On the Peace

Isocrates

Isocrates. Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, by George Norlin, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1929-1982.

But, heedless of these lessons, those who came after them desired, not to rule but to dominate[*](That is, to rule by consent as against ruling by force—delegated as against irresponsible power. See Isoc. 4.80 ff.)—words which are thought to have the same meaning, although between them there is the utmost difference. For it is the duty of those who rule to make their welfare,[*](Cf. Isoc. Letter 7.4.) whereas it is a habit of those who dominate to provide pleasures for themselves through the labors and hardships of others. But it is in the nature of things that those who attempt a despot's course must encounter the disasters which befall despotic power[*](Described in 111-113.) and be afflicted by the very things which they inflict upon others. And it is just this which has happened in the case of Athens;

for in place of holding the citadels of other states, her people saw the day when the enemy was in possession of the Acropolis[*](A Spartan garrison occupied the Acropolis during the rule of the Thirty.); in place of dragging children from their mothers and fathers and taking them as hostages,[*](This the Athenians did at Samos in 440 B.C. See Thuc. 1.115.) many of her citizens, living in a state of siege, were compelled to educate and support their children with less than was their due; and in place of farming the lands of other states,[*](The reference is to the cleruchies. See 6, note.) for many years[*](From 413 to 404 B.C.) they were denied the opportunity of even setting eyes upon their own fields.

If, therefore, anyone were to ask us whether we should choose to see Athens in such distress as the price of having ruled so long a time,[*](From 478 to 405 B.C.) who could answer yes, except some utterly abandoned wretch who cared not for sacred matters nor for parents nor for children nor for any other thing save for the term of his own existence? We, however, ought not to emulate the judgement of such men but rather that of those who exercise great forethought and are no less jealous for the reputation of the state than for their own—men who prefer a moderate competence with justice to great wealth unjustly gained.

For our ancestors,[*](See Isoc. 8.90.) proving themselves to be men of this character, handed on the city to their descendants in a most prosperous condition and left behind them an imperishable memorial of their virtue. And from this we may easily learn a double lesson: that our soil is able to rear better men than the rest of the world[*](Cf. Isoc. 7.74.) and that what we call empire, though in reality it is misfortune,[*](Cf. Eur. Alc. 802: ou)bi/os a)lhqw=s o( bi/os, a)lla\ sumfora/.) is of a nature to deprave all who have to do with it.

We have a most convincing proof of this. For imperialism worked the ruin not only of Athens but of the city of the Lacedaemonians also, so that those who are in the habit of praising the virtues of Sparta[*](Cf. Isoc. 12.200.) cannot argue that we managed our affairs badly because of our democratic government whereas if the Lacedaemonians had taken over the empire the results would have been happy both for the rest of the Hellenes and for themselves. For this power revealed its nature much more quickly in their case.[*](The Spartan supremacy lasted from 404 to 371; the Athenian from 478 to 405 B.C.) Indeed it brought it to pass that a polity which over a period of seven hundred years[*](From the reign of Eurysthenes and Procles, about 1072, to the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C. For the stability of the Spartan constitution see Isoc. 12.257.) had never, so far as we know, been disturbed by perils or calamities was shaken and all but destroyed in a short space of time.