all the treasures at Delphi[*](The Phocians met their expenses in the war from the rich treasures in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi.) by the outlay of their own funds. But none of these hopes has been realized; instead of seizing the cities of the Phocians they have lost cities of their own;[*](Orchomenus, Coroneia, Corsiae. Dio. Sic. 16.33-58.) and now when they invade the enemy's territory they inflict less damage upon them than they suffer when they are retreating to their own country;

for while they are in Phocian territory they succeed in killing a few hireling[*](The Phocian forces were composed mainly of mercenaries.) soldiers who are better off dead than alive, but when they retreat they lose of their own citizens those who are most esteemed and most ready to die for their fatherland. And so completely have their fortunes shifted, that whereas they once hoped that all Hellas would be subject to them, now they rest upon you[*](The war was concluded shortly after this by the intervention of Philip against the Phocians.) the hopes of their own deliverance. Therefore I think that the Thebans also will do with alacrity whatever you command or advise.

It would still remain for me to speak about our city, had she not come to her senses before the others and made peace; but now I need only say this: I think that she will join forces with you in carrying out your policy, especially if she can be made to see that your object is to prepare for the campaign against the barbarians.

That it is not, therefore, impossible for you to bring these cities together, I think has become evident to you from what I have said. But more than that, I believe I can convince you by many examples that it will also be easy for you to do this. For if it can be shown that other men in the past have undertaken enterprises which were not, indeed, more noble or more righteous than that which I have advised, but of greater magnitude and difficulty, and have actually brought them to pass, what ground will be left to my opponents to argue that you will not accomplish the easier task more quickly than other men the harder?

Consider first the exploits of Alcibiades.[*](For the career of the brilliant, unscrupulous Alcibiades see Grote, Hist. vi. pp. 301 ff., vii. 49 ff., and Plut. Alc.) Although he was exiled from Athens[*](He was exiled on the charge of having profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries.) and observed that the others who had before labored under this misfortune had been cowed[*](For example, Themistocles.) because of the greatness of the city, yet he did not show the same submissive spirit as they; on the contrary, convinced that he must attempt to bring about his return by force, he deliberately chose to make war upon her.[*](By stirring up and aiding, through his great personal influence and his sagacity, all the enemies of Athens in the Peloponnesian War.)

Now if one should attempt to speak in detail of the events of that time, he would find it impossible to recount them all exactly, and for the present occasion the recital would perhaps prove wearisome. But so great was the confusion into which he plunged not only Athens but Lacedaemon and all the rest of Hellas as well, that we, the Athenians, suffered what all the world knows;[*](The defeat at Aegospotami, and after that the rule of the “thirty tyrants,” and later the “decarchy.”)

that the rest of the Hellenes fell upon such evil days that even now the calamities engendered in the several states by reason of that war are not yet forgotten;[*](Under the rule of the decarchies described in Isoc. 4.111 ff.) and that the Lacedaemonians, who then appeared to be at the height of their fortune, are reduced to their present state of misfortune,—all on account of Alcibiades.[*](Isocrates does not much exaggerate the mischief he wrought in Greek affairs generally.)