Archidamus

But bitterest of all will it be for them when they learn that the members of our households have all along been living in comfort and plenty, whereas they will see their own people destitute every day of the necessities of life, and will not be able even to alleviate their distress, but if they till the soil, they will lose both crop and seed, and if they allow it to lie unworked, they will be unable to hold out any time at all.

But perhaps, you will object, they will join forces and with their united armies will follow us up and prevent us from doing them harm. Yet what better thing could we wish than to find close at hand, drawn up in line of battle and encamped against us face to face on the same difficult ground, an undisciplined and motley rabble, serving under many leaders? For there would be need of no great effort on our part; no, we should quickly force them to give battle, choosing the moment propitious for ourselves and not for them.

But the remainder of the day would fail me if I undertook to set forth the advantages we should gain by such a course. This much, at any rate, is clear to all—that we have been superior to all the Hellenes, not because of the size of our city or the number of its inhabitants,[*](Sparta was about six miles in circumference. The number of pure Spartan inhabitants never exceeded 10,000.) but because the government which we have established is like a military camp, well administered and rendering willing obedience to its officers.[*](The whole life of a Spartan youth was supervised by military officers of one sort or another. Those over twenty years of age ate at a common table, or military mess. War was the first and only duty of a Spartan citizen, and obedience more important even than life.) If, then, we shall create in reality that which it has profited us to imitate, there can be no doubt that we shall easily overcome our foes.

We know, moreover, that those who became the founders of this city entered the Peloponnesus with but a small army and yet made themselves masters of many powerful states.[*](For example, of Corinth, Sicyon and Megara.) It were fitting, then, to imitate our forefathers and, by retracing our steps, now that we have stumbled in our course, try to win back the honors and the dominions which were formerly ours.

But, monstrous above all things would be our conduct if, knowing well that the Athenians abandoned their country to preserve the freedom of the Hellenes,[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.96.) we should lack the courage to give up our city even to preserve our own lives, and should refuse, when it behoves us to set the example for others in such deeds, even to imitate the conduct of the Athenians.

Even more should we deserve the ridicule of men if, having before us the example of the Phocaeans who, to escape the tyranny of the Great King, left Asia and founded a new settlement at Massilia,[*](The first party of the Phocaeans left Asia about 524 B.C. Besieged by Harpalus, they swore that never would they return to their city until the iron which they had cast into the sea should rise and float on the water. See Horace, Epode. xvi., and Hdt. 1.165. A second group came to Marseilles later. See Paus. 10.8.4.) we should sink into such abjectness of spirit as to submit to the dictates of those whose masters we have always been throughout our history.

But we must not let our minds dwell on the day when we shall have to send away from us those who are nearest and dearest to us; no, we must at once begin to look forward to that good time when, victorious over our foes, we shall restore our city, bring back our own people, and prove to the world that while we now have experienced reverses unjustly, in times past we justly claimed precedence over all others.

This, then, is how matters stand: I have made this proposal, not with the thought that we must put it into effect forthwith, nor that there is in our circumstances no other means of deliverance, but because I wish to urge your minds to the conviction that we must endure, not only these, but even much worse misfortunes before conceding such terms regarding Messene as are being urged upon us.

I should not so earnestly exhort you to carry on the war if I did not see that the peace resulting from my proposals will be honorable and enduring, while that which would result from the counsel of certain men among you will not only be disgraceful, but will last no time at all. For if we permit the Helots to settle on our borders and allow Messene to flourish undisturbed, who does not know that we shall be involved in constant turmoils and dangers all our lives? Therefore, those who talk about “security” are blind to the fact that they are providing us with peace for a few days only, while contriving a state of war which will never end.

I should like to ask these men in what cause they think we ought to fight and die. Is it not cause enough when the enemy make demands that are contrary to justice, when they cut off a portion of our territory, when they free our slaves and settle them in the land which our fathers bequeathed to us, yes, and not only rob us of our possessions but in addition to all our other miseries involve us in disgrace?

For my part, I think that in such a cause as this we ought to endure, not only war, but even exile and death; for it is far better to end our lives in the possession of the high reputation which we now enjoy than to go on living with the infamy which we shall bring upon ourselves if we do what we are commanded to do. In a word, if I may speak without reserve, it is preferable for us to suffer annihilation, rather than derision, at the hands of our foes. For men who have lived in such high repute and in such pride of spirit must do one of two things—either be first among the Hellenes, or perish utterly, having done no ignominious deed but having brought their lives to an honorable close.